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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of Charles McClung McGhee (1828-1907), a Southern 
capitalist who achieved prominence as a railroad financier after the 
Civil War. Based primarily upon McGhee ' s  personal papers in the McClung 
Historical Collection of Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville , Tennessee , the 
dissertation describes McGhee ' s  transformation from planter to busines s­
man and his rise to power in the affairs of the East Tennessee , Virginia , 
and Georgia Railroad. Having become a provincial magnate by 1886, McGhee 
moved to New York City where he interested himself in the Richmond and 
West Point Terminal Company, a system of railroads which later became 
the Southern Railway Company. His role in the formation and dissolution 
of the Terminal is analyzed and evaluated. As a New York financier Mc­
Ghee made a number of investments ,  notably in the American Cattle Trust 
and Western Union Beef Company in the West and in the Roane Iron, Coal 
Creek Mining and Manufacturing, Lenoir City, and Nashville Street Railway 
companies in his native Tennessee . The history of  his involvement in 
these enterprises is examined in detail.  Although the study is essenti­
ally an analysis of McGhee ' s  business career, it also deals with his 
political activities and his personal life . 
iv 
PREFACE 
Charles McClung McGhee was not an empire builder, an entrepre­
neurial innovator, or one of the nation' s major financiers . He ranks , 
however, among the most successful Southern businessmen of the latter 
third of the nineteenth century, an era in American history which might 
be called the age of the capitalist . 
Like many of his contemporaries ,  McGhee made his fortune not by 
literally building or managing railroads but in buying and selling them, 
speculating in stock, and shaping the policies of corporations to his own 
ends . In the process of a thirty-year association with the East Tennessee , 
Virginia , and Georgia Railroad he helped put together a regional rail 
system. At the peak of the East Tennessee ' s  corporate life McGhee moved 
to New York and participated in the sale of the controlling interest to 
a mammoth railroad combine , the Richmond and West Point Terminal Company. 
Serving on the boards of both corporations , he and his associates used 
their positions to achieve substantial personal profits , often at the 
expense of the companies which they directed. When the Richmond Terminal 
collapsed in bankruptcy in 1892 , McGhee became co-receiver of the East 
Tennessee but was e�cluded from the Southern Railway Company, built from 
the ruins of the Terminal by J .  P .  Morgan in 1894. Thus as the world of 
business changed,  McGhee became obsolete , a "back number, " as he said, 
in the affairs of great railroad combinations . Yet this obsolescence 
does not lessen his leading role in making these changes possible . 
Despite his many opportunistic business decisions , McGhee was 
sincerely devoted to the economic development of his native Tennessee , 
v 
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investing heavily in, and drawing Northern capital to , a variety of  enter­
prises there--among them the Roane Iron, Coal Creek Mining and Manu­
facturing, Lenoir City, and Nashville Street Railway companies . Another 
significant episode in his business career was his involvement in two 
Western cattle companies ,  the American Cattle Trust and the Western Union 
Beef Company. 
The purpose of this study is to show how a Southerner, born to 
wealth in land and slaves ,  made a fortune from the industrial revolution 
and established himself as a financier in New York City. It is intended 
to recount how he accumulated, invested, and spent his money. An attempt 
is made to illustrate the working of nineteenth century business and 
finance and to analyze the relationship of the financier to the social 
and political world about him. Finally, it is hoped that the character 
and personality of the subject will be understood ; that McGhee ' s  virtues 
and vices ,  his objectives and accomplishments will be as fascinating to 
the reader as they have become to the writer. 
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THE EARLY CAREER OF A FINANCIER 
Rising among the high mountains of southwestern North Carolina , 
the Little Tennessee River (once called the Tennessee , thus giving its 
name to a state ) flows toward the west and creates a beautiful valley 
l at the foot of the Great Smoky range . Though Charles McClung McGhee 
is considered a Knoxvillian, it was in Monroe County in the valley of  
the green and winding Little Tennessee that he was born on January 28 , 
1828 . His maternal ancestors , the McClungs and the Whites ,  were lead-
ing citizens in Knoxville , which they had founded almost forty years 
2 before . Of his paternal ancestry less is known. Charles '  grand-
parents ,  Barclay and Jane McClanahan McGhee , are thought to have emi-
grated from Pennsylvania to what is now Blount County, Tennessee , 
about 1787 .  They probably came with friends and relatives , part of 
the great tide of Scotch-Irish immigration which flowed into the Old 
Southwest after the American Revolution. In 1788 Charles '  father, 
John, was born in or near the site of the present town of Maryville , 
1Early traders among the Cherokee Indians called the stream 
Tenase , or Tennessee , after one of the Indian towns on its banks . 
For a description of the changing nomenclature of the Tennessee River,  
see James R.  Montgomery, "The Nomenclature of the Upper Tennessee 
River, " East Tennessee Historical Society ' s Publications , No . 28 
(1956 ) ,  46-57 . 
2McGhee 1 s  son-in-law, Calvin Morgan McClung, was a diligent 
genealogist . Information about McGhee ' s  ancestry is largely drawn 
from a manuscript compiled by McClung, entitled "McGhee Family," 
McClung Historical Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville , 
Tennessee . 
l 
some eighteen miles south of Knoxville . 3 
The area was on the ultimate fringe of white civilization. 
Within a few miles of John McGhee ' s  probable birthplace was soon to 
run the line designated by the Treaty of the Holston of 1791 and sur-
veyed in 1792 between the lands open to white settlement and the 
tribal lands of the Cherokees . Five years after that first survey, 
so many whites were found to the south of the boundary in Indian 
territory that a new line was run in 1797 . The Tennessee frontier was 
in turmoil during the 1790 ' s , and the United States maintained several 
military posts at the edge of the Cherokee lands . 4 Meanwhile , Barclay 
McGhee and his three sons became merchants and seem to have prospered. 
Barclay is known to have done considerable business with the United 
States government in the supplying of the garrison at Tellico in 1797-
98 • .5 When he died in 1819, he was referred to as "Barkley [ sic ] Me-
Ghee , Esq. , late a contractor in the United States Army, a useful mem­
ber of society and a man of unblemished integrity. "6 
By 1820 , when he married Betsy McClung, John McGhee was 32 years 
old. A family legend relates that he had first seen his future wife in 
2 
181.5 , when she was only twelve , that he instantly fell in love with her, 
and had to wait five years before he could marry her. Besides being 
3Ibid. 
4stanley J. Folmsbee ,  Robert E.  Corlew, and Enoch L.  Mitchell , 
Histo!l of Tennessee (4 vols . ;  New York : Lewis Publishing Co . ,  1960 ) ,  
I ,  194- 20) . 
Snavid Henley, "Wastebook, " typescript in McClung Historical 
Collection. 
6Knoxville Register, August 31 , 1819.  
3 
young and presumably pretty, Betsy had much to recommend her to a mature 
bachelor. Her grandfather, General James White , was a great landowner, 
the founder of Knoxville , and a man heavy with public honors and offices .  
After building a small fort below the confluence of  the French Broad and 
Holston rivers in 1786 , the Revolutionary War officer had fallen in with 
William Blount , who later became governor of the Southwest Territory, an 
area coterminous with the present state of Tennessee . Blount made White ' s  
Fort , soon renamed Knoxville in honor of Henry Knox, secretary of war ,  
the capital of that federal territory. Thus the prosperity of White ' s  
new town was assured. 7 Betsy' s father, Charles McClung, a recent immi-
grant to the territory from Pennsylvania ,  married White ' s  daughter, 
Margaret ,  laid off the streets of the town, and later participated, 
along with Blount and others , in drafting Tennessee ' s  first constitu-
tion--of 1796 . Surveyor, public official , and merchant , Colonel Me-
Clung in 1805 retired to a country seat , "States View, " ten miles west 
of Knoxville . Like his father-in-law, he was one of the most wealthy 
and distinguished men of the state. 8 
John McGhee , who was known as a "merchant of Maryville" at the 
time of his marriage , soon became a planter as well and began to acquire 
lands which were to be his great domain on the Little Tennessee . 9 By 
7Mary U. Rothrock (ed. ) ,  The French Broad-Holston Count;r: A 
History of Knox County, Tennesse�Knoxville : East Tennessee Historical 
Society, 1946) ,  503-5 . 
8Ibid. , 446-47 . 
9Knoxville Register, September 19 , 1820 . 
Calhoun' s  Treaty of 1819 a substantial territory between the Little 
Tennessee and Hiwassee rivers was opened to settlement by whites ,  but 
a number of tracts were reserved to the Cherokee inhabitants , 10 and 
4 
it was from these Indians that John McGhee and others acquired some of 
the choice bottom lands in this fertile river valley. 11 A persistent 
family tradition describes one such transaction. According to the 
story, a well-to-do Indian, sometimes called a chief, approached Me-
Ghee and described to him a dream in which the white man had given his 
Indian neighbor a fine rifle. Such a dream, the Indian explained, 
must at all costs be fulfilled. McGhee ,  it is said , obliged and gave 
the Cherokee the rifle . Several weeks later, McGhee told the Indian 
about one of his own dreams in which the red man had given his white 
friend a large and valuable island in the river. The outwitted Indian 
accepted his loss and closed the contest , remarking, "white man and 
Indian dream no more . 1112 :By dream or by purchase McGhee accumulated 
thousands of acres ,  and in 1823 he and his wife settled on his bur­
geoning plantation. 13 Included in the McGhee holding, which lay on 
10 Folmsbee , History of Tennessee , I ,  273 . 
1� transfers of land from Cherokee Indians to John McGhee 
are recorded in Monroe County deed books ; see Reba Bayless :Boyer 
( comp . ) ,  Monroe County, Tennessee Records , 1820-1870 ( 2 vols . ; n. p . : 
1969-70) , I ,  88-193 . 
12 As related to the author by John McGhee ' s  great-great-great-
grandson, William Ross McNabb , in an interview, December 8 ,  1972 . A 
slightly different version of this story is told by W. :B .  Lenoir in 
History 2f � Sweetwater Valley (Richmond : Presbyterian Committee of  
Publication, 1916) ,  41-42 . 
l3McGhee is listed for the first time as a resident of Monroe 
County in an 1823 tax list . :Boyer, Monroe County Records , II , 163 . 
both sides of the river, were the sites of the colonial Fort Loudoun 
and the ancient Cherokee town, Tuskegee . Near the latter, John McGhee 
built the house in which Charles McClung McGhee was born, the last of 
John and Betsy ' s five children. 14 
The little boy had a sister, Margaret ,  and a brother, Barclay ; 
two other sisters had died within weeks of their births . When he was 
5 
fourteen months old Charles' mother died ,  the first of a series of per-
sonal tragedies which were to mark his life .  By the time he was seven, 
he and his brother were going to a school at Kingston, Tennessee . 15 
Later they removed to Knoxville , where they lived in the home of Joseph 
Estabrook, the Dartmouth-educated president of East Tennessee Univer-
sity. Here Charles was taught by the president ' s  first wife , Mrs . 
Nancy Dickinson Estabrook, a first cousin of the poetess ,  Emily Dickin-
16 son. The boys ' sister was also away at school , first at Salem, North 
Carolina , and later in Hartford, Connecticut.17 A letter from her, 
written in 1837 ,  illuminates to some degree the pathos of the children's 
lives : 
Nothing would gratify me more than to spend the coming summer 
at home with father, but I am very happy here & ought not to wish 
l4Zella Armstrong, Notable Southern Families (6 vols . ; Chattanooga : 
Lookout Publishing Co. , 1918-33}, I ,  l47-lt9 ; William McClung, The McClung Genealogy (Pittsburgh : McClung Printing Co. , 1904) ,  33-34. 
l5Margaret W. McGhee to John McGhee;-November 9 , 1835 , Niles Family Papers , McClung Histo rical Collection. 
16Jay Leda , The Years and Hours of Emily Dickinson (2 vols . ; New 
Haven : Yale University Pres�, 1960) , I ,  xxxvi-xxxv�i ; Rothrock, French 
Broad-Holston Country, 411 , 415. 
l7Armstrong, Notable Southern Families ,  I ,  148 .  
for any thing, five or six months is all that I have yet to 
spend from home. When I return I hope to add much to our 
dear father's happiness, at least, I will endeavor to do so. 
How happy I will be when we are again united as a family, 
down at home. 
Then she added a postscript to the younger brother: 
My dear Charles I think it is nearly time for you to answer 
sister's letters. Don't you think so? Write anything about 
your plays, your walks, your visits, & & everything which 
concerns you, sister will be glad to hear. How do you like 
the little book I sent you by Mr. Dickinson? Have you read 
it all through? Be a good boy, do every thing which you 
are told & then Mrs Estabrook will love· you. God bless you--
Good bye. l8 Margaret 
In 1841 Charles entered the preparatory department of East 
Tennessee University and two years later was admitted to the fresh­
man class.19 While preparing for the University, he lived with one 
of Knoxville's most remarkable women, Mrs. Margaret Christian Russell 
Cowan Humes Ramsey, known to generations of her many descendants as 
"Grandmother Ramsey." Thrice widowed and bearing each of her husbands 
a posthumous child, Mrs. Ramsey was the mother of rm:omas Wil�iam Humes, 
clergyman, university president, historian, librarian, and a staunch 
Unionist. One of her stepsons was James G. M. Ramsey, a physician, 
historian, and devoted Confederate. The only female among the incor-
6 
porators of the Knoxville Library Company in 1817, Margaret had a mag­
netic personality and a keen intellect.20 Together with Mrs. Estabrook, 
18 Margaret W. McGhee to Barclay McGhee, March 30, 1837, Niles 
Family Papers. 
l9East Tennessee University, Catalogue, 1841, 1842, 1843 (Knox­
ville, 1841-43 ). 
20 Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 471-72. 
7 
she may have exerted a strong and benevolent influence on the childhood 
and adolescence of Charles McGhee. 
The East Tennessee University from which he graduated in 1846 
professed to offer "a thorough and extended course of st-q.dy," which 
would allow its students to "qualify themselves for the learned pro­
fessions.1121 There is no indication that McGhee ever intended to pur-
sue law, medicine, theology, or any other "learned profession," but it 
is evident that he took the cour:ses of the University's "Classical De-
partment," for the "English and Scientific Department," which gave no 
degrees, was not established until he was almost ready to graduate. 
Thus he studied Greek and Latin, as well as mathematics, moral and 
natural philosophy, history, English grammar, and logic, with a smat-
te;ring of courses in such subjects as French, political economy, unit 
. . d hit t 22 eng1neer1ng, an arc ec ure. During his years there, the Univer-
sity was in one of its more flouri:shing periods. Though distracted 
by recurring controversies among the three leading religious denomi� 
ations, Presbyterian, Methodist, and :Baptist, the institution did not 
suffer in the 1840's from the extent of bitter sectarianism, declining 
enrollment, and financial impoverishment which almost wrecked it dur­
ing the following decade.23 Under the leadership of Joseph Estabrook, 
21East Tennessee University, Catalogue, 1842, p. 15. In ibid., 
1846-47, p. 8, he is listed as a member of the class of 1846. 
22
�., 1844, pp. 13-15. 
23stan1ey J. Folmsbee, East Tennessee Unive:rsit)' l840-l.§.1.2., 
�University of �ennessee Record, LXII, 3 (May, 1959 , 3-29. 
in 
8 
who had taught at Amherst, the University was consciously modeled after 
New England institutions of higher education. Estabrook brought to 
Knoxville several Amherst graduates, including Horace Maynard, later 
a congressman and postmaster general, who was a tutor and later in-
structor of'mathematics .  Maynard ' s successor and McGhee ' s  mathematics 
instructor was Albert Miller Lea, a Tennessee-born West Point gradu-
ate, engineer, explorer, and acting !secretary of war under John 
Tyler. 24 In view of his later interest in the University and his long 
service on its board of trustees, McGhee must have had a successful 
and satisfying· undergraduate career. If his formal education did not 
especially fit him for a life in business and finance, the same could 
be said of most of his contemporaries .  But even the liberal arts 
education at a small Southern university gave him a polish and at 
least a pretense to learning which many of the millionaires of the 
gilded age lacked. 25 
'Charles was eighteen when he graduated from the University, a 
young man of  fortune and excellent prospects . During the next year he 
may have travelled, perhaps taking something like a "grand tour" and 
seeing the world beyond Tennessee, or he may have returned to his 
father' s plantation and begun to learn how to manage the estate . In 
the summer of 1847 he married his second cousin, Isabella McNutt White, 
24Ibid . ,  9-12, 33, 35 ; George Frederick Mellen, "Joseph Esta­
brook," in ibid . ,  II (Jul;y; 1899 ), 165-84. 
25Thomas C .  Cochran, Railroad Leaders, �-1890 ; The Business 
Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1953), 29 . 
9 
another of  the ubiquitous descendants of General James White . Isabella ' s  
father, Hugh Andrew May White ,  was the cashi�r of the Union Bank in Knox­
ville . Her mother, Elizabeth Humes White , was a daughter of "Grand-
mother Ramsey, " whose son Andrew Russell Humes ,  had married Charles '  
sister Margaret in 1840. 26 Charles and Isabella would have known each 
other from childhood, and the union of cousins probably followed natu-
rally from these ties of family. Eleven months after their marriage , 
Isabella had a son, whom the parents named John for his grandfather. A 
few days later Isabella died ,  and in August ,  1849 , the little boy died 
too . 27 Thus at twenty-one McGhee had lost mother, wife , and son, and 
now began what must have been the darkest moments of his life . 
Years later he wrote a daughter who was suffering through a period 
f d . that h had d . "1 . 28 o epress1on e un ergone a s1m1 ar exper1ence . It may be 
surmised that this occurred after the tragedies which beset his early 
manhood, and indeed it is likely that until his second marriage :41 1857 
Charles McGhee led a sad and lonely life punctuated by the wild escapade� 
which are sometimes the product of despair. A solitary glimpse of him 
during this period is given by William G.  Brownlow in a letter29 o f  
October JO, 1852 , t o  Thomas A .  R. Nelson. Brownlow had attended a 
speaking and ��rbecue at Maryville at which he had stated his reasons 
26 McClung, "McGhee Family. " 
27Ibid. 
28 McGhee to Annie McGhee McClung, March 28 , 1898 , McClung Family 
Papers , McClung Historical Collection. 
29In the Thomas A. R. Nelson Papers , McClung Historical Collec-
tion. 
10 
for not supporting General Winfield Scott, the Whig candidate for presi-
dent in that year's election, in contrast to the pro-Scott speeches of 
Gustavus A. Henry and John Netherland, leading Whig politicians in the 
state. After describing the meeting, Brownlow reported the following 
incident: 
After speaking, late, Charley McGhee, who was taking his liquor 
rather freely, had come up with a buggy, with a top to it, one 
common seat, and two fine horses, to take Henry to the Barbeque 
at Calhoun, and started at 5 o'clock, taking both Henry and 
Netherland in it, and, as I am told, a bottle of liquor. Henry 
had taken a full tumbler of Brandy, before he got in--Nether­
laud drank none. Three miles this side of McGhee's Ferry, in 
the night, they £E-set, driving rapidly--broke the Buggy to 
pieces--dragged a part of it over Henry's leg, and, hurt him 
badly. Netherland was so badly injured, as to be put to bed. 
McGhee's negro came back to this town, got here at 2 o'clock 
this morning, and came for McCarty, of Hawkins, to go on down 
there for Netherland. McCarty and Netherland had come here 
in a Barouche, drawn by two mules. McCarty had gone down • • .  
the Nigro [sic] brought a verbal message, and awoke us all by 
hollowing us up. I give you the case as I have received it, 
and as an item of news, not vouching for the correctness of 
any thing, except that the accident did occur, and the parties 
are hurt. 
From this we may infer two things : first, that McGhee was a Whig, 
and second, that he was inclining to a dissolute and dangerous way of 
life. The last probable restraint upon him had been removed when his 
father died in 18)1, leaving a fortune to each of his three children. 
Charles inherited several thousand acres of land, twenty-nine slaves, 
five thousand dollars in cash and two thousand dollars worth of stocks, 
a total inheritance of at least fifty thousand dollars.JO It would 
have been a familiar story if he had squandered his fortune and drunk 
JOWill of John McGhee, typescript in McClung, "McGhee Family." 
ll 
himself into an early grave. Instead, he began a new life in 1857 when 
he married his first wife ' s sister, Cornelia Humes White.3l On what is 
surely one of the most beautiful situations in East Tennessee he built 
a large brick Gothic-revival bungalow. From its long windows framed in 
marble McGhee could look over fertile bottom lands and islands and up 
the lovely Little Tennessee River toward a spectacular view of the 
Great Smoky Mountains. Much of what he could see belonged to him or 
to his relatives , and in this idyllic setting Charles McGhee settled 
down as a planter, justice of the peace ,  and family man.32 
Across the river from his house McGhee and his sister built an 
Episcopalian chapel which they called Saint Andrew' s  Riverside. "The 
church, "  according to the historian of the diocese, "was a beautiful 
edifice, built of brick with marble trimmings,  stained glass windows , 
oak ceiling and elegant furniture, costing in all over $4, 000.1133 Com-
plementing the chapel were a rectory and a school for girls , called 
Riverside Hall. Though Saint Andrew' s  testified to the piety and benevo-
lence of the McGhee ' s , it seems to have been a particular interest of 
Joseph Warren Jenkins Niles , the second husband of Charles ' sister 
Margaret. A ''high" churchman at a time when the Diocese of Tennessee 
was decidedly "low, " Niles collided with Bishop James H. Otey over the 
3�cClung, McClung Genealogy, 33-34. 
3�cGhee is listed as a justice of the peace perfonning several 
marriages ,  1857-60. Boyer, Monroe County Records , I ,  40, 47 ,  52. 
McGhee ' s  house still stands on a knoll near the junction of the Tellico 
and Little Tennessee rivers in Monroe County. 
33Arthur Howard Noll, History of the Church in the Diocese of 
Tennessee (New York: James Pott and Co.:-1900) , llSo - -
12 
consecrati·on of Saint Andrew ' s . The Bishop insisted upon the removal of  
wooden candlesticks and a cross from the communion table , evidences of 
"Romeward" tendencies .  When Niles balked at this , McGhee acted as con-
ciliator and attempted to reconcile him to the removal of the offending 
appointments .  Saint Andrew ' s  was consecrated, but , perhaps because of 
Niles ' bitterness,  the church and school did not prosper. During the 
Civil War the chapel fell into disrepair, and in a few years nothing 
was left but a cornerstone which now rests on the nearby McGhee burial 
plot . 34 
By 1860 McGhee ' s  property consisted of real estate valued at 
$50,000 and personal property worth $85,000. Besides himself, his wife , 
and two daUghters ,  there were living on the plantation an overseer, 
three white seamstresses ,  several white laborers , and sixty slaves . 35 
Such an establishment was exceptional , especially in East Tennessee . 
In the entire state fewer than four hundred people owned more than fifty 
slaves each, and there were only one hundred and fifty-eight plantations 
consisting of 1,000 acres or more in Tennessee . 36 
How this particular member of the privileged caste of the old 
South reacted to the disruption of the Union is quite clear. McGhee was 
34william Mercer Green, Memoir of Rt. Rev. James Hervey Ote}' LL.D., 
the First Bishop of Tennessee (New York: -yames Pott and do . , 1885 , 66-
67 . See also James Hervey Otey manuscript diary, August 7 , 8, and 9, 
1857, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. · 
35united States , Bureau of  the Census , Eighth Census , 1860, Popu­
lation (Tennessee , Monroe County) , population schedule , 211, slave 
schedule , 295. 
36Mary Emily Robertson Campbell , The Attitude of Tennesseans Toward 
the Union, �-1861 (New York : Vantage Press ,  1961), 14-19, 24. 
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one of a number of signers of a letter to T. A. R. Nelson in September, 
1860, urging that leading Whig to answer publicly the "pernicious and 
revolutionary" speech of the arch secessionist, William Lowndes Yancey, 
in Knoxville.37 Like many East Tennesseans, McGhee evidently resisted 
the idea of secession at first, but when the state seceded in June, 
1861, he became a loyal Confederate. At any rate, the Athens Post of 
July 5, 1861, reported the formation of a Confederate cavalry company 
in Monroe County, which was called the "McGhee Invincibles" in honor 
38 of C. M. McGhee, Esq. 
It was probably about this time that McGhee moved to Knoxville, 
where he went into business as a meat packer. "Hogs ' Heads! Hogs ' 
Heads!" read an advertisement in the Knoxville Daily Register on 
December 20, 1861, which proclaimed that the poor of the city could 
have them free upon application at the Pork House of C .  M. McGhee & 
Co. at the foot of Gay Street. Though he was giving away the heads 
to the poor and the livers to soldiers, McGhee seems to have found a 
more lucrative market for the rest of his pork--the Confederacy, which 
suffered from a severe meat deficit . With its midwestern sources cut 
off by secession, it depended largely on Kentucky and Tennessee for its 
chief supplies of meat.39 Knoxville, occupying a strategic location 
37Knoxville Whig, August 10, 1861, quoting a letter to Nelson 
of September 18, 1860. 
38Athens Post, July 5, 1861, cited in Boyer, Monroe County 
Records, II, 185:---
39� War of � Rebellion: A Compilation of � 0fficial Records 
of� Union� Confederate Armies \)o vols. in 128; Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 4, Vol.  I, 869-79· 
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astride a major rail line across the Confederacy, was a natural loca-
tion for the pork packing plant operated by McGhee. It has often been 
said that McGhee was a colonel in the Confederate commissariat during 
the war,4° but it has so far been impossible to find any record of 
such a commission in the Confederate army. More probably the title 
"colonel" was bestowed upon him by the governor of Tennessee and did 
not signify true military rank .  
During this period he formed a friendship with Richard T. Wilson, 
a man whose career was to be closely linked with McGhee's for many years. 
Wilson held a commission as a major in the Confederate Department of 
Commissary and Subsistence, and, besides being involved in meat pack-
ing projects in Nashville and Loudon, was in 1862 and 1863 the agent 
in charge of purchasing hogs in East Tennessee and southwestern Vir­
ginia. 4l Born in poverty on a north Georgia farm, Wilson became a 
salesman, married Melissa Johnson of Loudon, and did well during the 
Civil War. In New York after the war he founded a private banking house 
and joined McGhee in obtaining a controlling interest in the East Tennes-
see, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad. By 1895, when his daughter married 
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Wilson's estimated worth was $15,000,000.42 
4°Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Count;y, 448. His name, however, does not appear in Tennesseans in the Civil War, published by the Civil 
War Centennial Commission (Nashville, 1964).---
410. R·, Ser. 4, Vol. I, 879; Knoxville Daily Register, December 25, l862.-
42cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., Queen of the Golden�'� Fabulous 
Sto;y of� Wilson Vanderbilt (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956), _ 
21-27. 
His own lack of military rank notwithstanding, McGhee was con-
sidered a warm supporter of the Southern cause. In January, 1863, the 
Knoxville Daily Register, the chief Confederate organ in East Tennessee, 
endorsed him for mayor: 
Knoxville .. is one of the most important military posts in the 
Southern Confederacy. It has been cursed with Unionism; but 
that has "played out." There is today no Unionism in East 
[Tennessee] but its bastard and most malignant offspring 
"NEUTRALITY" has succeeded it. Let our ci t,izens show today 
that they consider the offspring more odious than honest 
enmity. Let them Vote for the ticket we present at the head 
of our columns. Col. McGhee is a staunch and unequivocal 
Southern man, and will not only make an efficient Mayor, but 
we understand that he will devote the salary of the office to 
the relief of the destitute families of soldiers and the poor 
of Knoxville.43 
But the Register's entreaties were apparently ignored, and McGhee was 
defeated in one of his few races for office. Perhaps it was just as well, 
for before the year was out, Knoxville had fallen to the Union army.44 
McGhee remained in the occupied city and, nervously perhaps, 
tJ� 1 faced an certain future. The Register, which was now being published in 
f\ 
Atlanta, reported that he and other prominent citizens had been unjustly 
accused of taking the Federal oath of allegiance. "None of these men," 
it remarked, "have stained: their souls with perjury.''4S In fact, it was 
some five months after the capture of the city that he submitted to the 
4�oxville Daily Register, January J, l86J. 
�eturns from the election are unavailable. J. C. Luttrell, 
McGhee's opponent, is recorded as mayor of Knoxville, 1859-1868. William 
Rule ( ed. ) , Standard History of Knoxville (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co. , 
1900), 124-25, l62-6J. 
45.Daily Register, October 27, 1863. 
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oath.46 Meantime, however, he may have been ready to do business with 
the Federals. General Burnside's Commissary Department decided to pack 
its own pork in Knoxville and advertised for local parties to do the 
slaughtering. The historian of this __ packing project has written: 
Only one Knoxville po� packer responded the the advertisement 
and his offer was high: 52 pounds of po� to 100 pounds of 
pig, the government fuxnishing both salt and barrels. Worse, 
Burnside 1 s headquarters heard that this Knoxville porkma.n had 
packed hogs for the Confederates in 1862.47 
The combination of the high price and the packer's record made the army 
decide to pack its own pork. It is likely, however, that the man in 
question was McGhee, since his was the only pork packing house in town.48 
If he did not do as well during the war as his friend Wilson did, 
McGhee emerged from it with his fortune roughly intact. He had lost 
his slaves, but he still owned his valuable Monroe County plantation. 
He must have had a substantial amount of cash, because in 1865 he was 
one of the founders and the first president of the People's Bank of Knox­
ville.49 With Columbus Powell of Knoxville and one I. F. Green of 
Brooklyn, New York, McGhee organized a b�ing and commission business 
which began operations at New York City in the fall of 1865 as C. Powell, 
46Brownlow1s Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator, February 6, 
1864. Cited hereafter as Whig. 
47Palmer H. Boeger, "General Burnside's Knoxville Packing Project," 
East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 35 (1963 ), 77, 
citing Records of the Commissary General in the National Archives, 
Washington, D. C. 
48Ibid., 76. The National Archives is unahle to locate the 
letter which might positively identify the Knoxville packer. 
49Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 253. 
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Green & Co.5° Soon he would be involved in the affairs of the several 
railroads from which he would make a great fortune. At thirty-seven 
he was ready for the second stage of his life. Personal tragedy had 
seasoned him, and in the convulsions of civil war he had learned how 
to land on his feet. His business and political activities during 
the era of reconstruction in Tennessee would reveal the shrewdness 
of character which made him a success in a ruthless and troubled time. 
5°Tennessee General Assembl7, The State Debt: Report of the 
Committee Appointed to Investigate It, in Appendix to the House 
Journal, 1879, pp. 126-27. Cited hereafter as The State �· 
CBAPrER II 
THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS : McGHEE, MABRY, 
ANn THE KNOXVILLE ANn KENTUCKY RAILROAD 
l. 
., 
At the end of the Civil War the city of Kno�ille was on the 
l threshold of a period of rapid growth. Built at a strategic point near 
the junction of the French Broad and Holston rivers, which drain much of 
East Tennessee, the city enjoyed an early prominence as the capital of 
the Territory of the United States, South of the River Ohio, and until 
1817, as the capital of the state of Tennessee.2 Because of its loca-
tion and its initial political importance, Knoxville became the commer-
cial and cultural capital of East Tennessee, a distinction which remained 
even after the state's seat of government and center of population moved 
far to the west across the Cumberland Mountains. Knoxville's merchants 
hauled goods by wagon from Philadelphia and Baltimore; from their stores 
along Gay Street, named for a familiar thoroughfare in the latter city, 
they distributed manufactured products through the villages of the over­
whelmingly rural area.3 
1The population of Knoxville in 1860 was 5, 300; in 1870 it had 
grown to 8, 682, and by 1890 it was 22,253. After the turn of the century 
the growth rate declined and has never matched the increase of the thirty 
years after the Civil War. 
2 Folmsbee, HistoEY of Tennessee, I, 304-5. 
3Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 92. 
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East Tennessee f�om early times was recognized as a distinct 
region within the state. 4 Isolated by mountain barriers from the west-
ern two-thirds of Tennessee, as well as from the south Atlantic seaboard 
and the Ohio valley, the area developed a diversified farming and small 
manufacturing economy which was different from that of the more typically 
"Southern," slave-owning, and staple-raising Middle and West Tennessee. 
Binding these three regions of the state together was the Tennessee River ., 
which drained the eastern portion and, after looping into northern Ala-
bama, flowed northward across the width of Tennessee to the Ohio. The 
great river linked East Tennessee to its sister regions and was a highway 
to the Mississippi and ultimately tq New Orleans, although the great 
Muscle Shoals in Alabama was a serious bar to navigation.5 In 1828 the 
steamboat Atlas ascended the Tennessee to Knoxville, and the region's 
isolation from the rest of the state and the lower South seemed to be at 
an end.6 For a while advertisements of Huntsville and other Alabama 
business establishments were common in Knoxville newspapers, but in time 
the natural obstacles on the river put an end to the dreams of water 
communication between East Tennessee and the outside world.7 
4Folmsbee, History of Tennessee, I, 5-�. 
5For a discussion of the influence of geography on the histor.y and 
development of Tennessee's sections, see Thomas Perkins Abernethy, � 
Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: ! Study in Frontier Democracy 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932); Stanley John 
Folmsbee, Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845 
(Knoxville: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1939), especially l-19; 
Eric Russell Lacey, Vanquished Volunteers: East Tennessee Sectionalism 
from Statehood to Secession (Johnson City: East Tennessee ·state Univer­
Sity Press, 19�. 
6 Folmsbee, Sectionalism and Internal Improvements, ll-14. 
7Knoxville Register, 1820-32. 
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The railroad soon replaced the riverboat as the vehicle of East 
Tennessee's hopes for breaking its isolation.8 Conventions of railroad 
enthusiasts were held in Knoxville in ;1..831 and 1836, and in the latter 
year Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina "published the Banne" for the 
marriage of the South and West, a marriage to be consummated by the 
construction of a Charleston to Cincinnati railroad running through 
Knoxville. The �omewhat differen� vision of John C. Calhoun and the 
fo�idable barrier of the Appalachian mountains delayed for fifty years 
the realization of Hayne's dream. 9 
Meanwhile, two railroads, the �st Tennessee and Virginia and the 
East Tennessee and Georgia, were built through the relatively narrow and 
level Tennessee valley above and below Knoxville. On the eve of tne 
Civil War these roads which joined at Knoxville linked the city to Bris-
tol, Tennessee-Virginia, and to Dalton, Georgia. From these points con-
necting roads ran on to Washington, D. C. and New York City and to 
Atlanta, Memphis, and New Orleans. Thus at the end of the antebellum 
period Knoxville and East Tennessee had connections to the north and 
10 south. How these connections might have changed the economy of the 
region, had not war inte+Vened, is impossible to determine. 
8Folmsbee, Sectionalism � Internal Improvements, 85-91. 
9Ibid., 132-36; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips,! History £i Transporta­
tion in� Eastern Cotton� to 1860 (New York: Columbia University 
l'ress, 1908), 182-220, 375-80. 
10James W. Holland, "The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, 1836-
1860, '' East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 3 (1931), 
89-107 and Holland, "The Building of the East Tennessee and Virginia 
Railroad," ill£·, No. 4 (1932), 83-101. 
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As a result of the Civil War Knoxville was again t�st forward 
as a city of political importance. East Tennes�ee w�s the state's Re�ub-
lican stronghold. The Republicans dominated the state from 1864 to 1869, 
and Knoxville, if not the state's capital, was the Republican party's 
capital. Here lived William Gannaway Brownlow, Governor of Tennessee, 
1865-1869, and a number of other Republicans prominent locally or 
nationally. ll 
As early as 1832, rivalries within the Democratic party had pro-
duced a strong anti-Jackson movement which soon developed into the Whig 
party in the state. McGhee's great-uncle, Hugh Lawson White, East 
Tennessee's leading antebellum politician, carried the state in 1836 
against the Democratic presidential nominee, Martin Van Buren. Between 
1840 and 1860 the two parties were almost evenly matched in East Tennes-
see, with both producing strong champions who engaged in bitter politi-
cal combat. Andrew Johnson emerged as the Democrats' leading spokesman 
11The political history of Tennessee in the period 1828-29 is the 
subject of a number of monographs. The principal sources for the follow­
ing discussion are: AbernethY, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee; 
Thomas B. Alexander, Political R;Q00struction in Tennessee (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1950); Alexander, Thomas!· g. Nelson of 
�Tennessee (Nashville: Tennessee Historical Commission, 1956), and 
"Persistent Whiggery in the Confederate South, 1860-77," Journal of 
Southern History, XXVII (1961), 305-29; E. Merton Coulter, William-Q. 
Brownlow: Fighting Parson of the Southern Highlands (Chapel Hill: Uni.,.. 
versity of North Carolina Press, 1937); Verton A. Queener, "The Origin 
of the Republican Party in East Tennessee," East Tennessee Historical 
Society's Publications, No. 13 (1941), 66-90, and "A Decade of East Tennes­
see Republicanism, 1967-1876," ibid., No. 14 (1942), 59-85; Joseph A. 
Sharp, "The Downfall of the Radicals in Tennessee," ibid., No. 5 (1933), 
105-24; Oliver P. Temple, Notable � £! Tennessee from 1§11. to � '  
Their Times and Their Contemporaries (New York: Cosmopolitan Press, 1912). 
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in the 1850 ' s ,  and Brownlow , who published a newspaper, the Knoxville 
Whig, was unmatched for his vituperative defense of the Whig cause. 
While they disagreed about almost everything else, Brownlow and Johnson, 
along with a great majority of East Tennesseans , opposed secession. 
Union Democrats and Union Whigs in East Tennessee made common 
cause against the Confederacy , or tried to remain neutral during the 
war . Alliances strange and wonderful resulted froa the war , as the 
area ' s  politicians jockeyed for position. By 1864 almost the entire 
state was under Federal control , and the Union party of Brownlow and 
Johnson was the only recognized political force in Tennessee. With 
Johnson in Washington as vice president and later as president , Brownlow 
became the indisputable leader of the state ' s  Unionists. Rapidly he 
converted the Union party into a Republican machine. In East Tennessee 
the conversion was es�ecially successful, for a large majority of voters 
became staunch Republicans , and a party ascendancy was established which 
remains to this day. 
In large measure, the program of the Republican party in poet­
bellum Tennessee was shaped by a single objective : the reconstruction 
of politics in such a way that Republican dominance would be guaranteed 
for years to come. Brownlow and his followers sought to accomplish this 
in two ways. First , they rewrote the state ' s  constitution and enacted 
statutes to disfranchise former Confederates and to concentrate con­
siderable police power in the hands of the governor. Thus the natural 
constituency of the Democratic party in Middle and West Tennessee was 
barred from the polls , and, for good measure, the control of election 
23 
and grateful to the Republicans. With a large white Republican majority 
in East Tennessee and thousands of Elack Republican votes in the rest of 
the state, the party seemed assured of control of the state government 
in the foreseeable future. 
The second part of the Republican program was based on the strong 
antebellum Whig tradition of encouragement to business and internal im-
provements. The Brownlow regime would actively seek immigrants from out­
side the state. 13 It would attempt to lure capital investment to develop 
the state's resources, and it would sponsor state aid to railroads. The 
resulting prosperity, it was hoped, would redound to the benefit of the 
party which had so wisely encouraged it, and the Republicans would emerge 
not only as th� party of the Union but also as the creators of a truly 
reconstructed and 'revived Tennessee. 
All of this seemed possible and plausible in 1865, and prudent 
businessmen scrambled to assure their places in the new order. Some ex-
Confederates, or men who had co-operated with the Confederacy, sought 
favor with Brownlow, and the governor in turn welcomed men of capital 
into the forgiving arms of his party . "General" Joseph A. Mabry, of 
Knoxville, who had once offered to outfit a company of Confederate 
12 Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 18-32, 39-44, 73-77, 110-11. 
13william E. Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpetbaggers," 
East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, No. 4 (1932), 102-15 . 
volunteers in gray cassimere , 14 was described in 1865 by Brownlow's 
Whig as "one of the most successful business men in East Tennessee , 
having by his industry and prompt attention to business accumulated a 
large fortune. 1115 When Charles McGhee was elected president of the 
Knoxville and Kentucky Railroad in the spring of 1866 , his succession 
24 
was praised by the Whig: "No better man • • • could have been selected 
to look after the interests of the stockholders and to push the work 
rapidly forward. 1116 
2. 
The Knoxville and Kentucky, which came under McGhee's management 
in the spring of 1866 , was one of the four railroads radiiting from the 
city. The East Tennessee and Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia 
had been completed before the war , and they provided a �oute through 
Knoxville from the Northeast to the Mississippi. The Knoxville and 
Kentucky and the Knoxville and Charleston had been projected as the links 
in a similar route from the Ohi0 valley to the South Atlantic coast. Be-
cause of the formidable mountain barriers which the latter two roads 
would have to cross , their construction had lagged , and at the outbreak 
of the Civil War neither extended more than a few miles north and south 
of the city . 17 
14aothrock , French Broad-Holston Country, 130 .  
l5Whig, December 29 , 1865. 16Ibid. , March 28 , 1866. 
l7 James W. Holland , "A History of Railroad Enterprise in East 
Tennessee , 1836-1860" (unpublished Master's thesis , The University of 
Tennessee,  Knoxville , 1934) ,  66 , 81-82. 
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Before the war ended Knoxville ' s  hopes were raised by Abraham 
Lincoln's proposal for a military railroad from Kentucky and the Ohio 
into the South . In March , 1864 , after the city was once more in Union 
hands , the Knoxville and Kentucky was reorganized for the purpose of 
pushing the road through .18 Although the proposed military road never 
received the support of Congress , 19 a new stimulus for the Knoxville 
and Kentucky was found in the railroad building plans of the city of 
Cincinnati . Immediately after the war the "Queen City of the West" 
determined to construct a railroad line which would provide direct 
access to the South . 20 
At about the same time that Cincinnatians held a public meeting 
to get the Cincinnati Southern under way , 21 C .  M. McGhee was e�ected 
president of the Knoxville and Kentucky . "He is a man of energy, 
property , and credit ," remarked the Whig, "and will put the enterprise 
22 through at once ."  Though he had had no previous experience at rail-
roading, McGhee was probably a good choice for the presidency of a 
railroad the success of which depended as much upon powers of persua-
sion as on a practical knowledge of railroad management . He was already 
interested in a large tract of mineral land which lay along the 
18Whig, April 2 ,  1864 . 
19Jlli. ,  January 11 , 1865 . 
20Riley Oakey Biggs , "Development of Railroad Transportation 
in East Tennessee During the Reconstruction Period" (unpublished 
Master' s  thesis , The University of Tennessee ,  Knoxville , 1934), 66 , 
81-82 .  
22Whig, April 4 ,  1866 . 
railroad ' s  proposed route, and he had recently begun to establish 
financial connections in New York. 23 
Immediately upon his election, McGhee left for the east where 
he hired a chief engineer, Colonel Adrian Terry, a Yale graduate who 
had just been mustered out of the United States Ar.my . 24 McGhee and 
Terry returned south through Washington where the latter obtained 
26 
copies of charts and surveys prepared during the war for the military 
railroad. In Washington McGhee conferred with Senator James Guthrie 
of Kentucky, president of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, who 
told the Tennessean that his company was interested in connecting with 
the Knoxville and Kentucky at the state line . 25 
With an energetic new management and the promise of important 
connections at the Kentucky border, nothing stood in the way of the 
road ' s  completion except the lack of capital necessary to build it. 
The antebellum railroad history of East Tennessee provided a lesson 
in how this capital might be raised, for both the East Tennessee and 
Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia had been built largely 
with subsidies granted by the state. Neither railroad company had been 
able to sell enough stock to finance construction, and the money had 
finally been provided by state subscriptions to stock or loans of state 
bonds. Despite the great public enthusiasm for railroads, private 
1865. 
23Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 241; Whig, December 29, 
2�oxville Journal and Tribune, April 8, 1906. 
25Biggs, "Development of Railroad Transportation," 65. 
capital had not been equal to the task and well over half of the cost 
of the construction of these roads had come from the state. 26 
27 
The devastation of war and the impoverishment resulting from it 
were strong arguments for a renewal of this aid , and in January, 1866 , 
the general assembly passed an act to issue $3 , 483 , 000 in bonds to fif-
teen railroads for the purpose of assisting their reconstruction and suc­
cessful operation . 27 The Knoxville and Kentucky was to receive $2)0 , 000 , 
and upon the election of McGhee to the presidency in March Governor 
:Brownlow assured him that the bonds would be issued immediately.28 
The act of January, 1866 , like several similar ones passed later , 
was based on the Internal Improvements Act of 18.52 which had established 
the practice of lending state bonds to railroads. The antebellum law 
was quite limiting in its provisions , which required that enough stock 
must have been subscribed to grade the road ' s  entire length within the 
state before a company could receive bonds. When this qualification had 
been met , the railroad could apply for bonds to complete a thirty-mile 
section , at the rate of eight thousand dollars per mile. It was further 
stipulated that the proceeds of the bonds were to be used only for rails , 
spikes , and chairs , or for the laying of iron. A sinking fund was estab-
lished to retire the bonds , and the 6 percent interest to be deposited 
by the railroads at Nashville fifteen days before due . Finally , to 
26Holland , "East Tennessee and Georgia , 89-108 ; also "East Tennes­
see and Virginia ,"  83-101. This was the situation in many states at the 
time. See Carter Goodrich , Government Promotion of American Canals and 
Railroads , 1800-1890 (New York : Columbia University Press , 1960) , 61-16). 
27Public Acts of Tennessee (cited hereafter as Public Acts) , 186.5-
66 , Ch. XIV , 33-34. -
28According to an editorial in the Whig, March 28 , 1866. 
28 
protect the loans a primary lien on all properties of the railroad was 
given to the state . 29 Subsequent legislation in 18.54 increased the 
allotment to ten thousand dollars per mile and required that the bonds 
not be sold or exchanged for less than their par value.3° The postwar 
railroad aid laws were amendments to the act of 18.52 ,  and the bonds 
received by the railroads were subject to all of the above stipulations 
with one important exception : the pos-twar appropriations were in the 
fonn of direct grants not dependent upon the "thirty mile" provision. 
Thus the bonds were issued without regard to the progress of actual 
construction. 
Despite the efforts of antebellum Tennessee lawmakers to prevent 
misuse of state aid , the builders of both the East Tennessee and Vir-
ginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia had resorted to fraud in order 
to keep their charters. Bogus stock subscriptions and misappropriations 
of funds were among the reasons that the legislature had enacted the 
stringent laws of 18.52 and 18.54. 31 By neglecting to maintain all of 
thes-e strictures the postwar legislatures made new abuses possible , 
even likely , as the case of the Knoxville and Kentucky illustrates . 
· From its beginnings the line was dependent upon governmental 
subsidy. Three quarters of its capital stock was subscribed by Ander-
son, Campbell , and Scott counties and by the city of Knoxville. Before 
29Public Acts , 18_51-.52 , Ch. CLI , 204-1_5. 
30ibid. , 18.53-.54, Ch. CXXXI ,  20_5-8. 
3lHolland , "East Tennessee and Georgia , " 91-102; also "East 
Tennessee and Virginia ," 88-94. 
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the war , the road had received $180 , 000 in state bonds , and there could 
have been no doubt that further construction would be dependent upon more 
state aid. 32 
In mid-April , 1866 , McGhee released a statement on the company' s 
financial status and its prospects . He reckoned that there was $810 , 000 
in bonds available in state aid, including a grant of $250 , 000 under the 
act of January 18 , 1866. Labor was cheap and plentiful , thanks to the 
discharge of hundreds of Negroes from the First and Fourteenth United 
States Colored Infantry regiments , and McGhee was hopeful of pushing the 
road as far as the coalfields near Clinton, Tennessee , by autumn. 33 But 
despite these promising conditions , it soon became obvious that the state 
bonds were worth much less in cash than their face value , and although 
the law prohibited disposing of them for less than par , no one seems to 
have considered this an obstacle to selling or trading the bonds for 
what they would bring.34 In May, 1866 , a bill to incorporate the Tennes-
see and Pacific Railroad was expanded to include an appropriation of 
another $250 , 000 in bonds for the Knoxville and Kentucky. 35 
At the second session of the thirty-fourth general assembly in 
the fall of 1866 , the railroads were again requesting aid. They had a 
powe·rful ally in Governor Brownlow, who , in his message to the legislature 
3�iggs , "Development of Railroad Transportation," 57-60. 
33Nashville Republican Banner , April 14 , 1866 . 
34"Report to the Joint Select Committee ,"  in House Journal, 
Appendix , 1870-71 , pp. 19 , 156-57 · 
J5Private Acts of Tennessee , 1865-66 , Ch . LXXXVIII , 268. 
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praised "the commendable spirit with which you have come to the rescue 
of the railroads of the State ," and asked "still further exertions in 
behalf of the same great interests • .,36 Brownlow ' s  Whig reported that 
McGhee "who is at Nashville • • • is , we understand, sanguine of pro­
curing material aid in behalf of these important enterprises. n37 A 
bill providing a loan of $2 , 500 , 000 to needy railroads , including 
$500 , 000 for the Knoxville and Kentucky , passed the senate unanimously 
and was overwhelmingly approved by the house. 38 
On New Year' s  Day 1867 a "Grand Railroad Jubilee and Celebra-
tion" was held as the first Knoxville and Kentucky train rolled across 
the new Clinch River bridge and into Clinton. Brownlow and a host of 
dignitaries made the trip and heaped praises upon President McGhee and 
Superintendent Terry for completing the first important section of the 
Knoxville and Kentucky.39 McGhee continued as president until November 
7 ,  1867 , when he suddenly resigned , "in part for reasons of health."40 
No other explanation of his departure was offered. Although the effec-
tive date of the resignation was January 1 ,  1868 , the board of the Knox-
ville and Kentucky elected Joseph A. Mabry to succeed him, and soon he , 
the same "General" Mabry who had offered to handsomely outfit a company 
36House Journal, 1865-66 , p. 23. 
37Whig, December 12 , 1866. 
38Tennessee , General Assembly , Senate Journal, 1866-67 , p. 100; 
House Journal, 1866-67 , p. 140; Public Acts , 1866-67 , Ch. XII,  11�13: 
39Whig, January 2 ,  1867. 
4°Knoxville Daily Free Press , November 9 , 1867. Cited hereafter 
as Free Press. 
Jl 
of Confederates, was acclaimed as the "Napoleon" of the railroad 
lobbyists at work on the Radical Tennessee legislature. 4l 
There are several plausible reasons which might explain McGhee's 
abrupt retirement from his first railroad presidency. His health may 
indeed have been bad, or he may have been distracted by the financial 
difficulties of C. Powell, Green & Company, the New York commission 
house which had sold many bonds for the Knoxville and Kentucky. McGhee 
was supposed to have severed his partnership with C. Powell, Green when 
he assumed the presidency of the railroad in the spring of 1866, but 
there are strong indications that he remained intimately involved in the 
business of his former associates. 42 Another explanation is that Me-
Ghee foresaw that the Knoxville and Kentucky could not be completed 
without the aid of even more Tennessee bonds. He may have recognized 
the precariousness of a situation in which the bonds brought much less 
than par while the Knoxville and Kentucky remained liable for interest 
on those bonds which one day would have to be retired at full face value. 
In any case, McGhee's retirement came at a fortuitous moment. Time was 
running out for the Knoxville and Kentucky and the other railroads which 
owed their lives to state aid. Resistance to the railroad subsidies was 
mounting, and the ominous warnings of trouble ahead were apparently not 
lost on McGhee. 
The thirty-fifth general assembly, elected in August, 1867, was 
significant for its strong Radicalism and for the inexperience of its 
42The State Debt, 127. 
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members. 43 Among the problems facing it , those of the railroads once 
more demanded attention. A number of companies (not including the Knox-
ville and Kentucky) owed interest on the bonds issued in the past and in 
his message to the legislature on October 8 ,  Brownlow advised that: 
I have reason to believe that , in some instances, the Bonds 
of the State have not been disposed of according to law , while 
in others, the confidence of the State has been abused , and 
her credit sought to be injured even by the recipients of her 
favors. And in all future appropriations to railroad companies ,  
let us know the characters of the men into whose hands State 
Bonds go , both as to integrity and loyalty. Meanwhile , let us 
guard against any future increase of the State debt by the 
issuance of Bonds to railroads, unless it be in cases where the 44 
interests of the State would suffer for the want of further aid. 
Soon Leonidas Campbell Houk , a Brownlow protege from Knoxville ,  
reported in the columns of the Whig that the railroads had many friends 
in the legislature. He expect!3d that an aid bill would pass, and he 
noted the presence of Joseph A. Mabry in Nashville , "wo:rlcing for his 
Road [ the Knoxville and Kentucky] . "  "It is conceded by all, " wrote 
Houk , "that he is the right man in the right place. "4.5 
Not only the Radicals approved of the railroad aid measure. The 
Conservative Knoxville � Press praised Mabry "for the faithful and able 
manner in which he has presented the subject to the favorable notice of 
the legislature. . .. 46 Another Conservative paper , the Nashville 
Republican Banner, urged liberal assistance to "give to our uncompleted 
railroads all the necessary facilities. 1147 
43Alexander,  Political Reconstruction !a Tennessee , 160-61. 
�ouse Journal , 1867-68 , p. 27. 45Whig, December 4, 1867. 
46Free Press, December 1 ,  1867. 
47 As quoted in ibid. , November 22, 1867. 
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Mabry, to whom the Knoxville papers gave the credit for pushing 
through the "omnibus" railroad aid act of December 7 , 1867 , was one of 
the most colorful figures in Tennessee ' s  Civil War and Reconstruction 
history. 48 Born to a wealthy and prominent Knox County family in 1826 , 
he was a large landowner and had served as president of the Knoxville 
and Kentucky from 1858 to 1864. A red hot Confederate in the early days 
· of the war , he emerged later as a Radical and a friend of Brownlow. At 
one time he was proposed as a Radical candidate for Congress , but in 
1870 he was elected to the state constitutional convention which "re-
deemed" Tennessee from Radical reconstruction. His brother-in-law , 
William Montgomery Churchwell , a Democratic congressman from the Knox-
ville district , 1851-55 , preceded Mabry as president of the Knoxville 
and Kentucky and was accused of embezzling from the Bank of East Tennes­
see of which he was also president. 49 
Personal violence , as well as financial and political intrigue , 
were familiar themes in Mabry' s  family circle. His father died in an 
Alabama gun fight , and Mabry himself shot John Baxter , a Knoxville lawyer ,  
in 1870. One of Mabry's sons was murdered in 1881 , and the following 
year both Mabry and another son died in a blazing shoot-out with Thomas 
O ' Conner on the streets of Knoxville. 
48Jerome Gregg Taylor , Jr. , "Public Career of Joseph Alexander 
Mabry" (unpublished Master ' s  thesis , The University of Tennessee , Knox­
ville , 1968). 
49Ruth Osborne Turner , "Public Career of William Montgomery Church­
well" (unpublished Master ' s  thesis , The University of Tennessee , Kno�ville , 
1954). 
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Mabry' s  varied and important political connections , his railroad-
ing experience , and his recklessness made him perhaps the ideal lobbyist 
for the Knoxville and Kentucky. The same board meeting which elected him 
president voted him $5 , 000 to pay his Nashville expenses , and soon he was 
at the capital managing the passage of Tennessee 1 s last railroad aid act. 50 
What came to be called the "Omnibus Railroad Act" began as an in-
ocuous bill to amend the charter of the Harrison , Selma and Cincinnati 
Railroad. Offered by Senator A. M. Cate who represented a district in 
lower East Tennessee , 51 the bill passed its first reading , was reported 
favorably by the committee on internal improvements , and came up for its 
second reading on November 20 ,  1867.
52 At this point the friends of the 
railroads seized upon Cate ' s  bill as the vehicle for granting further aid. 
John B .  Rodgers , representing several Middle Tennessee counties , offered 
an amendment appropriating bonds for a number of railroads, including 
$800 ,000 for the Knoxville and Kentucky.53 On the following day Rodgers' 
amendment was passed by a vote of 11 to 8.54 Of the negative votes all 
but two came from Middle or West Tennessee senators. The two East Tennes-
seans voting against the amendment were Cate and P. P. C. Nelson who 
represented a district in extreme upper East Tennessee. John Fuson , of 
a Middle Tennessee district , offered an amendment granting substantial 
aid to the Tennessee and Pacific Railroad which was voted down;55 then 
50Shea y. Mabry, 69 Tennessee (1878) 336. 
51 Senate Journal , 1867-68 , p .  59. 
52Ibid. , 92 , 137 . 
54Ibid. , 139. 
53Ibid. , 137. 
55Ibid. , 139-40. 
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the senate defeated the bill on its second reading by a vote of 12 to 
7.56 Three Middle Tennesseans and an East Tennessean had defected from 
the majority which had adopted Rodgers ' amendment. The omnibus bill 
seemed to be in serious trouble , but now Brownlow came to the rescue. 
On November 22 the senate heard a special message from the governor 
which pleaded for: "A prudent but liberal aid to the railroads of the 
state to place them in a condition to be productive and enable them 
t·o meet , hereafter , the interest on the loans :rn.ade by the State to the 
roads ."57 Brownlow argued that "a comparatively small aid now extended 
to them , will preserve and save the interest of the State ," warning that 
"If such aid is not given the State will lose much more • • • than the 
whole amount required , by judicious expenditure , to place the roads in 
a condition of productiveness ."SS 
Meanwhile the friends of the bill amended it to win the votes 
necessary for its adoption . Fuson's amendment for aid to the Tennessee 
and Pacific was reconsidered and was attached to the bill , along with a 
grant of $100 , 000 to the East T.ennessee and Western North Carolina rail-
road which ran through Nelson ' s  upper East Tennessee district. Several 
Middle Tennessee railroads received appropriations , and at last the 
omnibus bill had something in it for almost every senator.59 Eugene 
Cary of Davidson County moved that any railroad accepting the benefits 
of the act be forbidden from discriminating in rates between local and 
through freight . The speaker , D .  W. C .  Senter , ruled Cary's  amendment 
56Ibid. , 141. 
5Bibid . 
57Ibid . , 144. 
59�. , 142 , 145-46 , 150-51. 
60 out of order , and the ruling was upheld by the senate. The bill was 
then given final approval with only Cary and A. M. Cate , the bill's 
. . l t • . t • t 61 orlglna sponsor ,  vo lng agalns l • 
In the house strenous efforts were made to add appropriations 
for other railroads , but these were beaten down. 62 On December 6 ,  the 
house voted 49 to 27 to approve the bill which in its final form 
allotted $3 , 700 ,000 in bonds to various railroads. 63 The opposition 
was strongest from Middle and West Tennessee members , for only five of 
the negative votes came from East Tennesseans. Almost half of the 
omnibus appropriations would go to East Tennessee railroads , and the 
reason for the bill 's  popularity among the legislators from that sec-
tion is therefore obvious. The other half of the appropriations were 
spread among the railroads in the state's two other grand divisions , 
and the members from those sections were proportionately less enthusi-
astic about the measure. 
But there was more than sectional rivalry involved in the divi-
sion of the legislature over the omnibus act. Or , to be more precise , 
there was another factor which aggravated these sectional animosities 
coming to the surface in the Republican party. In October , 1867 , 
Governor Brownlow decided to seek a seat in the United States Senate. 
Opposing him for ·the post was General William Brickly Stokes ,  a Middle 
Tennessean and a Union Army veteran. One of Stokes ' staunch supporters 
60Ibid. , 151. 61Ibi.d. , 152. 
62 House Journal , 1867-68 , pp. 249-56. 
63Ibid. , 285-86. 
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in the state senate was A. M .  Cate who became deeply embittered over 
Stokes ' defeat.64 For whatever reason , Cate was also the most persist-
ent opponent of the omnibus bill in the senate , while D .  W. C. Senter , 
Brownlow ' s  heir apparent and the speaker of the senate , played an im-
portant role in getting the bill through. In the house the same pattern 
was apparent. Fifteen of the twenty-seven members who voted against the 
bill had also been Stokes supporters. Two factions were forming in the 
Tennessee Republican party. The group following Brownlow tended to be 
composed of East Tennesseans ,  and they would follow their leader in his 
policy of friendship for the railroads. The other faction tended to 
come from Middle and West Tennessee ; it would coalesce around Stokes 
and Cate , and would oppose further railroad grants. 
Representative W. M .  Woodcock of Macon County in Middle Tennessee 
managed to have a protest against the act entered in the journal of the 
house. He opposed the bill because he did not believe that the bonds 
would ever be repaid. The railroads if sold by the state would not 
bring enough to redeem the bonds , he maintained , and he foresaw the 
certainty of either repudiation or bankruptcy . Woodcock said that he 
had been warned of political ruin if he opposed the bill , but he be-
lieved that the railroad men were enemies of the Republican party any-
way. The party , he said, "will have to answer in the next campaign the 
charges of having made way with the credit of the state • •  " More-
over , "these charges will be preferred against us by a majority of these 
very men who are now receiving the benefit of these loans."65 
64rbid. , 84-86 ; Senate Journal ,  1867-68 , pp. 59-61 ; Alexander , 
Political Reconstruction in Tennessee , 212. 
65 House Journal , 1867-68 , pp. 289-99 · 
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Soon after the first of 1868 Mabry began to collect the Knoxville 
and Kentucky ' s  bonds. 66 McGhee had meanwhile gone to New York City in 
'an attempt to salvage something from the impending failure of C. Powell , 
Green & Company. Founded in late 1865 by McGhee , Columbus Powell of 
Knoxville , and I. F .  Green of Nashville , the firm acted as financial 
agents in. the selling of Tennessee bonds for several railroads which 
received aid from the state. McGhee officially retired from the firm on 
May 1 ,  1866 , and as president of the Knoxville and Kentucky he sold 
through C .  Powell , Green most of the $1 , 240 , 000 in bonds received by 
the railroad during his administration. 67 By December , 1867 , the firm 
seemed about to fail , and McGhee was in New York at the first of January 
attempting to save the situation. In several letters which he wrote at 
that time to John Roper Branner , president of the East Tennessee and 
Virginia Railroad ,  McGhee proposed that he , Branner, Mabry, and C. W .  
Jones , president of the Knoxville and Charleston ,  should advance C. 
Powell ,  Green enough money to keep the firm afloat. 68 Anthony 1. Max-
well , a railroad contractor , endorsed McGhee's plan , and wrote "that 
Tenn. and her RR interests cannot dispense with Powell's services & 
influence in New York • • • •  1169 But however indispensable these services 
66Ibid. , Appendix , 1870-71 , pp. 156-57. 
68 The four letters in the Charles M. McGhee Papers , McClung His-
torical Collection , from McGhee to �ranner were written in New York on 
January 2 ,  J , 6 ,  and 1 but are variously dated 1867 and 1868. Since 
McGhee is known to have been in Knoxville on January 1 ,  1867 , it is 
probable that the letters were written in January, 1868 , and that Mc­
Ghee made the common error of dating some of them 1867. 
69Note from Maxwell to Branner in McGhee to Branner , January 7 ,  
186[8 ] , ibid. 
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may have seemed, it was apparently decided to let the firm die , and by 
its failure the Knoxville and Kentucky lost the proceeds of $90 , 000 
of Tennessee bonds then in the firm' s hands. 7° 
This failure did not prevent Mabry from selling the bonds re­
ceived under the omnibus act of 1867 through other New York firms . Nor 
did it prevent Mabry, McGhee , and others from developing a profitable 
plan for speculation in Tennessee bonds. The operation of this scheme 
in the spring and summer of 1868 would cause all of the participants a 
good deal of trouble later, but at the time it must have seemed an ex­
cellent opportunity to profit from the already disturbed state of 
Tennessee finances. 
As early as July, 1867 , some railroad companies failed to pay the 
interest due on their state bonds. 71 To cope with this threat to the 
state's credit the legislature passed an "Act to Liquidate the Debt of 
the State , falling due in 1868 and 1869 ." Under this law a state board 
of finance , composed of the governor, secretary of state , comptroller, 
treasurer, and the president of the Bank of Tennessee , was cl�rged with 
arranging for the prompt payment of interest on state bonds , beginning 
with those whose interest was due in July, 1868. 72 The passage of the 
act had a favorable effect on the price of Tennessee bonds which rose 
from about sixty in February to a high of seventy-six in June. 73 Toward 
7°House Journal , Appendix, 1870-71 , PP • 140-43 · 
7l"Report of the State Comptroller," .ibid. , 1867-68 , p. 45 . 
72Public Acts,  1867-68 , Ch. LXIX , 87-89. 
73House Journal, Appendix, 1870-71 , pp. 156-57. 
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the last of June the board of finance gathered in New York City to pay 
the July bond interest , the money to come partly from the railroad com-
panies and partly from a loan negotiated at the Fourth National Bank of 
New York. 74 As July l approached , the New York Times reported heavy 
trading in Tennessee bonds for delivery ten , fifteen , or thirty days 
later . 75 On June 29 sales of Tennessee bonds at 72 l/2 to 74 l/2 reached 
a total volume of $600 , 000 , 76 but the scene was set for the conversion of 
the Tennessee "bull" to a "bear." At 2 :00 on the afternoon of the 
thirtieth, one David F.  Forshay , an owner of twenty-four bonds , the 
interest on which was overdue , received an injunction to prevent the 
state from paying the July interest until the interest on his bonds had 
been paid. The injunction was only a temporary gambit to hold up the 
July interest , but it was enough to send the price of Tennessee bonds 
tumbling . 77 In the first few days of July they brought as little as 
68 1/2 . 78 As the New York Times observed: 
The State Bonds • • •  were especially ' agitated on Tennessees , 
in consequence of the success of a conspiracy to restrain 
payment of the First of July Interest at the Fourth National 
Bank tomorrow . • • • Both these legal or technical obstruc­
tions are in good part the result of a prearranged stock 
speculation here , against the Bonds and credit of the State ; 
in which it is charity to presume that neither the officers 
nor Directors , nor their confidential brokers of the Fourth 
National Bank were in any way concerned. It is also fair to 
add that such a result would not have been brought about but 
for a well laid and long meditated purpose by certain Railway 
and State officials �U Tennessee to bring about this temporary 
default of Interest. f� 
74Ibid. , 1868 , pp. 33-35. 
75New York Times , June 29 , 1868 . 
76Ibid . , June 30 , 1868. 
78Ibid. , July 1-4 , 1868. 
77Ibid. , July 1 ,  1868. 
79Ibid. , July 1 ,  1868. 
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It was soon charged, and much later it was admitted, that Mabry, 
McGhee, Richard T. Wilson, John R. Branner of the East Tennessee and 
Virginia, and Thomas Callaway of the East Tennessee and Georgia had sold 
themselves short in Tennessee bonds; that they had sold bonds for de-
layed delivery, had arranged the injunction which drove down the price 
of Tennessee bonds and then had bought the cheaper bonds to cover their 
earlier sales. Such a maneuver was not unusual on the New York Exchange, 
but it caused a furor in Tennessee. 
On July 6 Brownlow called a special session of the legislature to 
deal with outrages committed by the Ku Klux Klan, but the recent assault 
on the state's credit was also on his mind. In his message to the 
general �ssembly he proposed the appointment of a joint committee of the 
legislature "with full powers to send for persons and papers, so as to 
sift this �tter to the bottom, and ferret out the guilty parties, who-
ever they, may be " and, he added, "if found guilty, you should pro-
ceed to sue them for damages in the name of the State. 1180 Accordingly, 
the committee questioned under oath a number of the principals in the 
affair, including Mabry, McGhee, and Wilson, but the results were incon-
elusive. McGhee and the two others denied any impropriety or implica-
tion in a conspiracy to depress the bonds, and here the matter rested 
for over ten years until another investigating committee revived the sub­
. t 81 JeC • 
Despite the excitement over the state's finances and the fact 
that many of the railroads assisted by the state were unable to pay the 
80 Rouse Journal, 1868, p. 13 . 81Ibid. , 227-34 . 
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interest on their bonds , when the legislature met in November , 1868 , 
the governor argued that certain railroad companies needed still more 
aid: 
I recommend that no more appropriations be made to railroads , 
except in those cases where the State has a large interest in 
said roads , and would suffer heavy lo2s o� account of the lack 
of such appropriations . Of this class are the roads running out , 
North and South from Kno�ille , and the one extending South from 
Morristown; and , also , the road of which Hon. Senator Parker is 
President. These roads , in order to become profitable and pro­
ductive to the State , will require enough additional appropria­
tions to enable them to complete their lines , so as to conrect 
with other roads now in the process of construction. I pro­
pose , however , to meet these demands in a way not to increase 
the liabilities of the State. The plan is this: 
Leading gentlemen , connected with important railroads large­
ly indebted to the State , are asking for authority to issue 
second mortgage bonds with a view of exchanging them for State 
bonds. Thus purchasing State bonds by the avails of these 
second mortgage bonds the debt now due by the State would , in 
like amount , be transferred to these railroad companies , and 
so the State would be relieved of a burden of several million 
of dollars of debt now resting upon it.82 
It is hard to see what Brownlow intended by this recommendation , 
for a provision allowing the companies to purchase state bonds with their 
own second mortgage bonds while it might benefit the state could hardly 
supply more capital to the railroads. Apparently no one took the second 
part of the Brownlow proposal seriously anyway; his critics , like the 
Nashville Republican Banner , lambasted him . for favoritism toward East 
Tennessee ,83 and the friends of the railroads proceeded to introduce 
out and out subsidy bill on the order of the omnibus act of 1867. 84 
82 Senate Journal, Appendix , 1868-69 , p .  4 .  
83Republican Banner , November 11 , 1868. 
84 Senate Journal, 1868-69 , pp. 23-24 , 28-29. 
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The legislature convened on November 9 , and on November 25 the 
Whig published the following telegram: 
To Gov. W ,  G .  Brownlow: 
Nashville , Tenn., 
Nov. 18 , 1868 
A bill passed in the Senate on second reading , sixteen 
to five , giving our roads five hundred bonds each . 
M. , D. Bearden 
Jos • .  A. Mabry85 
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Mabry was once more in Nashville lobbying for the Knoxville and Kentucky , 
and this time he had been joined by Marcus D. Bearden , Republican poli-
tician of Knox County and the recently elected president of the Knox-
ville and Charleston . Before the new omnibus bill passed the senate 
it was amended to include appropriations for several other railroads. 
On its third reading the bill passed the senate by a vote of ten to 
. ht 86 e1g • Of the ten senators favoring the bill , six were East Tennes-
seans , three were from West Tennessee , and only one (Samuel Parker,  
president of the Southwestern Railroad which was to receive $500 , 000 
under the bill) was from Middle Tennessee. The opponents were all 
Middle Tennesseans , except for A .  M. Cate of lower East Tennessee , who 
I 
was a critic of the Brownlow-Senter wing of the Republican party and 
who had voted against the omnibus act of 1867 . 
When the bill was brought up in the house , the opposition pushed 
through a resolution calling for an investigation of the railroads' 
handling of earlier appropriations . 87 A pro forma inquiry followed , the 
85Whig, November 25 , 1868 . 
86 Senate Journal , 1868-69 , pp. 28-29 . 
87 House Journal, 1868-69 , pp . 64 , 84 , 86 , 115 .  
results of which tended to vindicate the railroads ,88 and the bill 
passed its second reading.89 Then help came to the opposition from 
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the state comptroller , G. W. Blackburn , who urgently requested the de-
feat of the omnibus bill on the grounds that Tennessee ' s  credit was in 
serious jeopardy . Blackburn had been quarreling with Brownlow ever 
since the erstwhile state board of finance had been embarrassed by the 
events of the summer ' s  raid on Tennessee bonds. He had managed to have 
the board of finance abolished by the legislature and the authority for 
paying interest returned to the comptroller's office. Now, in a message 
to the house , he refused to be responsible for the consequences of a new 
b d . 90 on 1ssue. Rallying behind Blackburn , the house tabled the omnibus 
bill by a vote of 40 to 34 . 91 Only five of the majority votes came 
from East Tennesseans , while those members who favored the bill included 
only nine Middle or West Tennesseans. Of these nine , six had voted for 
Brownlow in the senatorial election and two others were from districts 
through which the Southwestern Railroad ran .  
The dispute over railroad aid was not the only cause of the im-
pending disruption of Republican rule , but it goes a long way toward 
explaining the disastrous fracture of the party. It is possible to 
trace the emergence of a Stokes-Cate-anti-omnibus-Middle and West 
88senate Journal, Appendix, 1868-69, pp . 69-74 . 
89� Journal, 1868-69 , p .  151 . 
90Senate Journal, Appendix, 1868-69, pp. 73-76. 
91 House Journal,  1868-69 , p .  173 . 
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Tennessee faction, and it is also obvious that there was a Brownlow-
Senter-pro-omnibus-East Tennessee faction. The anatomy of these groups 
becomes even clearer in the light of the political developments and 
disclosures which were presently forthcoming. 
As the storm over state aid to the railroads built in intensity 
Charles McGhee began to make himself inconspicuous . He had left the 
presidency of the Knoxville and Kentucky to Mabry who rashly sought more 
and more state aid while the interest on the bonds began to pile up . 
The failure of C .  Powell , Green and the clamor over the bear raid of 
1868 must have shaken McGhee ' s  confidence , and the ignominious defeat 
of Mabry' s last lobbying effort was yet another straw in the wind. It 
must have seemed to McGhee that the condition of the Knoxville and 
Kentucky, like that of the Republican party, was bound to get a good 
deal worse before it could show much improvement . Probably with this in 
mind he completely se.vered his relationship with the company, resigning 
from the board some time before the annual meeting in the spring of 
1869. 92 Thus he was not present on March 30 when the board voted thir-
teen to nine to reimburse Mabry for unspecified expenses , which, it was 
later revealed , amounted to over $28 , 000. 93 
One member of the minority which opposed Mabry' s reimbursement 
was Edward Jackson Sanford , who for the rest of his life would be Me-
Ghee 1 s  close friend and associate . McGhee and Sanford, foreseeing 
92The board elected George W. Mabry, Joseph Mabry' s brother, 
"in place of Col . C .  M. McGhee , resigned. "  Whig, March 31 , 1869 . 
93shea y. Mabry, 337,39 . 
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Mabry ' s  calamitous fall, may have devised a plan to pick up the pieces 
of the Kn0xville and Kentucky. Sanford would work from within, repre-
senting McGhee's interests and openly opposing Mabry's control; McGhee 
would stand clear of the Knoxville and Kentucky and busy himself with 
other matters. When the collapse came, the two partners would be un-
scathed and could move in to reorganize and control the railroad. If 
this was their plan, it worked to perfection. 
By the spring of 1869 the break in the Republican party had be-
come open and unmistakable. A convention in May to nominate a candi-
date for governor ended in disruption with the party unable to agree on 
a single standard bearer. DeWitt Senter, who was filling out Brownlow's 
term as governor, had the support of the Parson's machine and its power­
ful railroad allies,94 including Mabry (who may have purchased the 
Nashville Press and Times in order to insure its support for Senter). 9S 
General W .  B. Stokes, claiming to represent true Republicanism, contested 
the election with Senter, and the Democrats failed to offer a candidate. 
Actually the opposition to radicalism in Tennessee included not 
only Democrats and most ex-Confederates but many former Whigs, especially 
from Middle and West Tennessee. In these sections Negro equality had 
aroused bitter white resentment, and the high handed actions of Brownlow 
in interfering with elections and local police powers had alienated many 
former Unionists and Whigs. Those who opposed radicalism but could not 
94Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 21)-2); 
Sharp, "Downfall of the Radicals in Tennessee:" 10)-14 . 
9SMemphis Sun, as quoted in Knoxville Daily Chronicle, June 2, 
1870. 
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stomach the Democratic label called themselves Conservatives, and they 
constituted a powerful political force. Both wings of the Republican 
party soon realized that the balance of power lay with the Democrats 
and the Conservative opponents of Brownlow radicalism . Senter, moving 
quickly to capture this support, reversed his earlier position and came 
out for universal suffrage. The Democrats, from Andrew Johnson down, 
endorsed Senter who used his considerable power to enfranchise thousands 
of former rebels. Though many Republicans were dismayed by this sur-
prising turn of events, enough of them remained loyal to Brownlow and 
his candidate to ensure a victory for Senter.96 
The Brownlow-Senter faction still held the governorship, _but its 
control over the state had been gravely compromised by the alliance with 
the Democrats and Conservatives. The latter groups had fielded many 
candidates for the legislature, and, capitalizing on the split among the 
Republicans, had captured control of the general assembly.97 Even when 
this became apparent, Brownlow seemed satis fied at the result of the 
election. He admitted that the legislature included some former rebels, 
but he correctly predicted that it would not repudiate Tennessee ' s bonded 
debt nor elect Andrew Johnson to the United States Senate. He expected 
that the Stokes faction would try· to have the election invalidated and 
would attempt to have Tennessee placed under military government.98 He 
96Alexander, Political Recons truction in Tennessee, 21.5-2.5; 
Sharp, "Downfall of the Radicals in - Tennessee:" 10.5-24. 
97Alexander, Political Reconstruction in Tennessee, 226-JO. 
98Brownlow to Matt H. Carpenter, August 16, 1869, in Miscel­
laneous Manuscripts, McClung Historical Collection. 
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could not anticipate , however,  how far the legislature could go in dis-
mantling the works of Radicalism in Tennessee . 
When the general assembly submitted to the people the question of 
a new constitution, it became clear that Reconstruction was over. Disre-
garding all limitations on the franchise , the legislature stipulated 
that the issue should be decided by universal male suffrage . The subse-
quent constitutional convention which met early in 1870 devised a docu-
ment that merely ratified the legislative actions which had already 
limited the extraordinary police powers of the governor and had removed 
the disabilities of former Confederates . More alarming to the Radicals 
were the provisions for a poll tax aimed at limiting Negro voting and a 
revision of the judicial system which removed Radical judges from office . 99 
All of this was too much even for Brownlow, and he joined Stokes in work­
ing for a renewed congressional Reconstruction of Tennessee . 100 
Among those who went to Washington to try to prevent the overthrow 
101 of the state government was C .  M. McGhee . The transition of power 
from Radicals to Conservatives ,  while it certa.in1y meant the end of 
state aid to railroads , did not portend an unfriendly attitude toward 
capitalists and railroad managers E?r �· On the contrary , the new legis-
lature had enacted a law which would allow the railroads to pay their 
99Alexander,  Political Reconstruction in Tennessee , 230-33· 
100John B .  Brownlow to B .  M. Branner, March 9,  1870 , in Branner­
Rodgers Papers , McClung Historical Colledirm ; John B .  Brownlow to 
L .  C .  Houk, March 30 , 1870,  in Leonidas C .  and John C �  Houk Papers , 
McClung Historical Collection. 
101 The State Debt , 18-19 , 72-� 73.  
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debt to the state by turning in state bonds to the comptroller. While 
this act could not do the heavily indebted companies  like the Knoxville 
and Kentucky much good, it was a windfall to those roads like the East 
Tennessee , Virginia , and Georgia, which could discharge their smaller 
obligations to the state by purchasing bonds at depreciated rates . 102 
This law and other legislation which came later from the "redeemed" 
Tennessee legislature explain why McGhee was active in the successful 
fight against congressional Reconstruction. 
Aside from undoing the Brownlow laws and constitution, the Con-
servative legislature undertook to harry the former governor with in-
vestigations . Rumors of the misuse of state bonds by the railroads had 
been freely circulating for some time , and the new assembly lost no time 
in establishing a joint committee to investigate those railroads which 
had failed to pay interest on their debts .  High on the list was the 
Knoxville and Kentucky. 
To no one ' s  surprise the investigation turned up irregularities 
in the handling of state bonds by a number of companies .  Bonds had 
been issued in large lots without proper certification of accomplished 
construction; bonds bad been sold at prices below their face value ; 
bonds had been used by railroads to pay interest to the state .  All 
these practices were in contravention of the letter of the law, but the 
most startling discovery was that large sums from the funds of the Knox-
ville and Kentucky had apparently been used to secure passage of the 
omnibus act of 1867 and in attempts to procure further aid in 1868 and 
102Ibid. ; Public Acts ,  1869-70 ,  Ch. XLVII ,  61-62 . - -----: 
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1869. 103 For months John Baxter, a Knoxville lawyer, stockholder in the 
Knoxville and Kentucky, and a bitter critic of Brownlow, had been charg-
ing Mabry with all kinds o f  malfeasance , but the committee dismissed 
Baxter' s  complaint which "bears upon its face the impress  of  a private 
quarrel ,  [ and] which, in the opini'on o f  the committee i s  of no im­
portance to the people of the State . "l04 
What was of importance was the testimony o f  E .  J .  Sanford that 
Mabry had been authorized by a close vote of the directorate to draw 
money for expense s  incurred in seeking aid from the legislature , and 
that he had received some $28 , 000 for which he never had to account . 105 
When pre ssed to explain, Mabry refused to answer the committee ' s  ques­
tions. 106 He was not ,  however, directly asked if he had used the 
$28 , 000 t o  influence the legi slature . In regard to Mabry the committee 
concluded : 
That $28 , 000 of  the funds of the State were used by him, in 
an evident attempt to perpetrate a further outrage , if  not 
a swindle upon the State ; and the committee are satisfied 
that nothing but a �earching legal investigation will ever 
expose the frauds 
B
erpetrated upon the State by thi s  company 
and its officers . l 7 
But having opened the fascinating subject neither the committee 
nor the state pursued a "searching investigation. " In fact the investi-
gation, which was pushed just so far and no further, served everyone ex-
cept Brownlow and Mabry quite well . The Conservatives ,  who were looking 
l03House Journal ,  Appendix, 1870�71, pp. 75-92 . 
l04Ibid. , 83 , 159-69.  
l05Ibid. , 119-21. 
106Ibid. , 154. 
107Ibid. , 91.  
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more and more like Democrats ,  received some good but vague campaign 
ammunition. The only Republican whose actions were condemned by the 
committee was Brownlow, and his indiscretions appeared more careless 
than . . 1 108 cr�m�na • His party was willing for the aged Parson to bear 
alone the opprobrium of "Radical excesses . "  Mabry, of course , was 
seriously compromised and his fall from power followed closely after 
the publication of the committee ' s  report . 
An early act of the Conservative legislature required that all 
"delinquent" railroads--companies which had fallen behind on their in� 
terest payments--should be placed in receivership with the companies ' 
presidents to act as receivers by appointment of the governor. 109 Ac-
cordingly, Senter made Mabry the receiver of the Knoxville and Kentucky, 
but in February, 1870 , the legislature changed the method by which the 
so- called "state dii•ectors" were appointed. The new law required that 
such directors , though still appointed by the governor, must be con-
firmed by the senate , and since Mabry had been for some time a state 
director, Senter faithfully re-appointed him. 110 The appointment came 
just as the sensational news of  Mabry' s misuse of funds became known, 
and the senate lost no time in rejecting him. 111 After several weeks , 
when it looked as though the senate would not change its mind, Senter 
withdrew the nomination. 112 Ma.bry1 s control o f  the Knoxville and 
108Ibid. , 90 .  l09Public �' 1869- 70 , Ch. III , 4- 6 .  
110
�. ,  Ch. VII , 72-73 ; Knoxville Daily Press and Herald , 
May 27 ,  1870. 
111 Senate Journal , 1870-71 ,  p .  55 . 
112Ibid. , 56 , 113 . 
Kentucky was now in real jeopardy, but a few weeks later an infirm mem-
ber of the board, Thomas H. Callaway, resigned, and Mabry jumped at the 
opportunity to reclaim a seat on the directory. Calloway had been 
elected by the stockholders , and the other board members could fill the 
vacancy. Dr. James Rogers nominated Mabry, while Sanford suggested ;Dr. 
John Fouche instead. Mabry still controlled the board, and he was 
elected by a vote of  eight to two . 113 
Meanwhile , John Baxter kept up a running criticism of Mabry in 
the Knoxville press , reviewing the record of the railroad president �t 
length and damning him roundly for a career of opportunism and corrup­
tion. 114 As Baxter himself correctly observed : 
The "oldest inhabitant" is unable to call to mind a period 
when East Tennessee was not disturbed by some personal , 
religious or political controversy, conducted with such low 
and vulgar epithets and personal denunciation as to offend 115 the refined sensibilities of every orderly and decent person. 
The Baxter-Mabry quarrel fitted this formula pretty well,  and it is not 
surprising that the feud degenerated into violence . On June 13 , 1870 ,  
Mabry, goaded beyond endurance ,  met Baxter on the street and shot him, 
wounding the lawyer in the arm. While this incident served to cool o ff 
the conflict it did not stop Baxter' s condemnations , nor did it do 
Mabry' s reputation any good. 
In September the Knoxville and Kentucky stockholders met and 
elected a new board of directors . If there was a contest between McGhee 
ll3Chronicle , July 17 , 1870 .  
ll4Ibid. , June 1 ,  4,  7 , �0 ,  12 , 17 , 19 , 21 ,  22 , 1870 .  
ll5
�. ,  June 1 ,  1870 .  
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and Mabry it was not recorded by the press , but McGhee was now clearly 
in control. Besides McGhee , the new board included Sanford and his 
friend , Dr. Fouche , and H. C .  Chamberlain, who would be a close associ-
ate of McGhee . Perez Dickinson, G.  W .  Ros s ,  and E.  C .  Edwards rounded 
out the new directorate which proceeded to elect McGhee to the presi-
116 dency. Because he maintained that his term as president had not 
expired,  Mabry sought an injunction to bar McGhee from office . The suit 
was heard by Chancellor 0. P. Temple who decided in October that the 
board was within its rights when it replaced Mabry with McGhee . 117 
Thus McGhee came to power in the Knoxville and Kentucky, and for more 
than twenty years thereafter his control of the road would be absolute .  
J . 
The story of McGhee , Mabry, and the Knoxville and Kentucky was 
not quite over, however. Although the Democrats were fairly secure in 
their control of Tennessee state government after 1870 ,  they soon fell 
to fighting among themselves .  The most burning issue in politics be-
came the state debt , in other words the bonded indebtedness  which was 
the legacy o f  the Radical Republicans ' aid to the railroads . A strong 
movement , with its roots in the agrarian wing of the Democratic party, 
demanded that the debt be repudiated. In part the repudiationists main-
tained that the Brownlow regime had illegally held power through the 
disfranchisement of the rightful voters of Tennessee . Additionally 
they argued that the "average" taxpayers of the state were being required 
116
�. ,  September 27 , 1870 .  
ll7Ibid. , November 13 , 1870 .  
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to pay heavy exactions to retire the bonds issued in aid of private cor-
porations .  Finally they recalled the evidence of corruption uncovered 
by the legislative investigation of 1869-70 ,  evidence which might indi­
cate that the bonds were actually illegally appropriated and issued .  118 
Men of capital and their allies within the Democratic party, some-
times called "railroad democrats , "  were alarmed at the prospect of this 
assault on property. Moreover ,  the men ( such as McGhee) who owned or 
controlled the railroads which had been aided by the state were fearful 
tr.1at the holders of repudiated bonds would seek redress from the railroad 
companies themselves . The opposition of these powerful men notwithstand-
ing, the repudiationist faction gained the ascendency within the now 
dominant Democratic party9 and the state Democratic platform of 1878 
promised to bring the Radical Republicans 19be fore the bar of public 
opinion, as the author of all the misfortunes which now oppress and 
threaten the people .  11 119 It was this pledge wh..ich an investigating 
committee of the 1879 legislature tried to fulfill . 
The report of the committee to investigate the state debt occupies 
two hundred and eleven pages in the appendix of the House Jou1nal .  Most 
of this space is given over to testimony which purports to prove that 
Mabry, McGhee, Bra��er , Wilson, Callaway, and M .  D .  Bearden cor��pted 
118Philip M. Hamer ( ed. ), Tennessee : ! History, illJ.-1.23.£ (4 vols; 
New York : American Historical Society , Inc. , 1933), II , 683-84; Alice 
Lynn Hunt, "Tennessee Public Debt as an Issue in Politics, 1870-1883" 
(unpublished Master ' s  thesis, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville , 
1934), 34-37. 
119Ibid. ,  .37. 
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the 1867 legislature , influenced other Tennessee legislatures in sinis-
ter ways , and bribed Governor Brownlow. It was upon Mabry that the com-
mittee focused its main attention, for it was Mabry' s activities which 
were most vulnerable . He had, after all , been seriously compromised by 
the earlier legislative investigation. 
In his testimony Mabry admitted that he had lobbied for the Knox-
ville and Kentucky during the 1867 , 1868 , and 1869 legislative sessions . 
He conceded that he had sometimes brought suits for members , but he re-
f d t th t . b t hi " bl l bb . t •  • t •  120 use o answer o er ques 1ons a ou s poss1 e o y1ng ac lVl 1es . 
H. A. Huntington, a Nashville clothier, testified that Mabry had main-
tained an account at his store and that he had some time s brought in un-
identified men who bought clothe s .  Huntington thought that Mabry some-
121 times bought goods for others .  G. W. Blackburn, a former state 
comptroller, said that Mabry had once told him that he carried the 
122 legislature in his pocket . These depositions comprised the sum of 
new evidence linking Mabry to the passage of the omnibus act . 
M. D. Bearden, the former railroad lobbyist and ex-Union Army 
officer, 123 was also examined by the committee in connection with the 
corruption of the legislature . Bearden admitted that while president 
of the Knoxville and Charleston he had lobbied for the company. He ad-
mitted spending several thousand dollars , but denied that he had bribed 
anyone . Several witnesses testified that they had heard or thought they 
120 � State Debt , 167-68.  
122Ibid. , 133. 
121Ibid . , 55-58 . 
123Rothrock , French Broad-Holston Country, 377-78 .  
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had heard Bearden tell of paying a member of the legislature $500 to 
vote for a railroad appropriation and of forcing the member to return 
the bribe when he failed to deliver his vote . 124 One witness also 
thought he remembered hearing Bearden relate that he and Mabry had 
ordered thirty barrels of brandy to help obtain the passage of an 
. t • 125 appropr1.a 1.on. 
The Reverend N. W. Motheral testified that Thomas H. Calloway 
had confessed before his death that he had employed whisky, women, and 
clothing to work his will on the legislature . Motheral also believed 
that just before the investigation Calloway' s widow had delivered in-
criminating papers to a railroad station agent , Sam Reese , who had 
126 turned them over to MC�hee . Reese was not called to testify, but in 
a published statement he vehemently denied any knowledge of such papers . 127 
The only really new evidence which was turned up by the investi-
gation had to do with th9' bribing of Brownlow. Under questioning, 
·Mabry admitted that he and Thomas Calloway had given the governor five 
$1 , 000 bills ,  a portion of the profits from the bear raid of 1868 on 
Tenness·ee bonds . According to Mabry, he , Callaway, McGhee , Richard T .  
Wilson, and John . . ,·R.  Branner had consulted a New York medium, one Madame 
Mansfield , who told them that the price of Tenne ssee bonds would decline , 
that there would be trouble in Tennessee , but that "old Scratch" (pre-
sumably Brownlow) could be controlled with money. Whereupon Mabry and 
124rhe State Debt , 
126�. , 84-86.  
147-49 .  
125� •
• 67 . 
127Nashville Daily American, March 15 , 1879 .  
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Callaway returned to Knoxville and offered the money to Brownlow who was 
lying ill on a couch at his home . The governor declined to receive it 
but indicated that it should be given to his wife , who accepted the 
$) , 000. 128 Branner and Callaway were dead in 1879,  and when first 
questioned about �he bribe Wilson denied any knowledge of it. 129 After 
Mabry' s testimoney, Wilson entered a deposition in which he admitted 
that the five men - had agreed to give the money to Brownlow or some mem­
ber of his family. lJO 
The Brownlow bribe represents the most serious evidence linking 
McGhee to the corruption of the Republican government during Reconstruc-
tion. Taken with the other evidence it supports the contention of the 
majority o f  the 1879 investigating committee that "The greater part of 
the present debt is the result of a vicious p�licy and corrupt legisla-
tion, superinduced by the various corporate bodies interested in securing 
aid from the state . 11l3l It is probable that Brownlow was first led t o  
recommend aid to the railroads by the desire , very natural in an old 
East Tennessee Whig, to see the isolation of the region broken by the 
transportation facilities which would secure the pro sperity and develop-
ment of Knoxville and the surrounding area. Later, the railroad men, 
.especially Mabry, did everything possible to increase their influence 
with the governor. His son, General James P. Brownlow, a distinguished 
veteran of the Union Army, was placed on the payroll as superintendent 
128 The State Debt , 176-78 . 
lJOibid. , 93- 94. 
129Ibid. , 92 . 
lJlibid. , 8 .  
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of the Knoxville and Kentucky in March, 1868 . 132 Another son, John Bell 
Brownlow, was reportedly hired by Mabry as a lobbyist , along with the 
governor' s sometime newspaper partne+,  the Reverend Thomas H. Pearne . l33 
Fina1ly, the $5 , 000 gift explains wby Brownlow did not push the prosecu-
tion of those responsible for the bear raid of the summer of 1868 . As 
for the legislature , its generosity to the railroads was obviously due 
in part to the lobbying of Mabry and his cohorts who must have spent 
lavishly in order to have expended $28 , 000 of Knoxville and Kentucky funds .  
The inyestigating committee , however, failed to produce the de-
tailed evidence which would have proved that the state bonds were ille-
gally appropriated or issued.  The minority of the committee noted that 
though the Brownlow bribe was outrageous , "it had nothing to do with the 
passage of any law or the issuance of  any bonds , and, is not ,  therefore , 
relevant to the matter being considered. "l34 Senator J .  H. Clapp , 
speaking for the minority, complained that the majority report was un-
supported by specifics : 
Who was bribed? How many? We request you to be specific in 
so grave a charge as this . The testimony fails to fix the 
charge of bribery upon a single member of the Legislature , 
The only specific case was that of the member bribed by 
Bearden, and that member • • • returned the bribe and voted 135 against the bill for which he was expected to give his vote.  
The fact is that the committee never knew all of the intricate de-
tails surrounding the relationship between the railroads and the state 
l3�g, March 25 , 1868 . 
l33The State Debt , 189-90 .  
l35Daily American, March 19,  1879 . 
government either during or after Reconstruction. Those details will 
probably remain incomplete as will the role of McGhee in that tangled 
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history. One piece of circumstantial evidence , in which the committee 
would have been interested , however, has come to light since 1879 o 
Among McGhee ' s  papers are a series of letters from B .  M. Branner which 
were written during June , 1879 . Branner was the brother of  John R .  
Branner who was involved in the speculation in Tennessee bonds and in 
the Brownlow bribe . B .  M. Branner wrote McGhee that he had papers 
"that may have an important bearing not only on the suit about which you 
are now so much engaged but also upon private and individual matters 
about which you may fin<i you are very materially interested. 11136 The 
suit to which Branner referred was probably Stevens y. East Tennessee , 
Virginia and Georgia and other railroads , an action brought by holders 
of state bonds who hoped to assume the state ' s  lien against the rail-
roads which had received bonds during Reconstruction. Had the suit sue-
ceeded it would have established the liability of  the railroads for pay-
ment of  these bonds which Tennessee was just then trying to repudiate or 
"scale down. " Surviving correspondence between Wilson and McGhee , who 
were in control of several of  the ra;ilroads named in the suit , shows that 
the matter was very much on their minds in the summer of i879 . 137 
Apparently McGhee and Branner entered into negotiations and on June 27 
Branner wrote :  
l36B .  M. Branner to McGhee , June 2 ,  1879 , McGhee Papers . 
l37Ricbard T .  Wilson to McGhee , April 27 , May 7 ,  10 , 19, Septem­
ber 6 and 11 , 1879 , ibid. 
Before leaving I make this further prqposition as a final 
adjustment of matters between rou � ! individually. • • • 
To wit .  You pay me 13 , 000 . 00 and loan me 12500 on one and 
two years , I to deliver. your letters and the Green letter 
r�ferred to . 
I f  you accept you can t elegraph Monday morning saying 
"all right" and I will come down. 
· 
P. S .  Your proposition to pay $3 , 000 will not do . 138 
Among the letters to which B. M. Branner referred were probably the 
several notes which McGhee had written to John R. Branner in January, 
60 
1868 . These show, as stated above , that McGhee was deeply involved in 
the affairs of C .  Powell , Green & Company whose failure resulted in the 
loss of funds belonging to the Knoxville and Kentucky and other railroads . 
The letters seem to indicate that McGhee might have salvaged some of these 
funds had he not been so concerned with working C. Powell , Green out of 
its difficultie s .  At any rate , �cGhee wanted very badly to get the 
letters back, and it is assumed that he and Branner came to some sort 
of agreement . 
Branner must not have sold all of  the letters in his possession, 
for in 1892 he tried some more blackmail :  
I have letters (which you never saw nor dreamed of) showi� 
how the last omnibus bill just after the war was past [ �J . 
You saw some of  these letters which related more particularly 
to you in person. These others are of a more general charac­
ter, and show what relation the road and certain individuals 
occupy towards the people and the state . 
You can show or advertise this letter if you wish. It 
will be an invitation to me to advertise some others , that 
the people and especially the Legislature may see how things 
have been done . l39 
· 
138 B.  M. Branner to McGhee , June 27 ,  1879 , �· 
l39Branner to McGhee ,  July 5 ,  1892 , �· 
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Such letters would have been interesting in 1870 or 1879 , but by 
1892 the corruption of the past had lost its political usefulness.  Most 
of the principals were dead, the state debt question had been settled, 
and the statute of limitations had long since run out . There is no in-
dication that McGhee was moved to curiosity about Branner' s second 
collection of papers . 
McGhee emerged almost unscathed from the post-war debacle which 
ruined Mabr,y and seriously wounded the Republican party in Tennessee . 
Indeed he protited especially from the bankruptcy of the Knoxville and 
Kentucky. It had become obvious that the railroad would never be com-
pleted without outside help , nor would the company ever be able to pay 
its interest or retire the state bonds . In an effort to tidy up the un-
happy railroad legacy of Reconstruction the Conservative legislature 
provided for the sale of the defaulting companies .  A commission was 
appointed to establish the minimum value of the railroads , �d the Knox-
ville and Kentucky was appraised at $892 , 500 in state bonds . The com-
mission advertised for bids , and on September 20 , 1871 , it was found 
that only $300 , 000 in bonds had been offered. Since this bid was well 
below the minimtim value , a new sale was held, and on October 5 the 
Knoxville and Kentucky was sold for $350 , 000 , no other bids having 
been received. l40 Thus the state disposed of its interest at a loss 
of $2 , 000 , 000 . 
l40Fairfax Harrison, ! History of the Le�l Development of the 
Railroad System of the Southern Railway Compan.y Washington, D. C .  : 
1901) , 870-72.  Cited hereafter as Legal History. 
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The new owners were a group of Northern and Southern capitalists .  
The only Tennessean in the combination was McGhee , but the group in-
eluded Anthony Legget Maxwell , a railroad contractor and bridge builder 
who lived sometimes in Knoxville and sometimes in Macon, Georgia. Other 
Georgians included were Joseph E. Brown, a former governor and a leading 
Democrat ; W. C .  Morrill , secretary-treasurer of the Western and Atlantic 
Railroad ; and Alfred Austell , a former East Tennessean who was an 
Atlanta banker and cotton factor. Northerners were Thomas A Scott , 
president of the Pennsylvania Railroad ; United States Senator Simon 
Cameron of Pennsylvania and his son Donald ; Secretary of the Interior 
Columbus Delano and his son John. l4l 
T�s combination had been brought together by McGhee after months 
of painstaking work.  As early as July, 1870 , he stated that the East 
Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia would be unable to complete the Knox� 
ville and Kentucky, and he hoped that the Louisville and Nashville would 
buy it and complete it to a junction with that line . 142 The 1. & N. hung 
back, however,  and in March, 1871 ,  McGhee interested Morrill in the Knox­
ville and Kentucky, as well as in some coal land which lay along the 
railroad ' s  route. Morrill had important connections in the group which 
had just leased the state-owned Western and Atlantic in Georgia ; among 
these were Scott , the Camerons , the Delanos , and Brown. After having 
the coal lands and the Knoxville and Kentucky examined, the northerners 
141 
142 
Press and Herald, October 14, 1871.  
Chronicle , July 27 , 1870 .  
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and Brown agreed to join in the purchase . l43 Apparently the new ow,ners 
intended to complete the road to a connection with the L. & N. and at 
some time to merge it with the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia 
which was soon to come under the control of Scott ' s  holding company, 
the Southern Railways Securities Company. 
Scott ' s  dreams of a Southern rail empire failed, however, and 
for a decade the Knoxville and Kentucky, reorganized as the Knoxville 
and 0hio , was operated by McGhee as a coal hauling subsidiary of the 
East Tennessee . 144 
In 1881 when the East Tennessee began an aggressive policy of ex-
pansion, McGhee and associates sold the Knoxville and Ohio to that sys-
tem for $1 , 808 , 745 . 72 . During the ten years between the sales the Knox-
ville and Ohio was extended by seven miles ,  and four miles o f  branch 
line were built . The value of  the coal trade on the line had probably 
increased greatly by 1881 , but neither this factor nor the improvements 
seems sufficient to explain the more than 400 percent profit which Mc­
Ghee and his group made on the sale to the East Tennessee . 145 Just how 
much McGhee personally made on the deal is unknown, but it is likely 
that his return was enough to have made him feel that his long con-
nection with the Knoxville and Kentucky had been worthwhile . 
Since he was presiden� of the Knoxville and Ohio and vice presi-
dent of the East Tennessee , any profit which he made is subject to con-
damnation on the grounds of  conflict of interest.  These conflicts ,  
l43w. C .  Morrill to McGhee , March 27 , April 24, 28 ,  May 11 , 14 , 
July 14, 15 , August 3 , September 5 , 1871 , McGhee Papers . 
1�rrison, Legal History, 872-76.  
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however, were hardly recognized as such in the 1880 1 s . In fact ,  among 
the new breed of financiers who ran Southern railroads in this period, 
exploitive manipulation was the chief means of profit making. 146 McGhee 
�as learning these new skills , and he was leaving behind the men like 
Mabry whose talents for merely manipulating provincial legislatures did 
not make them equal to the challenges of a new era in railroad building. 
l46Maury Klein, The Great Richmond Terminal : A Study in Business­
� !E! Business Strate8i'(Charlottesville : University Press-or Vir­
ginia for the Eleutherian Mills-Bagley Foundation, 1970) , 12-16. 
CJIA.PTER III 
A NEW REGIME : McGHEE AND THE EAST TENNESSEE, 
VIRGINIA, AND GEORGIA RAILROAD 
As Joseph Mabry' s prospects waned along with those of the 
Republican party in Tennessee , the fortunes of McGhee and the Democrats 
waxed. In the decade of the seventies the Knoxville capitalist stepped 
forward not only as a spokesman of the Democracy but also as a civic 
leader respected for his wealth, power, and public spiritedness. He 
helped to impose a new regime upon East Tennessee ' s  railroads while 
assisting the Conservative and Democratic redeemers in the establish-
ment of a new state political order. He nevertheless avoided the spirit 
of vindictiveness and maintained good relations with the Republicans and 
Unionists .  His friends and business associates were drawn from parti-
sans of both persuasions , and he seemed to have had a respect for men of 
principle and character that transcended political labels . In 1877 he 
commissioned a portrait of the unreconstructed historian, J.  G. M. 
Ramsey, w�eh was hung in the Tennessee State Library. 1 When the vener-
able and outspoken old Unionist , Thomas W. Humes,  was deposed as presi-
dent of East Tennessee University, McGhee gave him the position of librar-
ian at the new public library which he established in memory of his 
l . David Lawson Eubanks , "Dr. J .  G. M. Ramsey of East Tennessee : 
A Career of Public Service" (unpublished Ph. D .  dissertation, The Uni­
versity of Tennessee , Knoxville , 1965 ) , 357 . 
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daughter in 1885 . 2 Withal , he was definitely a Democrat and he did play 
a role in the party' s  resurgence of the 1870 ' s . 
The first legislature elected ��der the new or redeemed constitu­
tion of 1870 was strongly Conservative and Democratic. 3 D. W. C .  Senter' s 
successor as governor, John Calvin Brown, was an ex-Confederate brigadier 
and a member of a Middle Tennessee family which had furnished the state 
an antebellum governor. 4 The speaker of the senate was John C .  Vaughan 
from Monroe County, who had also served the Confederacy as a brigadier 
general . 5 James D. Richardson, a Middle Tennessean who was speaker of 
the house , had been only eighteen when the war broke out , but he had 
immediately enlisted and had become the adjutant of his Confederate 
regiment . 6 The new complexion of state government was clear : the 
rebels had recaptured the state house , and the influence of Middle and 
West Tennessee in the councils of state would be relatively enhanced, 
while that of the East would be partially eclipsed. 
Among the ex-Confederate Conservatives and Democrats who took 
office in October, 1871 , was Charles McGhee , chosen Knox County' s member 
2stanley J. Folmsbee , Tennessee Establishes � State University 
1§12-1887, in The University £f Tennessee Record , LXIV 1 No . j (May, 
1961 ) ,  67-89 ; McGhee to E. J .  Sanford , July 1 ,  1886 , McGhee l:>apers . 
3Alexander, Political Reconstruction, 234. 
4John Trotwood Noore ( ed. ) and Austin Foster, Ten.YJ.essee : � 
Volunteer State , 11.§.2.-J-m. 0+ vols . ; Chicago and Nashville : S .  J Clark 
Publishing Company, 1923) , II , 49 . 
5Daniel M. Robison (ed. ) ,  Biographical Directo;Y of � Tennessee 
General Assembly, 1796-1.2£2., Preliminary No . 24, Loudon County, Monroe 
County (Nashville : Tennessee State Librai� and Archives ,  1968- ) ,  40 . 
6�. , Preliminary No . 6 ,  Rutherford County, 45-46 . 
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of the house of representatives at the election held a r�ar before on 
November 8 ,  1870. 7 His election was almost unopposed, and although the 
Knoxville Daily Press and Herald, the Conservative newspaper, carried 
his name at its masthead along with those of other Conservative candi-
dates ,  the Republican Chronicle (successor to Brownlow' s  �g) did not 
. 8 oppose· him . In fact the Press and Herald, as it endorsed his candidacy, 
stressed the fact that McGhee was not a politician. 9 A letter to the 
editor spoke of him as "the People ' s  candidate , " rather than as a Demo-
t C t . 10 era or onserva 1ve . McGhee , in his announcement for office , declared 
that he was becoming a candidate "In response to the calls which have 
been made upon me by members of both political parties • • . •  11 11 
McGhee had actually been active in Conservative politics for some 
time . In 186 9 he was at Nashville when the legislature elected a United 
States senator. He was apparently an energetic supporter of former Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson, for he sent a telegram to Thomas A. R. Nelson urging 
Nelson to use his influence with a member to vote for Johnson for the 
12 senate . In 1872 he was the chairman of the second congressional 
7The election was the first held under the new constitution of  
1870 , but the governor and legislators did not take office until almost 
a year later. 
1870 . 




and Herald, October 
October 16, 1870 . 
to Nelson, October 
13 , 1870. 
llibid. ' October 20 , 1870. 
19 , 1869, Nelson Papers . 
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district's Democratic committee.13 He declined to stand for Congress 
himself but suggested to Nelson that if he should run ,  the legislature 
would give him a district which would be easy to carry. 14 McGhee prob-
ably participated in the gerrymandering of the second district to dilute 
the Republicans 9 strength. 15 In 1870, however, he was conspicuously 
absent from the Conservative convention and rallies . 16 
There were several good reasons why McGhee was anxious to be 
elected to the thirty-seventh general assembly and why Knoxvillians of I l i 
\ 
·both parties were glad to have him represent the county. Radical Repub- \ 
licanism had been good to East Tennessee ; it had showered the bounty of 
the state on the railroads which radiated from Knoxville, and it had 
made East Tennessee University the beneficiary of the Morrill Act. 
Knoxvillians (and of course McGhee especially) were extremely interested 
in the future of the area's railroads�-a future which could be affected 
for good or ill by the attitude of the state government. State aid to 
the railroads was dead, but it remained an important political issue, 
lJPress � Herald, August J, 1872. 
1�cGhee to Nelson, December 4, 1871, Nelson Papers. 
l5As a Conservative member of the legislature, representing a 
county in the second congressional district, McGhee was probably active 
in gerrymandering the district so that it stretched from Sevier County 
on the North Carolina line deep into Middle Tennessee. The district 
vaguely resembled a batt.ering ram, and it was said that it was so con­
structed in order to "butt" the incumbent Republican congressman, Horace 
Maynard, from office. Instead, Maynard capitalized on the candidacies 
of two Democrats and was elected as the member-at-large from the state. 
Jacob M. Thornburg, a Republican, was elected from the second district. 
Robert H.  White, Messages of the Governors of Tennessee (8 vols. ; 
Nashville : Tennessee Historical Commission, 1952 to date), VI , 201-2. 
16chronicle, September ll, November 8, 1870 .  
and the prospect of Conservative Middle and West Tennesseans attacking 
the East Tennessee railroads which had once seemed to own the Republican 
party was naturally disquieting. 
Even more vulnerable to the jealousy of politicians from the other 
two grand divisions was Knoxville ' s  East Tennessee University. As the 
historian of the University has observed : "The political overturn of  
1869 was fraught with peril for East Tennessee University and came very 
near depriving it of the agricultural college endowment . ,. l7 Leading 
Republicans had successfully fought to make the state eligible for a 
federal grant and the establishment of a land-grant college . Then East 
Tennesseans like Joseph A. Mabry lobbied the Radical legislature in be-
half of the University' s claims to the endowment . Finally McGhee ' s  
friend Ed��rd J .  Sanford, a lifelong Republican, guided through the 
general assembly an act which made East Tennessee Univer�ity the state ' s  
land-grant institution. 18 Hardly had the Conservative legislature of 
1869 convened, before a committee was appointed to investigate whether 
the University had complied with the terms of the act which assigned to 
it the Morrill endowment . It was generally understood that Middle and 
West Tennesseans in the legislature were determined to obtain a share 
of the endowment for institutions in their sections , and at the time 
of McGhee ' s  election in l87d it appeared likely that they would succeed. 19 
What Knoxville needed then was a respected and influential repre-
sentative , acceptable to the Conservatives , who could bargain and 
l7Folmsbee , East Tennessee 
18
.lli.£. ' 60-61. 
University, 71 .  
19Ibid. , 71-72 . 
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negotiate for the welfare of East Tennessee ' s  University and railroads . 
McGhee must have seemed just the man, and a few days before the elec-
tion the incumbent Republican representative , Will R. McBath, withdrew 
his candidacy with a cryptic statement saying that his friends knew 
his 
20 
reason. Years later a Republican newspaper charged that the 
Sanford faction of the party had engineered the withdrawal of McBath, 
21 who had been paid $1 , 000 to leave the field to McGhee . Whether or not 
this payment was actually made , it is probable that Sanford and his 
followers had a lot to do with clearing the way for McGhee ; this kind 
of "trading off" between the parties has been a time- honored Tennessee 
political tradition. 22 
For McGhee ' s  part , the explanation of this brief foray into 
public political life is simple . There were jobs in Nashville which he 
could do , and he would do them to benefit his city, his section, his 
friends , and his own interests .  Public office for its own sake held no 
attraction for McGhee , and he was probably being entirely candid when he 
said : "I only consented (or desired) to be a member of the Legislature 
on account of the interest I felt in the Agricultural College fund. It 
was business not political ambition that induced me to desire the seat. 11 23 
By the time he took office the worst of the crisis was over as 
far as the University was concerned, and it is not possible to determine 
how much he was able to help his alma mater in the successful fight to 
20chronicle , November 4,  1870 . 21�. , August 29,  1886 . 
22see for instance ,  V. 0. Key, Jr. , Southern Politics in State 
and Nation (New York : Alfred A .  Knopf, 1949) , 78-79,  284. 
23McGhee to Nelson, December 9,  1871 , Nelson Papers . 
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keep the Morrill endowment . He did introduce a resolution, which passed 
�he legislature , requesting the state ' s  railroads to provide free trans­
portation for students travelling to and from the Univers �ty. 24 This 
rna� have been a sop for the benefit of Middle and West Tennesseans who 
lived far from Knoxville , and it is unknown whether any of the railroads 
complied with the request . Still , McGhee ' s  devotion to the University 
was obviously sincere . He became a t rustee in 1870 and served until 
1886 when he moved out of the state . During much of this time he acted 
as the secretary-treasurer of the board. 25 
For a freshman legislator with no previous experience , McGhee 
�s extremely active during his term. He was a member of  two important 
committees--Education and Ways and Means . On the former he was in a 
position to support the University' s cause ; his appointment to Ways and 
Means was probably a tribute to his wealth and financial ability. Only 
one other member of  the house introduced more bills during the regular 
26 session of the thirty- seventh general assembly. Among the bills which 
he sponsored were two designed to benefit Knoxville by simple changes of 
name . One sought to amend the municipal charter by changing the word 
"town" to "city" ; 27 the other was designed to change the name of the 
river that flows past Knoxville from "Holston" to "Tennessee . 11 28 It was 
generally thought that this change would facilitate �he expenditure of 
2�blic Act s ,  1871 , Ch. LXIII , 2R5 . 
25The University £f Tennessee Record ,  I ,  No . 4 (June , 1898 ) ,  251 . 
26 House Journal , 1871 ,  pp. 487-50J . 
28Ibid . , 146 . 
27 Ibid. , 157 . 
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federal funds for river improvement in the vicinity of Knoxville . 29 
McGhee ' s  river bill passed the house but died in the senate ; his attempt 
to legislate Knoxville from a town to a city failed to pass either 
house . JO 
A more important and successful venture in the area of local 
legislation was McGhee ' s  bill to establish a separate criminal court 
district for Knox County. Jl This may have been--as he claimed--an 
attempt to make the courts operate more swiftly and efficiently. 32 On 
the other hand, it had the effect of removing a Republican district 
attorney from · the Knox County courts.  If  this act was intended to in-
jure the Republicans it failed, for Jacob M. Thornburgh, the district 
attorney, was elected to the United States House of Representatives at 
the next election, and the Republicans chose a district attorney for the 
new Knox County criminal court . 33 Another McGhee bill suspected of 
being inspired by partisanship was one which prov�ded for the publish­
ing of the opinions of the state supreme court . 34 Although the bill was 
endorsed by all the justices , the Knoxville Chronicle saw it as "a fu.r-
ther attempt to feed from the public crib a few partisan sheets.  • 
We do not suppose , "  the Chronicle remarked, "that Mr. McGhee has any 
29Montgomery, "Nomenclature of the Upper Tennessee , " 52-5J . 
JO� Journal, 1871,  p.  511 . 
JlPublic �' 1871 , Ch. LIV, 47-49 . 
32Press � Herald, December 10 , 1871 .  
33chronicle , August J ,  November 9 ,  1872. 
34Press � Herald, October 16 , 1871 .  
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interest in legislating money into the pockets of the Press � Herald. 
" If not ,  it added, let him frame the bill to prevent fraud. 35 
McGhee did introduce a proposal to change the method of selecting the 
public printer (presumably to remove it from partisanship ) but neither 
this bill nor the one for publishing supreme court decisions was 
passed. 36 
Though the promotion of the University and of his home town were 
important to McGhee , legislation affecting railroads must have consumed 
much of his attention while he served in Nashville . His bill making it 
a misdemeanor for railway engineers to fail to stop before crossing the 
line of another railroad was probably an attempt to give the force of 
law to a company regulation. 37 The bill passed without many votes 
against it , but there was opposition in the senate from Henry R. Gibson, 
a Republican who represented a district adjoining Knox County. 38 What-
ever Gibson' s objection to this particular bill may have been, he was a 
persistent opponent of legislation favored by the railroads .  Certain 
Republicans , Gibson among them, seem to have seized upon railroad bait-
ing as a means of recouping the party' s  popularity. After all , the 
Republicans ' Reconstruction romance with the railroads had contributed 
·to the party ' s  fall from power, and it must have been galling to witness 
the railroad men' s influence on the now ascendant Democrats .  Gibson 
35Chronicle , October 17 , 1871 .  
36House Journal , 1871 ,  pp. 504, 508 . 
37Public Acts ,  1871 , Ch. XLVI , 42 . 
38senate Journal , 1871 , p .  245 . 
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attacked ttan Act to authorise the Railroad Commissioners to perfect 
their sales , "  which was framed to guarantee the titles to the railroads 
foreclosed by the state and subsequently sold to private parties such 
as McGhee and his associates. He noted that "the Bill was the special 
darling of the railroad lobby who used every effort to secure its pas-
sage , employing their wiles and artifices unblushingly on the very 
floor of the Senate during the debates . "39 Gibson was something of a 
maverick in his attacks upon the corporations , but even the Chronicle ' s  
Nashville correspondent , who may in fact have been Gibson himself, 
Joined in decrying the influence of the railroad lobby: 
When I look around the Senate and the House and see the lobby 
at work, I can only exclaim, "May God help the taxpayers ! "  
The influence of the lobby is almost irresistable . Mr. This 
and Mr. That , Col. So and Col. Thus , General Which and General 
What , are always on hand, working cunningly and ceaselessly, 
and before a member knows it he is convinced or committed. 40 
Some Republicans relished the opportunity to emphasize the rail-
roads ' hold upon the Democrats ,  and there was undeniable evidence that 
such influence existed. When the new administration took office , Colonel 
Edmund W. Cole , president of the Nashville , Chattanooga,  and St . Louis , 
entertained in honor of Governor Brown, and the Nashville Republican 
Banner reported that "all the State officers , many members of the Legis-
lature and prominent Citizens were present . 114l East Tennessee 
Republicans might have made a good deal more of this issue had they been 
able to distinguish between the railroads and the railroad managers . 
40Chronicle , November 17 , 1871 . 
41Republican Banner, October 14, 1871 . 
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But in the 1870 ' s the progress-bearing railroad was such an object of 
veneration for both parties in Tennessee that few politicians or news-
papers had the heart consistently to attack the men who controlled the 
railroad companies .  
When a vigorous assault was loosed upon McGhee and his friends , 
it came not from the Republicans , nor out of any reformist movement , 
but from a disgruntled Democratic newspaper which was serving the in-
terests of other railroad men. The occasion for the attack was the 
introduction of a bill to require solvent railroads to pay their interest 
on state bonds in cash rather than in past due state bond coupons . 42 In 
the eyes of the Memphis Daily Appeal this was a deliberate attempt to 
force the Memphis and Charleston Railroad into bankruptcy, and this may 
have been what McGhee actually had in mind. The East Tennessee , Vi�inia, 
and Georgia, in which he was heavily interested, was seeking control of 
the M.  & C.  which ran westward to Memphis from near Chattanooga where it 
connected with the East Tennessee . Major Moses Wicks , president of the 
M. & C . , seems to have been determined to hold his road out of the com-
bination--hence , McGhee ' s  bill and the Appeal ' s  violent reaction to it . 
Wicks had already made good use of the Appeal in a campaign to liquidate 
the M. & C . ' s  debt to the state . He paid the newspaper $7 , 000 to attack 
the validity of Tennessee bonds , thus driving down the price and enabling 
Wicks to buy them cheaply to retire the debt . 43 Whether he had to pay 
the paper to attack McGhee is not known. 
42� Journal , 1871,  p .  lll . 
43Thomas Harrison Baker, The Memphis Commercial Appeal (Baton 
Rouge : Louisiana State University Press , 1971), 125-26.  
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The Appeal opened its campaign by praising McGhee as "The most 
potent of all the agents at Nashville . • He deserves the power he 
wields . He is shrewd, adroit ,  generous , and, in business transactions , 
trustworthy. " :But , it continued, "He absolutely persuaded himself that 
his own, and the interests of the tax-payers of Tennessee are identical 
with those of Tom Scott . If these men, 11 it added, "achieve their plans 
how long before there will be little McGhees enough, members of the 
General Assembly of Tennessee , not only to define the rates of taxation 
as Wall Street dictates but to convene and adjourn the body of law-givers 
in accordance with the behest of Tom Scott? 1144 The Appeal went on to re-
call Reconstruction, when "McGhee ' s  roads reigned at Nashville" and his 
New York ring ruined the credit of Tennessee . 4.5 The attacks on "McGhee ' s  
conspiracy against the people" became ever more personal . "The devil on 
the mountain offering bribes to our Savior was the impersonation of no 
diviner majesty than this of Charles McGhee . "  Worse still , he had an 
unholy influence over the governor:  "He sits by Governor :Brown, sleeping 
and waking, and fills a place on the floor of the House . • • • 1146 
These editorials , with their accusat1ons that East Tennessee ' s  
railroads had nearly bankrupted the state, brought Knoxville ' s  news­
papers into the fight . The Democratic Press and Herald was indignant ; 47 
the Republican Chronicle , though amused at the opposition' s  internal 
feuding, also came to McGhee ' s  defense : 
4�emphis Daily Appeal , October 2.5, 1871 .  Scott was president of 
the Pennsylvania Railroad and a power in the Southern Rai lway Security 
Company. 
4.51Ei£. , October 27 , 1871 . 46Ibid. , October 28 , 1871.  
47Press and Herald, October 27 , 1871 . 
The Memphis Appeal of Wednesday, devotes well nigh its entire 
issue to the benefit of our worthy Representative in the Legis­
lature , Hon. C .  M. McGhee , and Tom Scott , the Railroad King of 
Pennsylvania , and takes occasion to give Governor Brown a 
severe dig undei the fifth rib . The Appeal finds fault with 
McGhee because he is willing that Scott come in here with his 
capital , take charge of and build certain railroads in East 
Tennessee , and says Governor Brown has "unconsciously fallen 
into the bands of thel3e xemorselel3s railway speculators . "  We 
have read the editorial , and have come to the conclusion that 
Mr. McGhee may be guilty of the charges contained therein, 
and yet not be a serious enemy to the prosperity of the State 
or his immediate constituents . 48 
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Other ne�spapers also took McGhee ' s  part , the Nashville Republican Banner 
remarking that "There is no longer any room for doubt about the Memphis 
Appeal ' s  insanity. "49 The Nashville Union and American said that the 
attacks had brought to McGhee ' s  side his fellow Democrats ,  "who have 
read these attacks with astonishment and seen with pleasure the patience 
with which he has borne them. ,.50 McGhee 1 s patience must have worn thin, 
however, because the controversy brought him to the brink of a duel 
with Wicks . Only a public letter from Isham G. Harris and J .  B.  Cooke , 
which said that the. "personal difficulty" between the two men had re­
sulted from a misunderstanding, quieted the bitter feud. 5l 
What finally settled the affair was an agreement that the Southern 
Railway Security Company, which controlled the East Tennessee , should 
48chronicle , October 27 , 1871 . 
49Republican Banner, October 28 , 1871. 
50Nashville � and American, October 31 ,  1871 .  
5lPress and Herald , October 29 ,  1871 . 
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lease the Memphis and Charleston. 52 The Appeal did an abiq.pt flip-flop 
and gave its blesSing to the union, which it asserted would guarantee 
the prosperity of Memphis . S3 The newspapers of the state were sur­
prised but amused, S4 and the Press and Herald was jubilant over the 
Appeal ' s  humiliation. "Great Scott , "  read the headline which described 
the Appeal ' s  about face : 
At the opening of the present session of the General Assembly, 
or soon thereafter, it will.,be remembered , an unlocked for 
outbreak in the office of the Memphis Appeal startled even 
the sleeping echoes of the war in Western Tennessee , and 
about the halls of legislation in Nashville . The alarming I discovery was made that Tom Scott , the insatiate gobbler of 
railroads and purchaser of Legislatures ,  had foisted an agent , 
in the mild-mannered personage of the very amiable and ex­
cellent gentleman from Knox--Col. Ghas . M. McGhee--into the 
General Assembly of Tennessee , with the view of buying up the 
members , debauching the Governor, pocketing the Treasury, and 
stripping the down trodden and poverty stricken people of the 
State even to "the last axe and the last hoe and the last 
plow, " through the cruel process of taxation, under the 
meretricious plea of "State Credit . "  All this , Tom Scott , 
through "Charley McGhee"--the blue-eyed charmer of se.d.uc-
tive glfUlces--reinforced by all the "+ittle McGhees"--was 
expecteO.. to accomplish ere the, "well meaning" Governor and 
the "simple minded" verdants of the Legislature., "fresh from 
the people , "  as they were , could' be , aroused to an appreciation 
1of the peril to which their unsophi$ticated virtue was exposed. 
The_ apprehensions of the Appeal were terrible and truly "orful 
to kontemplate . " 
The receipt of intelligence at Nashville , on Friday evening, 
that Tom Scott--the veritable head-devil of the imaginary 
legion of diabolical railroad consp}rators--had actually 
S2This lease was announced in December, 1871 , and was legally 
concluded on March S , 1872 . Harrison, Legal History, 751 ; John F. Stover, � Railroads of the �' 1865-1900 (Chapel Hill : University of North 
Carolina Press ,  1955 ) , 116 . 
S3Daily Appeal , December 11 , 1871 . 
S4aepublican Banner and Union � American, December 10 , 1871 .  
"gobbled up" the Memphis and Cbarleston Railroad, of 
which the well-armed Appeal bas been the unblanching 
champion and stalwart protector, was the occasion of no 
little excitement and merriment • • . .  55 
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There was merriment in the legislature too where Representative 
Boyd M. Cheatham of Robertson County introduced the following resolu-
tion : 
Whereas , Information bas been received by this General 
Assembly through the medium of the Memphis papers that 
financial arrangements have been successfully consumated 
by which the Memphis & Charleston R. R. and its appurten­
ances (including, of course , the Memphis Appeal ) and other 
valuable and important public institutions , have passed 
into the hands , or under the control of "Tom Scott , "  and 
as the time is near at hand when, under the admirable 
financial provisions of the Constitution of Tennessee , 
the per diem of the members will cease , therefore . 
Resolved ,  That the Speaker of the House be requested to 
telegraph said Tom Scott at once , info�ng him of the 
state of affairs and ascertaining from him if he bas any 
other financial business or legislation to bring before 
the General Assembly. If he has not then we do adjourn 
on Friday next at 12 M. 56 
The Press � Herald reported that Representative Farrington Snipes of 
Madison County moved that the resolution be referred to a special com-
mittee of one , "to consist of the Hon. Representative from Knox. 
When the report of the committee comes in, let the Appeal , as in duty 
now bound, once more shout "Great Scott , "  and let all the "little 
McGhees" cry "Amen! "S7 
SSDaily Appeal , December 10 , 1871.  
57 Ibid. 
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2 .  
The McGhee-Wicks controversy, while i t  dramatized an unfolding 
struggle for control of important railroads , was actually a sideshow 
to the main event . And, although McGhee ' s  term in the legislature 
served to emphasize the close relationship of business and politics ,  
his business activities in the 1870 ' s  were far more important than his 
political ones .  Likewise , his alliance with the group of Northern 
capitalists who bought the Knoxville and Kentucky in 1871 was merely 
one event in the revolution that was taking place among Southern rail-
roads ; far more crucial was his role in the conversion of the East 
Tennessee , Virginia ,  and Georgia from two short local roads into a 
regional system. 
McGhee ' s  interest in the E .  T. & V. and the E.  T .  & G. seems to 
date from about the time of his temporary retirement from the affairs 
of the Knoxville and Kentucky. On June 1) , 1867 ( five months before his 
resignation from the presidency of the K.  an.d·K . ) , McGhee and five 
others�-Thomas H. Callaway, John R. Branner, Richard T. Wilson, Joseph 
Jaques ,  and R. C .  Jackson--formed a partnership to purchase stock in the 
two railroads . S8 Their company was capitalized at $200 , 000 , with each 
member to hold an equal part . McGhee , Branner, and Callaway were 
authorized to buy the stock ,  which, though belonging to the partnership , 
would be listed on the books of the railroad companies in the names of 
the individual partners . The intent of the partnership seems to have 
58copy of agreement in Miscellaneous Manuscripts ,  McClung 
Collection. 
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been to prevent competitive bidding for shares in the railroads and to 
insure that the stock would be voted in a block at the companies ' annual 
meetings . �9 The latter objective was especially important because in 
March, 1867 , the legislature had revised the charter of the E. T. & V. 
to permit the vot·ing of holdings in excess of five hundred shares .  60 
It thus became possible for the railroads to be controlled by persons 
with large blocs of stock ,  and control was obviously what the partners 
were after. 
In 1868 the partners had enough stock to dominate the election of 
directors , and Callaway, Jaques ,  and McGhee joined Branner on the board 
61 of the E. T. & V. A year later they were ready to push for consolida-
tion of the com�anies . Branner died in February, 1869 , and Callaway 
(already president of the E.  T .  & G. )  was elected to succeed him as 
president of the E. T.  & v. 62 The roads were therefore under the same 
management , and on Nbvember 29 ,  stockholders of both companies voted to 
consolidate under the title East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia Rail­
road Company. 63 The partnership was apparently dissolved after the 
death of Callaway in August , 1870 ,  and Wilson was elected to succeed 
him in the post which he would hold until 188o . 64 Only a few weeks be-
fore Callaway died , McGhee exchanged his four-thousand-acre plantation 
60Harrison, Legal History, 665-66.  
61East Tennessee and Virginia Rail Road Company, Annual Report , 
1868 , p .  5 .  
62Ibid. , 1869 , pp. 6-8 .  63Ibid. , 8- 13 . 
6�st Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad Company, Annual 
Report , 1870 ,  pp. 4-5 ; Stover, Railroads of the South, 115. 
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on the Little Tennessee for Callaway' s  large bloc of railroad stock in 
what was one of the most profitable trades of his life . 65 The exchange 
sympolized McGhee ' s  break with his Old South past and established the 
foundation for his fortune and for his career in the New South. 
McGhee was now the company' s  largest single stockholder, and with 
66 Wilson, Jaques ,  and Jackson he controlled the East Tennessee . On 
October 14, 187 1 ,  they sold their stock at par value to the Southern 
Railway Security Company under an agreement by which the vendors received 
their payment in cash and Southern Security stoqk. 67 McGhee probably got 
over a thousand shares of stock and about $50 , 000 in cash at the outset.  
The remainder of  his East Tennessee stock was to be turned over in in-
stallments upon the payment of five Southern Security notes to mature at 
six, nine , twelve , fifteen, and eighteen-month intervals . 68 Wilson became 
a director of Southern Security69 while R. H. Richards of Atlanta and 
65Press and Herald, August 23 , 1870 ; Worth S .  Ray, Tennessee 
Cousins , ! History of Tennessee People (Baltimore : Genealogical Publish­
ing Company, 1960 , 1966) , 404. When this writer first examined the Mc­
Ghee Pa�ers in 1968 , he saw a copy of the agreement with Callaway. This 
�uscript was missing, however, in September, 1970 (after the papers had 
been reorganized) , and cannot be located as of January, 1974. 
66 ·E .. T .  v. &: G. ' ;  Annual Report , 1871 , pp. 32-58 .  McGhee owned 
3 , 045 l/4 shares out of a total of approximately 19� 000 . In September, 
1871 , the four partners owned a total of  8 , 101 3/4 shares , and they 
probably cohtrolled enough other shares to make a niajority. 
67Agreement between Joseph Jaques and Southern Railway Security 
Company, October 14, 1871 ,  Joseph Jaques Papers , McClung Collection. 
68These details are based on the Jaques agreement . 
69c .  K.  Brown, "The l;)outhern Railway Security Company, An Early 
Instance of the Holding Company, 11 North Carolina Historical Review, VI 
', (1929 ) '  161 . 
83 
Morris K. Jesup ,  a New York banker, joined the board of the East Tennes­
see , probably to represent the interests of Southern Security. 70 
The · agreement with Southern Security was profitable to McGhee and 
his associates personally, but it was more important to them for its long 
term effect . Actually an alliance between the Southern roads cont rolled 
by Southern Security and the East Tennessee , the deal was sealed by the 
private financial arrangement with McGhee and the others which amounted 
to a bonus for their goodwill toward Southern Security and its other 
railroads . It is clear that Southern Security was much more than a 
front for what one historian has called "the Southern ambitions of  the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. 11 71 To be sure , Thomas A. Scott and his company 
were deeply involved in Southern Security; Scott seems to have envi-
sioned the holding company as the means of putting together a great 
Southern line which would connect the Pennsylvania with hi s pro jected 
Texas and Pacific Railroad. In other words , he saw it as the vital link 
in a transcontinental system. 72 But Southern Security was also the 
creation of the Baltimore capitalists , William Thompson Walters and 
Benjamin Franklin Newcomer, who were interested in eastern North Caro-
lina lines which were not on Scott ' s  route to the Pacific. Henry Bradley 
Plant of Augusta, Georgia, was heavily interested in the Southern Express . 
70 E. T . V. & G. , Annual Report , 1873 , pp. 4-5. 
7lStover, Railroads £! � South, 99 . 
72This hypothesis is based on Brown, "The Southern Railway Security 
Company" ; C .  Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction (Boston: Little , Brown, 
1966 ) , 68-100 ; and Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental Railway Strategy, 
1869-� (Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press , 1962) ,  17-27 . 
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Company, which had no particular connection with the Pennsylvania. Like-
wise, Morris K. Jesup, a New York banker , was not identified with the 
Pennsylvania; but like Plant , Newcomer , and Walters he would have a life­
long interest in the railroads of the seaboard South. 73 Thus Southern 
Security was not simply the Pennsylvania Railroad's holding company ; it 
was "a pooling of the interests of a number of capitalists who had al­
ready invested heavily in Southern railroads. "74 
• McGhee and Wilson saw Southern Security as the means by which 
they would try to expand the East Tennessee into an important system in 
the South. The holding company's control of the Richmond and Danville 
offered the East Tennessee another connection to the North . Acting for 
the East Tennessee, the two capitalists bought the Cincinnati , Cumber-
land Gap , and Charleston, which had been foreclosed because of its in­
ability to repay its debt to the state of Tennessee. 7S The C .  C. G. & C. 
ran from Morristown on the line of the East Tennessee to Paint Rock on 
the North Carolina border where it was supposed to connect with the 
73The importance of the Baltimore interest in Southern Security 
was emphasized by the Baltimore Gazette , November 17 , 1871 ,  in a long article quoted by the Press and Herald , November 19 , 1871. The Gazette stressed the role of Walters and maintained that the combination of 
Southern railroads was basically independent of the Pennsylvania. 
Stover in Railroads of the South ignores this possibility. Brown in 
"Southern Railway Security Company" states that while the Baltimore 
group was probably independent of the Pennsylvania Railroad , its influ­
ence in Southern Security was secondary to that of the Pennsylvania. Of 
Southern Security's seven directors , however, Walters, Plant , Jesup , and 
Wilson had no connection with the Pennsylvania. A strong argument can 
therefore be made that Southern Security was more an alliance of men 
interested in Southern railroads than a front for the Pennsylvania's 
"Southern Ambitions. " 
7�rown, "Southern Railway Security Company , "  163. 
7SHarrison, Legal History, 704- 10. 
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uncompleted Western North Carolina Railroad. McGhee and Wilson bought 
the title to the latter road with a view to completing it and estab-
lishing a major eastern outlet for the East Tennessee . Such a line 
would mean traffic with the Carolinas , and it would also provide a con­
nection with the Richmond and Danville . 76 In 1871 the East Tennessee ' s  
only northern outlet was at Bristol where the railroad was dependent 
upon the Atlantic , Mississippi , and Ohio for transportation to the north 
and east ; a connection with the Richmond and Danville would offer an 
alternative to this route and would greatly increase the leverage of 
the East Tennessee in traffic negotiations with the A .  M. & 0 .  
Equally important to  the East Tennessee was the security of its 
western flank which depended upon a connection at Chattanooga with the 
Memphis and Charleston. This was the reason for the East Tennessee ' s  
attempt to control the M. & C .  McGhee and Wilson might have accomplished 
this easily, had not Wicks resisted it and set off a commotion in the 
Memphis Appeal . As it was , he raised the alarm and probably delayed by 
several months the lease of the M. & C .  to Southern Security. The Wicks­
Appeal assault on "Great [ Tom] Scott and all the little McGhees" was the 
opening shot of the conflict provoked by McGhee ' s  and Wilson ' s  ambitious 
alliance with Southern Security. In this conflict Wicks was for a time 
the ally of the colorful and combative ex-Confederate general , William 
Mahone , president of the Atlantic , Mississippi , and Ohio . 
That there was bad blood between Wilson and McGhee and the general 
as early as 1868 is shown by a letter in the Mahone papers in which 
86 
Wilson wrote to Callaway about the possibility of removing Mahone from 
his presidency. 77 Wilson was interested in replacing Mahone with Joseph 
Jaques ,  who , before becoming vice president of the East Tennessee , was 
in charge of the salt works at Saltville , Virginia. 78 How the letter 
came into Mahone 1 s hands is not known, but it must have further em-
bittered him against the men who were about to turn his southwestern 
flank and who he felt had betrayed him . Mahone maintained that in late 
June of 1871 he had agreed to pay McGhee and Wilson $1 , 000 , 000 for 
10 , 000 shares of East Tennessee stock. During August ,  he said, the 
three men had consulted about "the progress of my negotiations and the 
programme for the new organization of their Road which was to follow 
under my purchase [ . ] "  On August 24, Wilson had written a friend that 
"we have seen Mahone and he has not got his money yet . We leave for 
Knoxville and shall stop over in Philadelphia to see Scott . "  On Septem-
ber 28 Mahone and Wicks met in New York and the latter reported rumors 
of the sale to Scott .  Mahone sent Wicks to see Wilson; Wicks reported 
back that "the negotiations with Scott was not closed. " Then Mahone 
offered "to take the entire stock of the Company (which might be offered 
for sale ) at par $100 . 
This proposition was made to Wilson (in his official capa­
city as President to be submitted to his shareholders) on 
Saturday Sept 30th or Monday Oct 2d. Wilson ' s reply to Wicks 
was : "There is no use to submit any such proposition to the 
77Wilson to Callaway, October 29 , 1868 , William Mahone Papers , 
Duke University Library, Durham, N. C .  
78Ibid. ; Press and Herald, June 1 ,  1871 .  
stockholders , McGhee Jaques Jackson and myself hold a 
majority and we have sold to Scott . "79 
87 
Mahone was furious and decided to make an open fight , attempting 
! ; 
to arouse public opinion against what he called "the Ring. " "It would 
seem, " he wrote Wicks , "that there is no contentment to their craw, how 
much do they want? Exterminate them or expel them from your state , "  he 
advised, "or you will be everlastingly mined in moral as well as in 
substance .  We can beat them yet if we only will do it . 1180 Wicks , how-
ever, made his peace with McGhee and Wilson. The M. & C .  was leased to 
Southern Security in March, 1872 , and the little general was left almost 
alone to fight "the Ring. "81 
Mahone ' s  natural allies ( such as they were ) consisted of a few 
dissatisfied stockholders in the East Tennessee and residents of Bristol , 
where the East Tennessee met Mahone ' s  road. The Bristol News , reporting 
rumors of the sale to Southern Security, was alarmed at the prospect : 
They [McGhee and Wilson] are said to have sold to that Cor­
poration their own stock at par, stipulating that they are to 
be kept in office for the consideration that the Memphis and 
Charleston road be cut off from its connection, and Mahone 
from his Western connections , thus destroying the through 
business of both lines and converting them into mere local 
roads . Nay, More ! They were offered par for the entire 
stock of the road, thus saving all the stockholders and pre­
serving the whole interests of both States ,  but they refused 
and left the large minority bound hand and foot . We wish 
we could pronounce these only rumors .  Alas they seem well 
authenticated. We wish it only could astound the people to 
79Mahone to Abram Fulkerson, September l ,  1872 ; Memorandum, 
Letterbook 19 , p .  378,  Mahone Papers . 
80 Mahone to Wicks , October 30 , 1871 , ibid. 
81Ha 0 rr�son, � History, 751 . 
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whom we speak. :But it will strike them with a dismay which 
we hope will cause them to arise in their legislative might 
to save themselves from a plot that implies their ruin. 82 
Knoxville and Morristown newspapers , however, were delighted by the sale , 
predicting that it would significantly enhance the prosperity of those 
towns and speed the development of all the surrounding country. 83 
Mahone took the battle to the East Tennessee ' s  annual meeting in 
November, 1872.  Here the stockholders were apparently unimpressed by 
his offer to buy all the shares at par, and a resolution commending the 
company' s  directors and officers was passed by a share vote of 15 , 346 3/4 
to 599 3/4. 84 Though Mahone steadfastly maintained that he had made an 
agreement to buy the McGhee and Wilson stock at par, he attacked the two 
for having made a sale to Southern Security on these iO.emt'rcal terms. 85 
This inconsistency was perhaps not lost on the East Tennessee ' s  minority 
holders who refused to support his attempts to unseat the McGhee-Wilson 
regime . 
Defeated at the stockholders meeting, Mahone carried the battle 
into the courts .  A suit was brought against McGhee , Wilson, and other 
86 directors and officers by several owners of East Tennessee shares .  
Mahone was in close communication with the plaintiff' s attorney, James T .  
Shields , and it  is clear that the action was designed to win for Mahone 
82:Bristol News , as quoted in Press and Herald, October 14, 1871 .  
83Ibid. ; Chronicle , October 27 , 1871 ; Morristown Gazette , as 
quoted in�ss and Herald, November 4, 1871 .  
8� . T .  V .  & G. , Annual Report , 1872 , p .  6 .  
85Mahone t o  Fulkerson, September 1 ,  1872 ,  Mahone Papers . 
86neaderick v. Wilson, 67 Tennessee ( 1874) 108-41 . 
in the courts what could not be won in a vote of the stockholders . 87 
The suit asked that the sale to Southern Security be set aside , and , 
failing this , that McGhee , Wilson , Jaq_ues , and Jackson "be held to 
account to the stockholders from whom they purchased [shares] for all 
profits made and realized by said purchase and sale ."88 In addition 
89 
it was urged that the acquisition of the Western North Carolina Railroad 
should be set aside because the East Tennessee's charter did not permit 
the purchase of railroads outside Tennessee . 89 
While this suit made its way through the courts , Mahone con-
sidered an attack on the political front . He seriously entertained a 
proposal by Rolfe Saunders of Knoxville to set up a newspaper to expose 
the "Evil Doers who have held high carnival in their monetary triumphs 
of greed and gain • • • •  "90 Working through Shields and N. L. York and 
Abram Fulkerson , lawyers of Bristol , Mahone expressed himself as ready 
to subsidize a paper for this purpose . 9l Saunders went so far as to 
visit former President Andrew Johnson at Greeneville to discuss the 
project : 
I told him that in politics it would be eminently independ­
ent , upon a Constitutional , Conservative platform. Then I 
advised with him as to the policy , in carrying out the plans 
we discussed , of making everything bend to the material 
interests of East Tennessee ,  bursting "rings" &c. of the 
87Shields to Mahone , September 11 , 1873 ,  Mahone Papers . 
88neaderick y. Wilson , 111-12 . 89Ibid. , 130. 
9°saunders to Mahone , April 23 , 1873 , Mahone Papers . 
9�hone to N. L York , June 19 , 1873 ,  ibid. 
probability & necessity of taking the people ' s  side in the 
railroad fight ; and he said it would be the strong side & 
the one to win. 92 
90 
But despite Johnson' s  interest and moral support the newspaper never pro-
gressed beyond the talking stage , perhaps because of the way in which 
the law suit was decided. The first judge who heard it decided against 
the Mahone party, and it was appealed to the Tennessee supreme court . 
In September, 1874, the justices ruled against all the petitions ex-
cept the one which asked the dissolution of the Western North Carolina 
purchase . On that point the court agreed that the East Tennessee had 
no right to buy an out-of-state railroad, and the sale was voided. 93 
Thus Mahone did postpone the nightmare of a diversion of the East 
Tennessee ' s  traffic to the Richmond and Danville . 
The decision was a victory of sorts for Mahone , but not a real 
defeat for McGhee and Wilson. By the time the purchase of the Western 
North Carolina was annulled, the nation was gripped by a business de­
pression and Southern Security was in dissolution. 94 It is not likely 
that the connection with the Richmond and Danville could have been made 
under the circumstances . Actually Mahone may have over-reacted to the 
threat of the East Tennessee ' s  diversion into North Carolina,  for this 
route · was simply inferior to that over the Atlantic , Mississippi and 
Ohio , later the Norfolk and Western. 95 The East Tennessee did not get 
92saunders to "Gentlemen, "  May 24, 1873 , ibid. 
93Deaderick y. Wilson, 132-33 · 
94:arown, "Southern Railway Security Company, " 164-69 .  
95Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 174, 214. 
91 
its Carolina connection until 1881 , and even then the old route through 
Virginia remained the East Tennessee ' s  principal outlet to the ports and 
cities of the North and East . 96 In fact , when the old Southern Security 
alliance was resurrected in 1887 as the Richmond and West Point Terminal 
system, McGhee would fight against an interruption of the East Tennes­
see ' s  traffic over the Norfolk and Western. 97 
Neither McGhee and Wilson nor the East Tennessee were firmly 
wedded to Southern Security, and there must have been little dismay in 
East Tennessee when the holding company fell apart . 98 Mahone may have 
been correct when in 1873 he observed that Southern Security was in a 
state of disintegration, and that "I suspect that Wilson is waiting for 
and helping to this end , when they will pocket what has been paid on 
account & repossess themselves of the stock they undertook to selL "99 
Something like this must have happened because at some time between 
1873 and 1876 Southern Security divested itself of the East Tennessee 
100 sto·ck. This may have occurred in the spring of 1874 when the holding 
company' s  lease of the Memphis & Charleston was terminated by mutual 
consent . By this time , however, the East Tennessee had taken over the 
96Harrison, Legal History, 709-10. 
97Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 214-15 .  
98R. T .  Wilson t o  Joseph Jaques ,  July 30 ,  1872 , Jaques Papers . 
This letter reinforces the view that Wilson, McGhee , Jaques ,  and the 
East Tennessee were accustomed to taking action independently of  
Southern Security. 
99Mahone to York,  September 19 , 1873 ,  Mahone Papers . 
100 Brown, "Southern Railway Security Company, " 169. 
92 
management of the M. & C .  Wilson became president o f  the latter road 
101 in October, 1874, and it remained a satellite of the East Tennessee . 
The collapse of Southern Security, then, did not disturb the 
dominance of McGhee and Wilson in the East Tennessee . While depression 
raged and the Pennsylvania Railroad was forced by its shareholders to 
102 give up its interest in the holding company, the East Tennessee re-
mained solvent . The same economic contraction which destroyed Southern 
Security forced Mahone ' s  railroad into receivership and removed him from 
its affairs forever, 103 which must have been a relief to the East Tennes-
see ' s  managers . McGhee and Wilson came out of the Southern Security 
affair with their fortunes augmented and with the strength of their 
railroad certainly increased. They had made valuable iriendships with 
some Northern capitalists (especially the non-Pennsylvanians , Jesup, 
Newcomer, and Walters ) who continued to take an interest in the East 
Tennessee. They had gained control of the Memphis and Charleston and 
were more deeply entrenched in the East Tennessee , an embryonic system 
which now stretched from the Virginia border through four states to the 
Mi . . . R " 104 SSlSSlppl lVer. 
101 Stover, Railroads of the South, 116-17. 
102 Brown, "Southern Railway Security Company, " 164-67 . 
103stover, Railroads of the South, 138-39· 
10�or a map of the East Tennessee system, see Figure 1 .  
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McGhee's financial operations in the decade after the Civil War 
made him one of Tennessee's richest men. Just how rich he was, however, 
is difficult to establish precisely . In 1868 a Knoxville newspaper pub­
lished the names and incomes of the town's wealthiest citizens. 105 This 
information was derived from the federal income tax rolls and was prob-
ably an indication if not a positive gauge of the wealth of these individ-
uals. On this scale McGhee ranked seventh with an income of $6, 578. 61. 
The largest income reported was $13,929 . 15, earned by a lawyer, Oliver 
Perry Temple . McGhee was still in the pork packing business in 1868,
106 
and he was president and a principal stockholder of the People's Bank of 
Knoxville.107 Besides these and his railroad interests, he was active in 
real estate and was developing a new manufacturing and residential area, 
called McGhee's Addition, adjacent to the terminal of the Knoxville and 
Kentucky Railroad.
108 During the next few years he certainly made large 
amounts of money through his speculation in Tennessee bonds and railroad 
stock. 
By 1872 he was ready to build a mansion to house his growing family 
and perhaps to symbolize his standing as one of the city's richest men. 
l05Knoxville Daily Herald, May 24, 1868 . 
106Ibid . ,  December 14, 1867, February 23, 1868; Press and Herald, 
December 1�875. 
l07Rule, Standard History of Knoxville, 253. 
108Daily Herald, April 9, 1868 . This area is northwest of the 
central business district and is  presently in the angle formed by Inter­
state highways 40 and 75. 
95 
The house was Italianate in style , had fourteen large rooms , and was 
described as a "palatial mansion. 11 109 It sat on the crest of a hill a 
few blocks from Knoxville ' s  business district ,  and the yard and gardens 
covered a full city block. Though he grew much richer during the next 
thirty years , McGhee was apparently not tempted to build even more im-
pressive houses . For years he did maintain a roomy but not ostentatious 
country home on a farm several miles east of the city, but , with the 
exception of his residence in New York hotels and his visits to various 
resorts ,  the mansion that he built in 1872 remained his home for the 
rest of his life . Here his five daughters grew up , and here he and his 
wife entertained on a scale that was considered lavish by Knoxville ' s  
standards . When President Rutherford Hayes toured the South in 1877 he 
stopped at Knoxville where McGhee gave the principal entertainment at 
hi h 110 s orne . Six hundred people were invited to the reception and many 
more came to troop through the house , meet the president , and wander 
through the grounds which were "ablaze with gas lights . " In the garden 
a platform accommodated as many as a hundred dancing couples ;  the band 
played far into the night during what was called 11the most recherche 
t t . t . . Kn . ll 11 111 en er a�nmen ever g�ven �n oxv� e .  
What made this splendor and luxury possible was ,  of  course , Me-
Ghee 1 s connection with the growing East Tenness,ee , Virginia , and Georgia 
and his close association with Richard Wilson and Joseph Ja�ues .  Together 
they formed the triumvirate which controlled that railroad. In 1872 
l09Press and Herald, June 2, 1872 . The house still stands at 
SOS Locust Street although it has been extensively remodeled. 
110ch . l ron�c e ,  September 22 , 1877.  
111Ibid. 
Wilson was president , McGhee was vice president , and Jaques was vice 
" d  t d 1 . t d t 112 presl en an genera superln en en • The cooperation of each was 
96 
essential to the maintenance of control , and no one realized this more 
acutely than Wilson, who operated in New York where he could observe 
the habits of Wall Street ' s  wolves ,  as well as the activities of its 
bulls and bears . Ever watchful for signs of trouble , Wilson was worried 
when he heard of a development which threatened the unity of the tri­
umvirate .  His letter113 on this subject to Jaques reveals much about 
the relationship of the three men : 
I see from a notice published in the papers a new bank is to 
be had. I am heartily glad of it , and hope you may make it 
the means of contributing to the business interests of East 
Tenn. I see however that Charley and .myself are left out in 
the cold. So far as I am concerned, this wouldent [ sic] make 
any difference , but will it be the case with Charley? Wont 
their [ sic] be conflict of interest and danger of severing 
the close-relations hitherto existing[ ? ]  
I fear there will. � • • Now you know we have stood by each 
other, and if anything' occurred likely to make a breach in the 
Cabinet , other members not so directly effected [ sic] have sug­
gested plans of harmony and the result has been in all our 
undertakings we have had more or less success [ . ]  Every day of 
my life brings more forcibly to my mind the great merit of 
united action and without any intimation from McGhee as to 
whether such a thing would suit him or not ,  allow me to sug-
gest to you in confidence , whether or not it wouldent be well 
to try and merge his bank into yours and increase your capital , 
so that you could establish agencies from Bristol to Memphis [ . ]  
The business of the line of road which we shall be able to con­
trol if we stick together, would of itself, be a good basis to 
start to bank on. McGhee , if he quits politics would be a most 
admirable man to place at the head of the bank [ ; ]  he has quali­
fications for a thing of that kind of considerable merit , and with 
the aid of counsel which he could receive from a properly 
112 E.  T . V. & G . ,  Annual Report , 1872 , p .  2 .  
ll3Wilson to Jaques ,  July 30, 187 2, Jaques Papers . 
organized board w�uld make a success of it and let me say to 
you just here that it is not every man who is fit to manage 
a bank. If you can so arrange matters--and knowing your 
ability as well as I do in the capacity of a compromise man- ­
I believe you can get up a plan which will not be likely to 
clash with any one's interest[ . ] 
97 
Jaques may have taken Wilson's advice and made room in the new 
East Tennessee National Bank for McGhee, but the suggestion of merging 
the two banks under the latter's presidency was not carried out. 114 The 
thre.e men continued to run the railroad until 1876 when Jaques retired 
as vice president and superintendent though he remained on the board of 
directors. McGhee then assumed Jaques' duties and for the next seven 
115 years he was active in the direct management of the East Tennessee. 
As vice president and superintendent he oversaw the day-to-day operation 
of the East Tennessee and its satellites, leaving most of the financial 
management to Wilson who in turn relied heavily on the advice of Walters 
and Jesup, two of the Northern ·directors. 116 
In his new capacity, McGhee had to face labor difficulties during 
a business recession in 1877 which touched off strikes across the nation. 
He won the praise of newspapers and working men when he ordered the wages 
of Memphis and Charleston shop employees restored to their pre-recession 
11�cGhee is listed in Knoxville city directories as president of 
the People's Bank until 1884. In 1887 he appears in the city directory 
as a member of the board of the East Tennessee National Bank. 
ll5E. T . V . & G. , Annual Report, 1876-1879; according to H. V.  
Poor's Manual of the Railroads of the United States, 1880-1884. McGhee 
remained as vice president of the East Tennessee until 1883 . He was a 
director of the East Tennessee until the company was absorbed by the 
Southern Railway in 1895. 
116see, for example, Wilson to Walters, October 28, 1879, and to 
McGhee, October Jl, 1879, McGhee Papers. 
levels.  His old critic the Memphis Appeal observed that "Had the 
98 
officers and employees of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad acted in the 
same spirit as has characterized Vice President McGhee and the employees 
of the Charleston road, in all probability the country would have been 
spared the dreadful drama which has not yet closed. 11117 Later, in a 
newspaper interview, McGhee said that he would have to cut wages if 
business worsened, and he complained. of the difficulty of being a rail­
road manager during hard times . 118 He had answers , however, for the cur-
rent troubles : 
Remonetize silver;  build the Southern Pacific Railroad ; re­
lieve the Mexican Government of that part of her territory 
which is so distant f�om the seat of government as to render 
neither its control pleasant or its possession desirable , and 
we will not • • •  hear of any more trouble with labor. We do 
not need more territory o o • but as this joins us , it would 
be better, perhaps , to take it . ll9 
Whatever these simplistic solutions may have been worth, they do 
not do justice to McGhee ' s  skill as an execu�ive in difficult time s .  
During the years 1871-80 when McGhee , Wilson, and Jaques controlled the 
East Tennessee , other companies whose lines comprised half of the rail­
road mileage in the South went into receivershipo 120 Beset by recession 
and yellow fever epidemics which paralyzed trade along much of its route , 
the East Tennessee remained solvent and even managed to pay several 
d o " d d 121 �v� en s .  At the same time , the partners were able t o  think of 
ll7As quoted in Knoxville Tribune , July 29 , 1877- The "dreadful 
drama" refers to the violent national labor trouble of 1877 .  
118Ibid. , August 28 , 1877 . 119Ibid.  
120stover, Railroads of the South, 124-25 .  
121 E. T . V.  & G. , Annual Report , 1876-1879 . 
expansion. They negotiated for the East Tennessee a new twenty-year 
lease of the Memphis and Charleston and proceeded to arrange for the 
repayment of the latter road 1 s  debt to the state. McGhee and Wilson 
personally agreed to buy one half of the bonds floated for this pur­
pose, and the M. & C.  was at last freed from the state debt . 122 At 
99 
the same time they engaged in negotiations with the L. & N.  for a con-
nection between that railroad and the Knoxville and Ohio at the Kentucky 
state line, 123 and they urged the governor of North Carolina to complete 
the Western North Carolina Railroad to a junction with the Morristown 
124 branch of the East Tennessee. Though neither of these projects bore 
fruit until after 1880 they were important elements in the partners' 
strategy during the l870 1 s . 
Another evidence of their ambitions for the East Tennessee was 
their interest in a southern expansion in Georgia and Alabama. In 1879 
McGhee proposed the purchase of the franchise of the bank�pt Georgia and 
Western which would provide the East Tennessee a means of entering Atlanta 
independent of its Dalton connection with the Western and Atlantic. 125 
Perhaps because of Wilson's conservatism the East Tennessee lost the 
opportunity and the franchise went to the L. & N. 126 Shortly thereafter, 
122Harrison, � History, 756-58 ;  Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, XXIV (1877) , 565, 614. 
123Wilson to William Ernst, July 23, 1880, McGhee Papers .  
124wilson to Zebulon Vance, November 17, 1877, ibid. 
125Wilson to McGhee, October 31, 1879, ibid. 
126wilson to McGhee, December 16, 1879, ibid. 
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however, the partners acquired the Selma, Rome , and Dalton,  which 
stretched 236 miles from north Georgia into central Alabama and gave 
the East Tennessee a substantial branch in the direction of New 
Orleans . 127 Simultaneously they began to move toward buying the Macon 
and Brunswick, a railroad which in a few years would add to the East 
T l .  th t t f G . t th t f B · k 128 ennessee a 1ne across e s a e o eorg1a o e por o runsw1c • 
In the midst of this expansion, a change occurred which had great 
significance for both McGhee and the East Tennessee . Richard T .  Wilson 
resigned the presidency on May 27 , 1880,  and though it was said that he 
would continue as "financial agent and managing director of the road , " 
he left the board of directors in November and within a year had with­
drawn completely from the East Tennessee . 129 Elected president in Wil-
son 1 s stead was Edmund W. Cole who had been just ousted as head of the 
Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis by the managers of the L. & N. l30 
There is no ready explanation of why Wilson stepped down or what brought 
about the termination of his connection with the East Tennessee . Per-
haps , as one historian has guessed, he found the presidency "an intoler-
able burden. 11 He may also have found that his conservatism put him out 
131 of tune with the times and with some of the company' s stockholders . 
· 
127Wilson bought the Selma, Rome , and ' Dalton .in ' l880 on behalf 
of a syndicate and sold it a year later at a profit to 'the East Tennes­
see . Harrison, Legal History, 807-12. 
128Ibid. , 840-52 ; Wilson to McGhee , February 3 ,  1880 , McGhee 
Papers . 
129commercial and Financial Chronicle , XXX ( 1880 ) , 567 ; Poor, 
Manual of Railroads , 1881 ,  p .  449 . 
l30Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 119 . l3libid. , 119-22.  
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Whatever the reasons for the dissolution of the old partnership , the 
business and personal relationship between McGhee and Wilson remained 
close . McGhee , however, remained as vice president and a director, 
and when his connection with the company took him to New York to live 
and involved him in diverse enterprises ,  his int erest remained focused 
on the East Tennessee for the rest of its corporate life .  With the 
passing of Wilson from the company, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
praised his management and that of McGhee during the troubled decade of 
the seventies : 
Under Mr. Wilson ' s  administration the property was placed in 
a high state of efficiency and the indebtedness very much 
reduced. It is proper to state t�t the results mentioned 
were achieved, not through any stock jobbing manipulations 
but wholly through good business management . l32 
The accession of Cole to the presidency is almost as imponderable 
as the abdication of Wilson, but the difference in the men ' s styles was 
immediately apparent . Cole had a reputation as a flashy and expansive 
operator. 133 During the eighteen months of his presidency he completed 
the purchase of the Knoxville and Ohio , the Macon and Brunswick , and the 
Selma, Rome , and Dalton, and undertook several other improvements and 
extensions of the East Tennessee . In May, 1881 ,  he revealed the formu-
lation of a syndicate to convert the East Tennessee into a huge southern 
system. Although Cole made the announcement it is not certain that he 
was the architect of the developments that brought a new group of 
132commercial and Financial Chronicle , XXXIII ( 1881 ) ,  553 . 
l33Except where otherwise noted, the following discussion of the 
reorganization of the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia is based on 
Maury Klein rs masterful study, .Great · Rl.cbmond Terminal , 119-45 .  
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Northern capitalists into the East Tennessee. l34 Some time in 1880 or 
1881 a group of New York investors came together to establish a major 
east-west railroad , the New York, Chicago , and Saint Louis , familiarly 
known as the "Nickel Plate . "  Soon thereafter the same group became 
involved in the East Tennessee . 
Three men were the kingpins of the syndicate .  George I .  Seney, 
president of the Metropolitan Bank of New York City, enjoyed a reputa-
tion as a sound and conservative financier, but he was soon to be 
transformed into a reckless plunger and speculator. Samuel Thomas and 
Calvin Sellars Brice were Ohioans whose successes in railroad, industrial , 
and real estate ventures made them powers in New York financial circles .  
An iron manufacturer who rose to brigadier general in the Union army, 
Thomas was a Republican. Brice was a lawyer whose remarkable career in 
business did not deter him from serving as chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee in 1888 and United States Senator from Ohio , 1891-97· 
Both Brice and Thomas "pursued the simple principle that politics existed 
primarily for the protection of personal financial interests11l3.5 _ _  a 
philosophy which they shared with McGhee who became their close friend 
and business  associate.  
lJ�lein notes in �. ,  120 , no . 12 , the assumption that Cole 
brought the Seney syndicate into the East Tenne.ssee is based on circum­
stantial evidence . In view of Cole ' s  swift departure from the East 
Tennessee in 1882 , it might be assumed that McGhee (who remained a 
power in the company) had a closer relationship with the Seney syndi­
cate than Cole did.  McGhee ' s  papers in the period 1881-8.5 are very 
sparse , and there is no evidence in them to shed light on this question. 
lJ5Ibid. , 31 . 
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As quickly as he had come into the East Tennessee , E.  W. Cole 
left it . Maury Klein , in his searching analysis of the railroads that 
made up the Richmond Terminal system, reasons that "The liaison between 
Cole and the Seney syndicate [ was] never entirely comfortable . • • 11 
Cole he characterizes as "an individualistic empire builder, " who 
thought primarily in terms of the system itself and its needs . 
The syndicate ,  however, regarded the company as but one 
of many interests and weighed its demands carefully in the 
balance with the claims of other projects .  Neither had any 
strong personal or regional loyalty to the system but Cole 
could devote himself more completely to its welfare . In 
that sense his ties to the East Tennessee were largely per­
sonal while those of the syndicate were almost purely finan­
cial . l36 
The departure of Cole and the subsequent managerial changes ,  Klein ar-
gues ,  "crystalized a growing separation of financial and ope rational 
control.  11 137 
All of which may be true , though it does not explain how McGhee ,  
who had strong regional , financial , and personal interests in the East 
Tennessee , weathered the transition. In fact no explanation is possible 
except that McGhee seems to have developed a Darwinian ability to evolve 
and adapt to new circumstances .  Through the many changes which the 
company underwent between 1867 and 1882 , McGhee alone retained his in-
fluence and position. His old partners , Jackson and Jaques ,  his long 
time "twin, " Wilson, and finally his recent associate , Cole--all dropped 
out one by one leaving McGhee as the single personal link between the 
company' s  past and its future . But if by 1882 he had already demon-
strated a remarkable tenacity and an ability to survive the changes 
l36Ibid. , 126. 137Ibid. , 127 . 
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which were affecting southern railroads , the next decade would prove 
him a prodigy in this regard. 
Under the Seney syndicate the transformation of the East Tennes-
see proceeded at a dizzying pace . The company' s  stock was listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange , making it possible for the managers to engage 
in quick lucrative transactional speculations . Samuel Thomas succeeded 
Cole as president , McGhee assumed the title of first vice president , 
and Henry Fink, a professional railroad man, was brought in as second 
vice president and general manager. The Seney syndicate sold its Nickel 
Plate investment for a good profit and deepened its interest in the East 
Tennessee ; soon McGhee and his Knoxville friend and protege , E. J .  San-
ford, were the only Tennesseans on a board of directors dominated by 
New Yorkers . 138 
The new infusion of Yankee capital made acquisitions possible and 
opened the prospect of further expansion, all , however, at a heavy price 
to the East Tennessee . On February 2) , 1881 ,  the company was mortgaged 
for $10 , 000 , 000 by its new masters , but by June these bonds were con-
sidered insufficient to continue the expansion, and a new $22 , 000 , 000 
issue replaced the earlier mortgage . At the same time a second mortgage 
issue of income bonds worth $16 , )00 , 000 was authorized, and finally in 
March, 1883 , an additional $2 , 000 , 000 of bonds covering extensions and a 
new Atlanta terminal were floated. l39 "Float" is perhaps the exact term, 
l38E. W. Cole was re-elected to the board in 1883 along with Mc­
Ghee and Sanford. In 1884 Cole was dropped, leaving the two Knoxvillians 
as the only Tennesseans on the board of directors .  
l39Harrison, � History, 677-80 . 
lOS 
for by this time it was becoming apparent that these financial exertions 
represented a heavy watering of securities. 14
° 
The East Tennessee simply 
could not stand such a heavy burden of fixed interest charges .  In order 
to meet these costs and make the mortgages appear bearable , capital 
expenditures ,  improvements ,  and even good maintenance were sacrificed. 
�here is no evidence that McGhee objected to these policies which in the 
normal course of administration he must have helped to implement . If he 
did have reservations he probably suppressed them, realizing that he did 
not have the power to alter the course set by the Seney syndicate .  
The money panic o f  May, 1884, precipitated a crisis for the East 
Tennessee . George Seney' s Metropolitan Bank suspended payment , leaving 
the East Tennessee bereft of its major source of credit . Without the 
timely loans from the bank, the - railroad was unable to pay its fixed 
charges of interest and bond retirement . In his exposed position Seney 
could not help the East Tennessee , so Brice , Thomas , McGhee , and several 
other directors subscribed at face value an issue of $1 , 200 , 000 in 6 per-
cent debenture bonds ; the cash from these bonds eased the East Tennes-
see ' s  immediate crisis and forestalled the company' s bankruptcy. The 
prompt action by the directors was ,  as the Commercial and Financial 
C:hronicle remarked, "uniq_ue in this respect--it happening so seldom 
that members will apply their own resources to sustain the property with 
which they are identified. "l4l The subscribers , led by Brice and Thomas , 
140 Henry Clews , 
watering of securities 
Irvine Publishing Co. , 
a contemporary financial analyst ,  condemned this 
in T)enty-Eight Years in Wall Street (New York : 
1887 ' 164. 
141commercial and Financial Chronicle , XXXIX ( 1884) , 168-69 , as 
q_uoted in Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 13.5 .  
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now began to emerge as a faction opposed to Seney' s continued domina-
tion of the East Tennessee . :By their "unique" and generous response 
to the company' s difficulties they managed to separate themselves ,  in 
the public mind at least , from the ruinous and somewhat shady Seney 
policies .  Though they may have been equally culpable with Seney, the 
:Brice-Thomas faction now seemed a respectable alternative to the dis-
credited New York banker. 
Early in 1885 the East Tennessee ' s  management entered into bank-
ruptcy proceedings and secured the appointment of Henry Fink, the com-
pany' s  general manager, as receiver. Thus the road remained under the 
same management even in bankruptcy, but at the annual stockholder� ' 
meeting at Knoxville in November, George Seney made his move to oust 
the :Brice-Thomas faction from the company. Seney' s attorney appeared 
with enough proxies to control the election of directors , whe reupon 
:Brice managed ,  by citing a technicality, to have the meeting adjourned 
until March, 1886 . Warfare between the factions was now open, and the 
:Brice-Thomas group hastened to consolidate its position. Aboard "ele-
gant" pullman cars :Brice , Thomas , McGhee , and their allies proceeded to 
Huntsville , Alabama, for the annual meeting of the Memphis and Charles-
t 142 on. There they made sure of their control of that vital subsidiary 
of the East Tennessee by electing a board which included McGhee and two 
of his sons-in-law, Calvin M. McClung and David Shelby Williams . The 
142chronicle , November 12 , 1885 . 
new board then made McGhee and Brice president and vice president of 
the M. & c . 143 
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Though Seney controlled a majo�ity of the East Tennessee ' s  com-
mon stock,  the Brice-Thomas faction had more consols , or first mortgage 
bonds . In the fight to reorganize the company the bonds were a far 
more important weapon than the stock,  and the bondholders therefore 
selected a reorganization committee composed of McGhee ;  Robert Fleming, 
a Scottish investor representing foreign bondholder&; Frederick P. Ol­
cott , president of the Central Trust Company af New York ; George 
Warren Smith of the Kountze Brothers brokerage firm;  E.  W. Corlies ,  
vice president of  the Bank of  America ; and Frederick D .  Tappen, presi-
dent of the Gallatin National Bank. McGhee 1 s  membership on this com-
mittee of financiers demonstrated his importance in the Brice-Thomas 
faction ; it also indicated that the plan drawn by the committee would 
likely be favorable to the faction which he represented. 
The Olcott plan, as it was called, was in fact tailor-made for 
the Brice-Thomas offensive against Seney. It combinea "a masterpiece 
of partisan calculation" with a thoroughgoing reform of the bloated 
financial structure of the East Tennessee . To the detriment of Seney, 
the plan called for a drastic sacrifice of the company' s equity which 
was represented by the capital stock. Income bondholders were also to , 
be forced to accept second preferred stock in lieu of their bonds . The 
consol ,  or first mortgage holders , however, would receive some new bonds 
as well as potentially valuable first preferred stock .  For good measure 
l43Poor, Manual of Railroads , 1886,  p .  188 . 
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the h6lders of first :preferred were allowed to elect a majority of the 
company' s  board for five years , or until two consecutive S percent divi-
dents were :paid on their stock. 
The Olcott plan won the praise of disinterested observers and was 
rapidly accepted by the first mortgage holders . The owners of income 
bonds , however, brought a suit to block the sale of the railroad and its 
reorganization under the Olcott plan which demanded a heavy sacrifice 
on their part . The legal action came before McGhee ' s  close friend, United 
States Circuit Judge Howell Jackson, who held against the plaintiffs and 
ordered that the sale should continue . 144 The last obstacle to the re-
organization was thus removed,  and the victor,y of  the Brice-Thomas fac-
tion was assured. 
In the reorganization of the East Tennessee , McGhee achieved a 
:personal as well as a financial triumph. He was now virtually a full 
partner with Brice and Thomas in the group which now controlled the East 
Tennessee . His role in these affairs was now too important to permit him 
to continue to live in Knoxville , and in the fall of 1886 he moved to New 
York where he had spent much of his time during the preceding year. In-
stalled in living quarters at the Murray Hill Hotel , he carried on busi-
ness at number 10 Wall Street in the building where Brice and Thomas also 
l44Jackson had just been appointed to fill a vacancy on the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals caused by the death of Judge John Baxter of 
Knoxville . On April ll ,  1886 , A .  J .  Ricks , clerk of the Circuit Court 
for the northern district of Ohio , wrote to McGhee asking him to urge 
Jackson ' s  appointment . "I know you are intimate with the Senator, " 
wrote Ricks , "and have influence with the President . Can you not use 
your influence to induce Mr. Jackson to take this office?" McGhee 
Papers . 
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had offices .  The syndicate controlled 60 , 000 of the East Tennessee ' s  
110 , 000 first preferred shares , and McGhee ' s  portion was about 6 , 000 
shares . 145 The partners now had the power to deliver in a neat bundle 
the controlling interest of the East Tennessee to anyone who would 
care to pay for it . 
They were in an enviable situation because at least two other 
railroad companies were deeply interested in having the East Tennessee . 
The Norfolk and Western had long enjoyed profitable connections with� the 
East Tennessee ; their combined lines formed one of the great trans-
regional systems . The alliance between the two , called the Virginia , 
Tennessee , and Georgia Air Line , provided an important commercial route 
146 linking the North and the South. East of the Appalachians , and al-
most parallel to the East Tennessee , were the group of lines under the 
control of the Richmond and Danville Railroad. The Danville was the pre-
eminent property of a polding company, the Richmond and West Point Termi-
nal. The boards of directors of the Danville and the Terminal largely 
overlapped, and together they constituted a system which was in direct 
competition with the East Tennessee at many points . l47 On the question 
of whether the East Tennessee should be merged with its longtime ally or 
its natural enemy McGhee had a definite preference : he hoped to see his 
l45Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 173 ; manuscript stock ledger, 
McGhee Papers . 
l46Joseph T .  Lambie , From Mine to Market , the History of Coal 
Transportation gn the Norfolk and Western Railway-r:New York : New York 
University Press , 1954) , lll-12 . 
l47Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 86-114, 174-75. 
no 
company go to the Norfolk and Western. 148 The Air Line route , he felt , 
was far too valuable and well established to be interrupted. Moreover,  
the N. & W.  was strongly interested in developing the resources along its 
line . It had found its way into the rich coal and coke producing area 
of southwestern Virginia and West Virginia, and it was doing a booming 
business in transporting these valuable products . The development of 
such local resources always appealed to McGhee , who had large invest­
ments in Tennessee coal and iron enterprises. l49 Another factor which 
inclined him toward the N. & W. was the friendship which he had formed 
with Robert Fleming and Jacob Schiff. He had gotten to know them well 
during the reorganizations of the East Tennessee and the Texas and 
Pacific. Both the British investor and the senior partner of Kuhn, 
Loeb were powers in the Norfolk and Western and were involved in the 
negotiations for the purchase of the syndicate ' s  shares of East Tennessee 
150 first preferred. 
During December, 1886 , and January, 1887 , the bargaining went on. 
First the N. & W. seemed likely to buy the stock ,  then the Terminal se-
cured an option for 63 , 000 shares which expired on January 6 .  Next , 
Robert Fleming secured an option on 22 , 000 shares for the N. & W. and 
received from McGhee an agreement for his 6 , 000. On January 9 Fleming, 
Schiff, and the other N. & W. managers formed a syndicate to buy 55 , 000 
l48McGhee to C .  S .  Brice , January 19, 1887 , McGhee Papers . 
l49McGhee 1 s  reasons for preferring the Norfolk and Western were 
fully explained in a letter to John H. Inman, June 30 ,  1887 , ibid. 
l501ambie , From Mine to Market , 116 . 
shares to be paid for with a new issue of 90 , 000 N. & W. first pre-
ferred and $1 , 000 , 000 in the company' s notes. With the deal almost 
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clinched, Schiff ' s legal counsel hesitated to approve the purchase plan, 
and the management of the N. & W. also may have had reservations about 
it . l)l Whatever the reason for it , the delay was fatal to the deal ; 
the Terminal took the plunge and purchased 6) , 000 East Tennessee first 
preferred in exchange for $4, 000 , 000 in cash and )0 , 000 shares of 
Terminal common stock. 152 Henceforth the fate of the East Tennessee 
would be linked to that of the new giant of the railroad world--the 
great Richmond and West Point Terminal. 
l)libid . , 11)-17 . 
l52Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 175 . 
CHAPTER IV 
RISE AND FALL : McGHEE AND THE GREAT RICHMOND TERMINAL 
"Ten Millions ! "  read the headline of an 1887 story by a cor-
respondent of the Philadelphia Press which sketched the careers of 
"Southern Rich Men. " Reprinted in t;tle Knoxville Tribune , the article 
received a front page location for it described McGhee as "the wealthi-
est of them, and probably the best known in the east. • • I I  Although 
the story probably overestimated his wealth and contained other factual 
errors , it gave an interesting and lifelike sketch of the Southern 
millionaire : 
Mr. McGhee in appearance is peculiar enough to be noticeable 
anywhere . He is over 6 feet tall , very slender, and of a 
peculiar aggressive movement in his stride , which makes him 
seem always very full of important business .  His nose is 
Roman, his eyebrows large and bushy, his cheekbones promi­
nent and his countenance sunburned and sallow. He wears a 
moustache and goatee slowly becoming gray, and has light­
brown hair, which is beginning to show a few streaks of the 
sand color. In Tennessee , whatever may be his concessions 
to fashion in New York, he wears a plain gray suit , neat but 
not noticeably good, and a big, comfortable soft hat , of the 
style common down here below the Ohio. He spends a great 
deal of time in New York in connection with his railroad 
enterprises but is still very often at home , and regards 
himself always as a Tennessean. l 
McGhee often affirmed by word and deed the cont ention that he re-
mained a Tennessean at heart , but in the late 1880 ' s  his visits home 
were few and far between. His time was mostly spent in New York City 
where he kept a vigil over the stock market and was in close touch with 
1Tribune , May 24, 1887 , quoting an undated item in the Philadel­




other financiers . According to a statement of his securities holdings 
as of February 25 , 1888 , much of his fortune was invested in the stocks 
and bonds of railroads subject to the manipulation of their New York 
masters . 2 Although his holdings of East Tennessee stocks and bonds 
were relatively small after the sale of the first preferred stock of  
the Richmond Terminal , he retained an active interest in  the company. 
He remained president of the Memphis and Charleston, and he was gradu-
ally drawn more deeply into Banville and Terminal affairs . 
McGhee philosophically accepted the disappointment of his hopes 
for the sale of the East Tennessee to the Norfolk and Western. Helping 
to reconcile him to the Terminal was the fact that he and his friends 
had made a large profit on the sale and that they had entered a large 
corporation whose stock offered excellent opportunities for lucrative 
transactional profits. 3 Balancing this was the nagging fear that the 
new situation might injure the East Tennessee itself and thus retard 
the development of Knoxville and its tributary territory where McGhee 
had many large investments .  He probably agreed, however, with his 
friend Sanford who wrote that after all he himself had not "moved to 
Knoxville for the purpose of ornamenting it . "4 
Shortly after the sale McGhee put on a good face and told an-
other Tennessee business associate that "I  do not think my influence 
on the East Tenn system will be materially lessened by reason of the 
2Letterbook , February, 1888-February, 1889 , p .  24, McGhee Papers . 
3Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 174-75 . 
4sanford to McGhee , December 10 , 1886 , McGhee Papers . 
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change , nor do I think Knoxville or Chattanooga will be to the slight­
est extent injured. 11.5 These two propositions were firmly linked in 
his mind. He saw himself as the only member of the East Tennessee 
board who had the power or the desire to protect the interests of his 
native state--a position he was determined to maintain under this new-
est regime . 
Perhaps because of his independence and devotion to the East 
Tennessee , or because he was linked to the managers of the Norfolk and 
Western, some parties in the Terminal tried at the outset to remove him 
from the East Tennessee board. In a letter to Brice he declined to be 
driven out : 
Having been elected by the stockholders of the East Tenn 
company a Director for the current year, I shall discharge 
the duties of the position and as at present advised will 
not resign no matter who may control the stock. 
The representations made by parties interested in secur­
ing my resignation to the effect that I was interested in 
in [ sic] the securities of the Norfolk and Western Road and 
therefore not a proper person to remafn in the Directory 
of the East Tenn Co should that Company pass under the con­
trol of the Terminal Co are entirely devoid of truth as I 
do not own a dollar of the securities of the Norfolk and 
Western Company. 
I preferred that the Norfolk and Western Company should 
dominate the East Tenn. system. They had the opportunity 
to do so , failed for want of prompt action at thg critical 
moment and I have no relation with that Company. 
The lot of the unifiers on the Terminal board--those who wanted 
to subordinate the individual systems to the whole--would have been 
.5McGhee to Hiram s. Chamberlin, January 28 , 1887 ,  ibid. 
6 McGhee to Brice , January 18 , 1887 , ibid. 
115 
easier had McGhee resigned. 7 Instead he remained to fight tenaciously 
for the East Tennessee within the Terminal combination. To uphold the 
interests of the East Tennessee he appealed to the Tennessee-born New 
York investment banker, John Hamilton Inman , a leading Terminal director : 
"Let me beg of you to take this matter under careful consideration and 
endeavor to use ever [ sic] means possible • • •  to prevent a conflict 
• • •  that would result in a serious loss to the East Tenn and the 
Memphis & Charleston Roads . 118 The Terminal , he explained ,  had bought 
the East Tennessee stock in order to divert traffic to the Richmond & 
Danville ; but "any effort to divert the traffic now possessed by the 
Norfolk & Western road, forceably, will result in a large loss to the 
business of the East Tenn and the M & C roads . II Furthermore , the 
Danville did not have the steam shipping facilities at West Point , Vir­
ginia , to handle the increased traffic . 9 He wrote the general manager 
of the Memphis & Charleston that while it did not matter whether the 
traffi·c went to the Norfolk or the Danville , "it is our duty to prevent 
any loss of business to the Memphis & Charleston R. R. Co . " The M. & C . , 
he said sternly, "is under the control of the Board of Directors and the 
Officers by them e lected , and I shall . not recognize the right of the 
officers of any other company to direct its operations , as long as I am 
its President . 1110 
cussed 
7The struggle over unification of �erminal properties is dis­
in Klein, � Richmond Terminal , 184-88 . 
8 McGhee to Inman , June 30 ,  1887 , McGhee Papers . 
10McGhee to E .  B.  Thomas , August 4, 1887 , ibid. 
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McGhee stopped short of declaring open war and leading a seces-
sion of the East Tennessee from the Terminal . He wrote Robert Fleming 
that "I would be willing to serve on the board of the East Tenn. Co .  
to  protect its interests against all comers and goers , but would not 
be willing to undertake the work of organizing a party. 11 11 He recog-
nized that only Brice and Thomas , through their influence in Terminal 
affairs , could guarantee protection to the East Tennessee . They promised 
him that they would protect the company, 12 and, perhaps to symbolize the 
promise , McGhee was elected to the boards of both the Danville and the 
Terminal in December, 1887 . 13 As long as the Terminal lasted, he , Brice , 
and Thomas maintained the autonomy of the East Tennessee within the 
framework of the larger combination. They also used the East Tennessee 
as a power base in the incessant factional fighting which afflicted the 
Terminal . 
The histor,y of the Richmond and West Point Terminal Railway and 
Warehouse Company was marked by open warfare between factions fighting 
for control. 14 It was created in 1880 as a holding company to enable 
the Danville to own and lease roads which did not connect with that 
company' s lines .  Through the early 1880 ' s  it  was used by the Danville 
to facilitate a rapid expansion, and soon both companies were listed on 
11McGhee to Fleming, August 5 ,  1887 , ibid. 
12McGhee to Fleming, August 11 , 1887 , ibid. 
lJR. Brooke to McGhee , December 14 and 21 ,  1887 , ibid. 
l4For a detailed histor,y of the Terminal , 1881-1886 , see Klein, 
Great Richmond Terminal , 90-114. 
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the New York Exchange , where their stocks fell prey to parties of specu­
lators . Brice and Thomas , for instance , had been in and out of the 
Terminal ' s  affairs before the East Tennessee sale was made . In 1886 
the Danville and the Terminal were convulsed by another power struggle 
when William P. Clyde attempted to strip the Terminal of its proper­
ties for the benefit of the Danville . Stockholders of the Terminal 
counterattacked ,  gained control of the Danville , and ousted Clyde just 
before the East Tennessee acquisition was consummated. 
Clyde ' s  successor as most influential man in the Terminal was 
Alfred M. Sully, a New York investment banker,  who hoped to integrate 
the Terminal properties but found himself powerless to overcome the 
aggressive factions which had elevated him to the presidency. In the 
spring of 1888 a group of investors in the Georgia Central , an ally of  
the Terminal system, began an offensive to get rid of Sully as  well as 
of the East Tennessee faction. Sully quickly resigned and was replaced 
by John Inman, but the Brice-Thomas faction, with the help of Inman and 
his friends , put down the Georgia Central rebellion and emerged as an 
even more powerful force within the Terminal . This victory, however ,  
was bought at a great price to  the Terminal and all its  constituent 
companies .  I t  would appear that Inman' s terms for hi s  support o f  the 
Brice-Thomas group included the Terminal ' s  purchase of a controlling 
interest in the Georgia Central . Over a period of nine months from 
October, 1888 , to June , 1889 , the Terminal directory made several unani­
mous decisions which led to the acquisition of the Georgia Central 
through the purchase of securities from a syndicate in which Inman was 
a participant . As the historian of the Richmond Terminal put it : "In 
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completing the transaction Inman unquestionably exposed himself to 
charges of conf1ict of interest • • . •  11 15 While not involved in Inman ' s  
syndicate ,  McGhee was present and voting at the board meetings which 
ratified the Georgia Central purchase . 16 Thus he acquiesced in the 
transaction that was ,  in a manner of speaking, the beginning of the 
end for both John Inman and the Richmond Terminal . 
Control of the Georgia Central cost the Terminal over $8 , 000 , 000 , 
or far more than the new acquisition was worth. 17 The deal , so profit­
able to Inman and his cronies ,  greatly increased the liabilities of the 
Terminal . When a day of reckoning finally arrived these liabilities 
had much to do with dragging the entire Terminal system into bankruptcy. 
Although the Georgia Central affair represented the classic case 
of conflict of interest in the history of the Terminal , it is by no means 
the only such case . A much smaller, though not the less questionable , 
transaction, involving the purchase and later the resale to the East 
Tennessee of an insignificant little line called the Tennessee and Ohio , 
was arranged by McGhee and his close associates in 1888 and 1889 .  
This company had been chartered in the palmy days of antebellum 
railroad enthusiasm as the Rogersville and Jefferson "for the purpose of 
establishing a communication by railroad between Rogersville and the most 
eligible point on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. "  Later the 
charter was amended to permit the company to push its road on to the 
l5Ibid. , 207 . 
17Ibid. , 205-6 .  
16Ibid. , 210 . 
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Moccasin Gap in the Cumberland Mountains on the Virginia state line . 
Several years of successful lobbying for state aid provided funds to 
build the line from near Morristown to the Holston River by 1860 .  The 
war wrecked the railroad, but the famous generosity of the post-war 
Radical gove�ent provided money for rebuilding and completing the 
line to Rogersville . With only sixteen miles of track,  the company 
was one of the first to default on its payment of interest to the state , 
and in 1871 the Rogersville and Jefferson which had cost the state 
$385 , 000 was sold to the East Tennessee for $23 , 000 . Even this little 
company was a bargain at the price , although its bridge over the Hol-
stan River was found to be unsafe . Obligated under the terms of the 
sale to operate the line , the East Tennessee had no desire to make 
costly improvements ; it therefore "sold" the Rogersville and Jefferson 
to a dummy in 1873 so as to escape rebuilding the Holston bridge . For· 
four years the East Tennessee operated the line north of  the river with 
horsepower, and in 1877 it conveyed the company to Horace M. Aiken for 
$10 , 000. Aiken busied himself for ten years in rehabilitating the road, 
I which he reorganized under the title of the Tennessee and Ohio Railroad 
Company. 18 
By 1877 the coal fields of eastern Kentucky and southwestern Vir-
ginia were beginning to boom, and the Norfolk and Western and the Louis-
ville and Nashville were considering expansions into that very area 
towards which the Tennessee and Ohio pointed. 19 At McGhee ' s  request 
18Harrison, Legal History, 914-21.  
l9La.m.bie , From Mine to Market ,  210-28 ;  Maury Klein, History of the 
Louisville � Nashville Railroad (New York : The Macmillan Company, 197� 
276-83 . 
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Sanford sbunded out Aiken about selling the road20 and got an offer of 
a twenty-day option to purchase - at $115 , 000. 21 He strongly recommended 
that it be bought : "In my opinion that ' s  the road to build to the Coke-
ing · [ sic] coals • •  11 He added that "I • would like to make some 
money and not loose [ sic] any by doing so--a sentiment I think you will 
share with me . 1122 McGhee apparently took the matter up with :Brice and 
Thomas but action was deferred for the time being. 23 A year later the 
T .  & 0 .  looked like an even better investment , and McGhee again asked 
Sanford to look into the matter. "If bought , "  he said, "it would all 
have to be done in your name. See about it and I think we will buy it 
this time . 1124 McGhee was aware that he and the other New York directors 
would have to avoid any public involvement in the purchase in order to 
keep the price down and escape a conflict of interest charge when the 
road was sold later to the East Tennessee . Under Aiken ' s  management the 
- T .  & 0 . was making from $10 , 000 to $15 , 000 a year and his aSking price 
was $150 , 000 . 25 Sanford bargained him down to $115 , 000 , and then after 
more negotiations closed the deal at $100 , 000. 26 :Besides McGhee and 
Sanford, three other directors of the East Tennessee--probably Thomas ,  
20 McGhee to Sanford, June 13 , 1887 , McGhee Papers . 
21 Sanford to McGhee ,  June .. 13 , 1887 , ibid. 22Ibid. 
2�cGhee to Sanford, June 16 , 1887 , ibid. 
2�cGhee to Sanford, August 18 , 1888 , ibid. 
25sanford to McGhee , August 24 , 1888 , ibid. 
26sanford to McGhee ,  August 28 ,  October 17 , 1888 , ibid. 
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Brice , and the investment banker, John G. Moore--were parties to the 
purchase . 27 
At McGhee ' s  direction Sanford reorganize� the company with a dummy 
board of Knoxville directors and had himself elected r:>resl'derit.28 McChee 
advised him to continue the management of the road as it had been in the 
past , "spending no more money than is absolutely necessary and make as 
large net earnings as you can. We will lay no more rails than required 
to keep the road in a safe condition. It will all come out right in the 
end, " he added, "but will not perhaps be as speedy as you might wish. 11 29 
The partners kept the Tennessee and Ohio for almost a year and in Julyf 
1889 ,  sold the property to the East Tennessee for $320 , 000 in East Tennes­
see extension bonds . JO This price represented a profit to the sellers 
of approximately 220 percent , while it meant a fairly sizeable increase 
in the debt of the East Tennessee . The T .  & 0. might have been a po-
tentially valuable addition to the East Tennessee if it had been com-
pleted into the coal lands of southwest Virginia. Apparently McGhee and 
his cohorts expected that the extension would be made , and in 1890 Presi-
dent Samuel Thomas of the East Tennessee recommended that this be done . 
But as the legal hi storian of the Southern Railway laconically 
27McGhee to Sanford , October 27 ,  188 8 ,  ibid. 
28 McGhee to Sanford, October 18 , 1888 , ibid . 
-- · 
29McGhee to Sanford, October 27 , 1888 , ibid. 
30sanford to McGhee , July 20 , 1889 ,  ibid. ; Harrison,  � 
Histo!;;Y, 921. 
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put it , ":Before these plans could be carried out bankruptcy overtook the 
East Tennessee , Virginia and Georgia. "3l 
The purchase of the T .  & 0.  contributed to the East Tennessee ' s  
bankruptcy, and the sale is therefore indefensible from any standpoint . 
It would appear that McGhee and his friends used the threat of the Nor-
folk and Western ' s  possible entrance into East Tennessee as a justifica-
tion for the purchase . Sanford was ready to swear tba t "if the Louis-
ville & Nashville or any other Road or person had been willing to give 
more for the Road than the East Term Va & Ga gave for it I would have 
sold it to them. 1132 Such a sale , however, would have been inimical 
to the interest of the East Tennessee , of which Sanford was a director, 
and in fact the partners intended all along to sell the T .  & 0.  to the 
East Tennessee . 33 The exorbitant profit which they made helped to load 
the East Tennessee with debt ; for if the T. & 0. continued to earn as 
much as $15 , 000 a year this was not even enough to meet the interest on 
the bonds which were paid for it . 34 McGhee ' s  T. & 0. deal , like Inman ' s  
Georgia Central transaction, was symbolic of the Richmond Terminal ' s  
weakness.  The holding company' s  board of directors was filled with men 
3lllli. ,  922 . 
32sanford to McGhee , October 10 , 1889 ,  McGhee Papers . 
33At the time the road was bought from Aiken, McGhee was obvi­
ously planning to sell it to the East Tennessee , for he wrote that "We 
will have to take extension bonds in payment . "  McGhee to Sanford ,  
October 19 , 1888 , ibid. 
34The East Tennessee ' s  first extension bonds paid 5 percent in 
annual interest . Thus the interest alone on the $320 , 000 paid for the 
T.  & 0. amounted to $16 , 000 per year. 
who did not hesitate to use their positions to realize opportunistic 
personal profits .  Even when they were seemingly dedicated to  the 
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interests of a particular railroad (as McGhee sometimes was to the East 
Tennessee ) the urge for personal gain at the expense of the company was 
too strong to resist . If McGhee was willing to foist the T .  & 0 .  upon 
his own East Tennessee , what might he do to the Terminal which commanded 
none of his personal loyalty? 
The stresses within the Terminal ' s  far flung system led to one 
last attempt to sell the East Tennessee to the Norfolk and Western. 
Again McGhee seems to have been one of those who tried to arrange the 
sale . Attempts to switch the East Tennessee ' s  traffic to the Richmond 
and Danville had been largely unsuccesful , thanks to McGhee ' s  stubborn 
opposition, and the Terminal was quite willing t o  divest itself of  the 
property. The Norfolk ' s  managers ,  however, were too cautious to take 
hold of the East Tennessee , and the last negotiations ended in the fall 
of 1888)5 
But though the Terminal could not rid itself of the East Tennessee , 
it found this railroad steadily slipping from its grasp. The first pre-
ferred shares which the Terminal had purchased in 1887 could control the 
36 East Tennessee for only five years at most . Late in 1888 a plan was 
formed to lease the East Tennessee to the Terminal for ninety-nine years . 
J5See Frederick J .  Kimball to McGhee , August 4, 1888 , and McGhee 
to John H. Inman, August 3 , 1888 , ibid. 
36By the terms of the reor��zation plan of  1886 the first pre­
ferred holders could elect a majority of  the board of directors for five 
years or until dividends of 5 percent on this stock were paid in two 
consecutive years . 
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Having been disappointed a second time in his attempts to form an alli-
ance with the Norfolk and Western, McGhee fell in with the lease plan, 
one highly questionable because it flagrantly violated the rights of  the 
second preferred and common stock owners who sued to prevent it . 37 Me-
Ghee promptly went to work to effect the lease . He wrote almost identi-
cal letters to Sanford and Major Daniel A . Carpenter, an old friend and 
business associate in Knoxville , setting forth his opinions : 
For fear that our friends there , who like myself, are 
interested in the future of Knoxville may feel that the 
lease of the East Tennessee Road to the Richmond & Dan­
vill� will interfere with the future growth of our City, 
I write you for the purpose of giving my views of the 
situation. 
In the first place the headquarters of the East Tennes­
see will remain at Knoxville as at pre.sent . In the next 
place if the Danville succeeds in controling [ sic]  the East 
Tennessee through the lease and thus outing [ sic] off 
the Norfolk & Western, that road will unquestionably build 
down from Bristol and make a connection with the Knoxville 
& Cumberland Gap road or they will extend -their Mountain 
Branch on in the direction of Cumberland Gap , reaching 
Knoxville over the Powell ' s  Valley road. They can extend 
down the Holston Valley and make a connection with the 
Powell ' s  Valley road and get a line to Knoxville some 38 fifteen or twenty miles shorter than the East Tennessee . 
He urged Sanford to show the letter to William Rule , editor of the Re-
publican Knoxville Journal , and suggested that Carpenter show it to the 
editor of the Democratic Knoxville Tribune . He admonished the men, how­
ever, to "be careful to keep my name out of it . "39 Both newspapers 
37Harrison,  Legal Histo;r, 685-86 . 
38McGhee to Sanford and McGhee to Carpenter, November ;L ,  . 1888 , 
McGhee. Papers . 
39Ibid. 
responded with editorials in favor of the lease , and Sanford planted 
"an interview with a prominent iron man of Middle Tennessee" in the 
Cincinnati Commercial Gazette which was reprinted in Knoxville . 4° 
12.5 
In spite of these efforts the lease was invalidated by Chancellor Henry 
R. Gibson, who had proven his hostility to railroad corporations in the 
1870 ' s  when he and McGhee were serving in the Tennessee legislature . 
Gibson held that the East Tennessee and the Richffiond and Danville were 
in fact competing lines and that the lease would effect a restraint to 
commerce . 41 The Terminal unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the deci-
sion to a federal court , and on December 7 ,  1888 , the East Tennessee 
was returned to the control of its old officers . 42 
If anything, the failure of the lease strengthened the hand of 
the Brice-Thomas group within the Terminal. Their cooperation was 
essential if the Terminal was to keep its costly and tenuous hold on 
the East Tennessee . McGhee , too , now loomed much larger in Terminal 
affairs ; with Inman and George Scott ,  president of the Richmond and 
Danville , he was empowered to cast the Terminal ' s  vote in the stock­
holders meetings of all the constituent companies . 43 When he was out 
of New York Thomas kept him informed of Wall Street matters , 44 and Inman 
4°sanford to McGhee , November 19 , 1888 , enclosing .plippings from 
these newspapers , ibid. 
4lKnoxville Journal , November 2.5 , 1888 . 
42Harrison, � History, 686 . 
43A .  J .  Rauh to McGhee , April 20 and November 14, 1889 , McGhee 
Papers . 
44see , for instance , Thomas to McGhee , March 4 and 12 , 1889 , ibid. 
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solicited his· advice about important questions of policy. 45 Late in 
1889 relations between Inman and Scott deteriorated, and McGhee attempted 
to reconcile the two . 46 Scott resigned, however, and McGhee was offered 
the presidency of the Richmond and Danville , a position which he de­
clined at the urging of his family. 47 The offer was a high compliment 
to his diplomatic skill , and it demonstrated the regard in which he was 
held by his associates.  Had he accepted the post at the head of the key 
company in the Terminal structure it would have been the crowning honor 
of his career, but it is improbable that he could have saved the system 
from the destruction towards which it was heading. Instead, Inman be-
came president of the Danville , and it was he who bore the brunt of the 
storm which soon broke over the Terminal. 
In the spring of 1889 McGhee took an eight thousand mile journey 
through the South and West. 48 After the train which bore his private car 
left Washington, D. C . , he travelled for days over tbe tracks of com-
parlies of which he was a director. The East Tennessee ' s  lines could 
carry him from Bristol on the Tennessee-Virginia border almost to New 
Orlearts . At the Crescent City began the Texas and Pacific Railroad, 
in w'hich'" he was heavily interested, and over which he could travel all 
the way to El Paso before swinging north to visit the ranches in 
45Inman to McGhee , April 14, May 23 , November 8 ,  1888 , June 26 
and November 8, 1889 ; McGhee to Inman, May 24, June 6, August 8, 1888 ,  
October 5 ,  26 , November 7 ,  December 23 , 1889 ,  and January ll , 1890 , 
�· 
46c .  M. McClung to McGhee , November 30 , 1889 ,  ibid. 
48w. T. Walters to McGhee , May 2, 1889 ,  ibid. 
47Ibid. 
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Colora:do and Wyoming owned by his Western !Jnion Beef Company. Truly 
McGhee was at the apex of his career; the companies with which he was 
associated were prosperous and still expanding. The year 1889 was a 
great one for the East Tennessee , which earned more than it ever had 
before , and the Richmond Terminal was about to acquire enough additional 
miles of track to become the nation ' s second largest system. 49 The 
South was enjoying an unprecedented boom. 50 Real estate in Knoxville 
commanded unheard of prices , 51 and the Knoxville Woolen Mills Company 
earned an 18 percent return on its capital stock in 1888-89 . 52 
The expansion and prosperity of the late eighties concealed the 
weaknesses of the Terminal. As long as business boomed, the giant sys-
tern could stay ahead of its mounting expenses ,  but the end of the boom 
meant the exposure of the Terminal ' s  frailties. In the fall of 1890 
Baring Brothers ,  a British banking house with large investments in the 
United States and ' South America, was financially embarrassed and turned 
to the Bank of  England for funds to meet its obligations . The resulting 
"Baring Panic" caused a drastic decline of American rail securities on 
the London market and disturbed the money market in the United States . 53 
49Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 232 , 300 . 
5°c .  Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1§11-1lli. (Baton 
Rouge : Louisiana State University Press , 1951�7-39 ·  
)lSee , for instance , D .  A .  Carpenter to  McGhee , Februar,y 18 ,  
1889 , McGhee Papers . 
52R. P. Gettys to McGhee , July 8 ,  1889 , ibid. 
53Dorothy R. Adler, British Investment in American Railways 
(Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia, 1970), 160-61.  
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The contraction of credit seems to have hit the South especially hard ; 
by 1891 the region was already suffering from the depression which would 
affect the entire nation in 1893 . 54 
The Memphis and Charleston was among the first of the Terminal ' s  
properties to feel the effect of the souring economic situation. The 
last six months of 1890 showed a decline of $5 , 406 . 82 in net earnings 
below the figures for the latter half of 1889. 55 As president of the 
railroad McGhee was responsible for arranging its financial affairs . 
Realizing that the M. & C .  could not meet its January, 1891 , interest 
payments from money on hand , he applied to  John Inman for help . "The 
Memphis & Charleston, " he wrote on December 3 ,  1890 , "will have to 
borrow over $100 , 000 to meet its interest charges • • •  and unless the 
East Tennessee Company will furnish it , we will have a great deal of  
trouble . "56 On the same day McGhee urged the M. & C . ' s  financial agents 
to ask the banking house which collected most of the interest to allow 
a short extension of time for the payment . 57 When this failed to pro-
duce the desired results ,  the agents announced that they could not ad-
vance the needed cash, and McGhee transferred the M. & C . ' s  account to 
another firm. 5B Meanwhil� he continued to scramble to fund the January 
54 
Woodward, Origins of the New South, 264-65 .  
55Memphis and Charleston Letterbook, February, 1889-February, 
1892 , p.  734, McGhee Papers . 
56McGhee to Inman, December 3 ,  1890 , ibid. 
57McGhee to Walston H. Brown & Bros . , ibid. 
58walston H. Brown & Bros . to McGhee , December 12 , 1890 ; McGhee 
to Walston H. Brown, Bros . ,  December 13 , 1890 , ibid. 
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coupons , arranging for the railroad to borrow $50 , 000 from a Memphis 
bank and dunning the East Tennessee for payment of traffic balances 
owed to the M. & c . 59 Finally he sought to borrow $21 , 393 - 37 from the 
Ea. t T t t th . . d f .  . t 60 s ennessee o mee e rema1.n1.ng e 1.c1. • On the moming of 
December 30 he argued with Thomas who refused to let the East Tennes see 
advance this sum. The cool tone of a note which he sent later in the 
day shows that the M. & C . ' s  financial crisis had strained the relation-
ship between the two men : 
I confess to some surprise at the spirit of your conversation 
this A .  M. Your position in the matter was not what I had 
been led to expect from our former conversations . You had 
agreed that the East Tennessee Company would advance $50 , 000 
if I could get up the balance .  Having succeeded in getting 
up all the money required except about $20 , 000 , I was not 
prepared for the spirit in which you met my inquiry of this 
morning. 
I will advance the required amount and relieve the East 
Tennessee Company of a compliance with any part of the obli­
gation you assumed for it . If not asking too much will you 
kindly use your influence to have the East Tennessee Company 
pay freight balances to the Memphis & Charleston Company. 
I hope the request will not give you additional offense . 6l 
As business conditions in the South worsened during 1891 , the 
M. & C .  continued to lose money. The June interest payment was made 
only after the company borrowed $120 , 000 which was guaranteed by the 
East Tennessee ; with a floating debt of $300 , 000 , the M. & C .  had run 
out of credit . 62 Although he looked for an improvement of general 
59McGhee to H. C .  Wilton, December 2, 1890 ; McGhee to Henry, Fink, 
December 19 , 1890 , ibid. 
60McGhee to Thomas,  December 29 ,  1890 , ibid. 
61McGhee to Thomas , December 30 , 1890 , ibid. 
62 McGhee to Milton Humes ,  June 18 , 1891 , ibid. 
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business conditions , McGhee advised a friend in Tennessee that "Con-
servatism should now be the watch-word. • To all manufacturing 
enterprises in which I am interested I am giving the above counsel. "63 
By the summer of 1891 the Terminal ' s  difficulties became common 
gossip in New York, and on August 8 ,  the New York Herald brought the 
embarrassing details into public view by publishing a lengthy finan-
cial analysis of the system. The examination of the Terminal ' s  struc-
ture revealed that none of the constituent companies were earning 
enough to pay their large dividends and that the East Tennessee was 
only making expenses . 64 Responding to the charges ,  Inman blithely 
asserted that "there is no portion of the system • • • which is not 
earning its fixed charges , " and added that "Each of these companies 
owns securities of unquestionable value largely in excess of its out­
standing indebtedness . 1 1 6S Despite these protestations , the Terminal 
failed to produce convincing evidence of its solvency. The charges 
were in fact all too true and talk about the Terminal ' s  troubles con­
tinued in the newspapers . 66 W. T .  Walters , McGhee ' s  old Baltimore 
friend, wondered about the many Terminal rumors and feared for the 
safety of his East Tennessee consols . McGhee reassured him about the 
bonds but added a cryptic note about the Terminal ' s  troubles : "Not 
6�cGhee' to D. S .  Williams , June 26 , 1891 , ibid. 
64Klei� Great Richmond Terminal , 23)-39 · 
6STribune , August ll , 1891. 
66Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 236�38 .  
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prepared to write much about Terminal . • • • Statement in the papers 
not far wrong. 1167 
Which newspaper statement he meant is not clear, but McGhee must 
have known that the Terminal 1 s situation was precarious . He lacked any 
real commitment to the far flung system, and like Brice and Thomas he was 
deeply interested only in the East Tennessee . He had no choice but to 
await developments and hope that when the dust had settled around the 
Terminal he would find his own position unchanged or perhaps enhanced. 
In January, 1892 , he wrote his son-in- law that he remained on good terms 
with Inman, and that his influence in the Terminal had increased. 68 
This , in the face of an apparent struggle between the Inman and Brice-
Thomas factions , would seem to emphasize McGhee ' s  position as a concili-
ator of the various parties which were trying to ride the whirlwind now 
sweeping through the Terminal . 69 
All of this commotion around the great holding company began to 
attract other parties .  Sometime in the late winter of 1892 Inman 
67McGhee to Walters , September 1) , 1891 , McGhee Papers . 
68 McGhee to C .  M. McClung, January 18 , 1892 , ibid. 
69As Klein states in Great Richmond Terminal , 237-40 , relations 
between Inman and the Brice-Thomas group seemed to deteriorate during 
the fall of 1891 . On December 2 ,  L .  F. Brown in the New York office of 
the Terminal wrote Charles H. Hudson, General Supe rintendent of the 
East Tennessee , that the "R. & D.  folks through Mr. Inman --; • •  [ were .  
trying] t o  elect such a Terminal Board as will enable the Inman crowd 
to elect their directors when the E.  T .  annual meeting is held. " He 
felt sure that this was "another effort to get control of the E .  T .  
Board, and the management o f  the E .  T .  properties , t o  the exclusion o f  
the present men. " Charles H. Hudson Papers , McClung Collection. The 
Inman effort was unsuccessful , but it is remarkable that McGhee re­
tained his close relationship with Inman as well as Brice and Thomas . 
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began to slip , while at least two powerful outside groups began to move 
in on the Terminal . A syndicate headed by Walter G. Oakman of New 
York' s First National Bank was showing a strong interest , while William 
P. Clyde , a former Terminal president , began to make another bid for 
contro1. 70 At this crucial moment McGhee apparently decided to with-
draw at least temporarily from the struggle .  In mid-February he left 
for the South where he remained until late April. He received daily 
letters or telegrams from his secretary Charles T .  Leonhardt in New 
York and in this way remained abreast of the unfolding developments in 
the Terminal situation. 71 He was in Hot Springs , Arkansas , when a major 
reshuffling of the , officers and directors took place . Inman resigned 
as president to be succeeded by Oakman, and Thomas journeyed to Knox­
ville to brief McGhee fully on the situation. 72 At about this time 
Brice , Thomas , and McGhee began to concentrate increasingly on main-
taining their control in the East Tennessee . 
As matters turned out this meant McGhee ' s  further withdrawal 
from the Terminal and a reimmersion in East Tennessee affairs . The 
William Clyde faction was about to gain control of the holding company, 
but John Inman had not given up hope for a comeback. From his summer 
home at Stockbridge , Massachusetts ,  he wrote McGhee urging him to re-
main on the Terminal board : 
70Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 245-58 . 
7�emphis and Charleston Letterbook , February, 1892-0ctober, 
1894, McGhee Papers . 
72Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 254 ; Leonhardt to McGhee , 
March 30 , 1892 , McGhee Papers . 
My desire to have you "stay in, " is of course partly self­
ish, as I think you might be in position to render me some 
service . Among other things , I would like to know their 
"line of attack, " and you might get this for me by " rurming 
with the hounds. " 
I may not be in city for several days-- should you have 
to decide before I see you, you can only use your judgment , 
but I would like you to remain, at least for a time . 73 
McGhee ' s  judgment , however, was to get off the board. He was one of 
only four directors renominated by the Clyde faction, but when over­
whelmingly re-elected on September 15 , 1892 , he declined to serve . 74 
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The prolonged infighting over the Terminal , together with the worsen-
ing business conditions in the South, threw the holding company and its 
subsidiaries into bankruptcy in the summer of 1892 . McGhee and Henry 
Fink, an experienced railroad man, were named co-receivers of the East 
Tennessee . 75 Fink wrote that the appointments had "given great satis-
faction to Officers, Agts & Employees of the Co. as well as to the 
people • • • •  11 76 McGhee ' s  son-in-law, Calvin Morgan McClung, observed 
that "The whole town [ of Knoxville ] seemed greatly pleased over the 
East Tenn. going into the hands of yourself and Mr. Fink. They felt it 
was in home hands and that the property and Knoxville ' s  interest would 
be looked after. "77  
73Inman t o  McGhee , September 17 , 1892 , ibid. 
7�lein, Great Richmond Terminal , 261 . 
75McGhee and Fink were also co-receivers of the Memphis and 
Charleston, ibid. , 256.  
76Fink to McGhee , June 26 , 1892 , McGhee Papers . 
77McClung to McGhee , July 6 ,  1892 , ibid" 
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For the last time McGhee shouldered responsibility for the East 
Tennessee . In spite of the favorable response to his and Fink' s 
appointment , he soon realized that their task would be extremely diffi-
cult . Returning from a trip over the East Tennessee lines ,  Fink reported : 
I find conditions in the South very bad, worse than I had 
expected. We will have a short cotton crop again in Ala­
bama and on the line of the Mem. -Ch. The people are poor 
and cannot travel or buy goods , and we must look £or further 
reductions in our revenue . And at the same time we are un­
able to carry any farther, the so-called "economy. " In fact 
we will have to make extra ordinary expenditures to make up 
for past economies . 78 
McGhee predicted that eventually the East Tennessee would undergo a 
drastic reorganization, 79 but in the meantime he threw himself into the 
business of keeping the railroad going. He generally refused to inter-
fere in the operations of the company, leaving this phase almost en-
tirely to Fink and the hired employees of the road. This involved 
fending off a hoard of placeseekers who had some claim to his influence . 80 
Occasionally he intervened to correct a situation in which he had some 
personal interest or knowledge . He ordered, for instance , the removal 
of a rural sidetrack from one location to another so that more farmers 
81 could be served. The fact that the new siding made one of his own 
78Fink to McGhee , August 26 , 1892 , ibid. 
79McGhee to Fink, August 18 ,  1892 , ibid. 
80see , for instance ,  McGhee ' s  letters to Frank S .  White ,  July 8 ,  
Herbert J .  Lowry, July 18 ,  Arthur H. Henley, July 20 ,  and John Eo  
Helms , July 26 , 1892 , ibid. 
8�cGhee to Fink, August 18 ,  1892 , ibido 
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farms more valuable was also a consideration in this rare example of 
intervention. In the main he restricted himself to the financial man-
agement of the company' s  affairs in New York, and while he must have 
enjoyed this last fling at administering the East Tennessee , he had no 
illusions about how long it would last . By the summer of 1893 he felt 
that "I am to a great extent a back number in railroad circles as I do 
not give attention enough to railroad affairs to be able to influence 
to any great extent the active men operating them. I do not attend 
any meetings and do not come in contact with them. 1182 
As evidence of his determination to stay out of the complicated 
tangle of the Terminal , he did not exert himself to accede to Circuit 
Judge Howell E.  Jackson ' s  plea that McGhee advise him in confidence on 
the "terribly complicated" details of a suit involving the Georgia 
Centra1 . 83 This case was of great importance to the Terminal , and pre-
sumably McGhee might have been able to have significantly influenced 
the decision. He wrote Jackson, however, that he was indisposed and 
could not come to Nashville to confer with him on the "complicated and 
troublesome matter. 11 84 
The bankruptcy of the Terminal was rapidly resolving itself in 
a way which few could have foreseen two years earlier;  for in 1893 the 
depression which already distressed the South spread to the rest of the 
nation. McGhee was perplexed by this prolonged economic situation. 
82McGhee to John A.  Grant , July 14, 1893 , ibid. 
83Jackson to McGhee ,  June 16 , 1893 , ibid. 
84Ibid. , Jime' 22,  1893" 
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"I have gone through several panics , " he wrote , "but I do not think I 
have ever known so much disturbance among the business interests through­
out the country as there is at present . "85 The depression was not the 
result of a "Wall Street panic ,  11 he felt , because Wall Street specula-
tors had not really been too badly hurt by the decline in prices of 
securities .  New York banks had shown "the utmost liberality" toward 
their correspondents in the hinterland. Still he was unable to ex-
plain or predict business conditions : 
It seems in the present to be impossible to judge as to cause 
and effect as we used to be able to do . The world is now so 
intimately connected in its business relations and the rapid­
ity of communication one to the other is such that a given 
cause here is prevented of having its anticipated effect by 
some disturbance or counteracting cause which is created 
elsewhere . 86 
McGhee ' s  world was changing, and the inexplicable depression of 
the nineties was speeding the transformation. McGhee and his associates 
had created something new when they put together the massive Richmond 
Terminal . Truly one of the first gigantic corporations which would be-
come the symbols of American economic life ,  the Terminal was anything 
but a monolithic structure . The various railroad companies which com-
prised it continued to lead lives of their own. McGhee ' s  stubborn and 
successful resistance to the subordination of the East Tennessee to the 
Richmond and Danville illustrates the continued ind!'Jpendence of the in-
dividual companies .  Moreover, Inman ' s  Georgia Company deal and McGhee ' s  
Tennessee and Ohio transaction show how the opportunistic masters of the 
S5McGhee to Isham G. Harris , July 17 , 1893 , ibid. 
86Ibid. 
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Terminal used their power to achieve pe�onal profits .  There were too 
many such individuals and factions who satisfied themselves at Terminal ' s  
expense . Having created the great railroad combine , McGhee and the 
others were unable to make it function properly, but they were likewise 
powerless to dismember the monster and return to a simpler time . The 
thrust toward the great corporation was a sign of the times and could 
not be resisted ; the Terminal would die ,  but it would be reborn as a 
truly monolithic corporation. 
The transformation of the Terminal into the Southern Railway was 
the accomplishment of the great banking house , Drexel ,  Morgan & Co. , 
working through its railroad specialist Samuel Spencer who would become 
the Southern' s first chief executive . The reorganization was also an 
important contribution to the formidable reputation of J .  P. Morgan who 
conceived a plan which mastered the complexities of the Terminal situa-
tion. In addition, Morgan "provided funds for the reorganization, helped 
support the market ,  arranged for the necessary loans , and most important , 
restored public confidence in the Terminal properties • • • •  1 187 By the 
summer of 1893 the various factions had accepted the plan and bad de­
posi'ted their securities with Drexel ,  Morgan. 88 Spencer was named co-
receiver of the East Tennessee and the other Terminal propertie s ,  and 
McGhee as usual accepted the inevitable with good grace . His attitude 
toward the new regime is illustrated in the letter which he wrote to 
the East Tennessee ' s  general counsel :  
87Klein, Great Richmond Terminal , 277 . SSibid. , 280 . 
As I telegraphed you to-day, Drexel ,  Morgan & Company have 
now deposited with them a majority of the securities of the 
East Tennessee road. Mr. Spencer is connected with that 
firm and I regard it entirely proper that they should have 
a representative of their large interest in the receivership. 
The reorganization proposed by Drexel ,  Morgan & Co . , is 
a very comprehensive one and makes adequate provision for 
the future wants of the property. 
Experience teaches us that in order to encourage the 
development of the tributary country continual expenditures 
must be made by railroads and from time to time additions 
to the equipment is rendered necessary to take care of the 
increasing business . Ample provisions are made for this in 
the plan of Drexel ,  Morgan & Co .  That feature of it com­
mends the plan to me as a security holder and especially 
is it acceptable to me , in view of the large interests of 
various character which I hold in the East Tennes�ee .  
As the sale of the property is necessa� to a reorgani-
zation I hope now soon it may take place . 0� . 
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The sale of the East Tennessee to Southern Railway, however, did 
not take place until the summer of 1894. During the year' s  interval 
McGhee worked with Spencer as co-receiver and apParently developed. a 
good relationship with him. McGhee had a financial and personal in-
terest in making the transition a smooth one , and, as he had done when 
the East Tennessee was bought by the Terminal , he wrote letters to 
Knoxville urging a peaceful acquiescence : 
The Southern Railway Company has bought the Richmond & Dan­
ville R 1y. and will buy the East Tenn. Va. & Ga. R 1y. Thus 
the East Tenn. will be absorbed and will not exist and the 
Southern Railway will extend from Washington to Brunswick. 
There are five directors in the new Company, and none of 
our people are in it . 
I had a talk with Genl . Thomas upon the subject and I 
told him I thought he ought to be in the directory, in view 
of his large interest in the property and that his going 
89McGhee to W. H. Henderson, July 17 , 1893 , McGhee Papers . 
into it would not indicate that any others of the old party 
should go in as he had the largest interest , and that I 
had a very small one . That with the East Tenn. Va. & Ga. 
out of existence the aroma was gone and that I cared nothing 
whatever for a connection with the Southern Railway Company, 
and that I did not feel the slightest disappointment in not 
being put into the Board. I said to him I felt sure Sanford 
would feel very differently about it , and that he would be 
very much mortified if he was left out entirely and not put 
in something. I said further that I hoped he would be re­
tained at least as a director in the Knoxville & Ohio . 
The position of a director in a railroad has long ago to 
me lost any degree of importance and I have not the slightest 
regrets in severing my connection with it entirely. 
I fear howevef., it will result in the loss of some popula­
tion to Knoxville : for good sense and economy dictates that 
the very expensive and well filled offices there should be 
to a considerable extent decimated. 
The auditors office will probably be removed to Washington 
or elsewhere .  
I should prefer that you would not b e  at all active in 
talking about these changes or in criticizing the action of 
the Southern Railway Company, as I still have some interest 
in it and my personal relations with the management are very 
pleasant and cordial . 90 
Though this candid letter to a son-in-law showed a realistic 
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understanding of the changes which would take place , McGhee was care-
ful to be less frank with other Knoxvillians . "The sale of the Road 
will not disturb any of you, " he wrote to one , "nor will Knoxville 
feel it in any way. 119l He was correct in thinking that Sanford would 
be harder to pacify. McGhee ' s  old associate wrote that "Spencer may 
know more about the Southern Rail Road than every one else connected 
with it but if he does he dont look that way. " He was furious that 
90McGhee to C .  M. McClung, June 22 ,  1894,  ibid. 
9�cGhee to W. B. Jackson, June 26 , 1894, ibid. 
McGhee was to be left out of the directorate and felt sure that he 
himself would also· lose his seat on the subsidiary Knoxville and 
Ohio . Sanford was determined to exact a high price for his K. & 0 .  
stock i f  he went t o  the "waste basket . 1192 Tactfully McGhee com-
miserated with him and assured him that he would be retained on the 
K. & 0 .  board. As for McGhee 1 s being left off the Southern board, 
that would "relieve me of hundreds of applications for help that have 
been very troublesome to me . "  He urged cooperation with the Southern 
and advised that "You will have a large influence that can be exerted 
for the good of the reorganized company and for the benefit of our 
joint interest s . "93 
Sanford remained obdurate ,  however, especially in the matter of 
the Knoxville and Ohio stock. The Southern inherited from the East 
Tennessee a majority holding in this subsidiary road ; the remaining 
shares were owned by the city of  Knoxville , Knox County, and various 
individuals . McGhee , Sanford, and Thomas owned 1 , 433 shares between 
them •. 94 Sanford wanted a large sum for this stock and McGhee had to 
coax him into letting the Southern have it at fifty dollars per share , 
or one-half the par value . He warned Sanford that should they ask more 
for the stock Spencer "would probably feel that we were tr,ying to 
squeeze him, and in view of our large interests dependent upon his 
92sanford to McGhee , June 23 , 1894, ibid. 
93McGhee to Sanford, June 26 , 1894, ibid. 
9�emorandum of Agreement , Letterbook, October, 1894-May, 1897 , 
p .  339 , ibid. Available information does not indicate the total number 
of shares in the K.  & 0. 
favor, we cannot afford to do that . 119.5 The deal was finally closed 
with the Southern paying fifty for the stock but also purchasing some 
notes which McGhee and Sanford held against another railroad, the 
Nashville , Athens , and Tellico . As McGhee remarked ,  "This is a poor 
sale for the stock but a first rate one for the • • • debt and I am 
very much gratified at closing it up. 1196 
There would be no deals with the Southern like the sale of the 
Tennessee and Ohio to the East Tennessee , but McGhee and Sanford found 
that the new regime would make certain concessions to its friends . 
McGhee , for instance , was still privileged to use a private Southern 
Railway car, and his numerous interests in enterprises along the route 
of the Southern could not have suffered from his "cordial" relation-
ship with Spencer. In return, he and Sanford made themselves useful 
to the giant corporation by using their considerable influence in 
Tennessee in its behalf.. Sometimes this took the form of simply fur­
nishing political intelligence , 97 but the Southern' s purchase of the 
Knoxville and Knox County interest in the K. & 0 .  provides a neat ex­
ample of how that "large influence" could be "exerted for the good of 
the reorganized company. II 
At the same time that they were selling their own K. & 0 .  stock 
to the Southern, McGhee and Sanford were arranging for the acquisition 
9.5McGhee to Sanford, May 27 , 189.5 , ibid. 
96McGhee to Sanford, July 24, 189.5 , �· 
97McGhee to Spencer, July 12 , 189.5 , ibid. 
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of the t:i ty1 s and coUll.ty1 s shares .  With the development of  a large coal 
hauling business the· K. & 0 .  had become a profitable little railroad, 
but the managers of the East Tennessee and later of the Southern had 
no desire to pay out this surplus in dividends o Rather, they tried to 
disguise the profits by spending heavily on equipment ; in this way they 
hoped to persuade the minority holders ,  especially the city of Knox-
ville and the county of Knox, that their stock was of little value and 
might be sold at a low price. 98 The general public suspicion of large 
Ia.i.lroad companies , however, prevented such a sale until 1895 - In that 
year the popular feeling against the Southern Railway was cleverly used 
as a lever to obtain the city and county stock. 
This was made possible by the appearance a.t Knoxville of a 
Colonel Albert E. Boone who proposed to build a railroad to be desig-
nated as the Ohio River,  Jellico , . Knoxville , and Tidewater, also called 
the Black Diamond line . The ne1.v railroad was projected as a rival of 
the Southern and was supposed to run from the coal field.s on the 
Tennessee-Kentucky border through Knoxville and into the Carolinas . 
Boone loudly proclaimed that i t  would s.imul taneously "relieve Knoxville 
and Knox Col.LTJ.ty from the death grip the Southern Railway has upon her 
future prosperity" and "strike a death blow to the coal BalXll.ls . "99 
San:rord referred to Boone ' s  company as the "Wind Railroad , "  but he saw 
in it a good possibility of getting the K. & 0 .  stock. 100 At McGhee ' s  
98McGhee to Spencer, July 23 , 1895 , ibid. 
99Journal , June 10 , 1895 . 
100 Sanford to Spencer, May 11,  1895 , McGhee Papers . 
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suggestion, Spencer authorized Sanford to handle the matter for the 
101 Southern. It was proposed that the city and county should swap 
their K. & 0 .  stock for shares in Boone ' s  Black Diamond line , and though 
Sanford called this proposal a "dead fraud" he recognized that it would 
11probably be the means of having the City and County divest themselves 
of their K. & 0 .  stock, which is a desirable thing to do • • • believing 
. t t b th 1 t t . .f' . t 11 102 � -o e e on y way o ge possessJ.on o � • Sanford made alli-
ances with some of the local men who were promoting Boone 1 s railroad. 
Some money spent in the right places secured a referendum on the ques-
. 
tion of  making an exchange of the stocks , and a campaign of picnics and 
103 speeches by Boone persuaded the voters to approve the swap. A few 
weeks after the Boone group got the stock Sanford was able to buy it 
at thirty dollars a share . 104 He sent it on to McGhee together with 
a report of how he had accompl�shed this coup : 
Had it not been for a couple of pools being for.med by citi­
zens here to buy up this stock and hold it as a matter of 
speculation for the future , I could have gotten it at quite 
a sum less ,  but these combinations had to be broken up and 
it has cost money to do it . I have not appeared in the 
matter at all myself, having worked entirely through others , 
as one of the great "bugaboos"  was that it should not be sold 
to you, I or the Southern and at present , no one here knows 
who the purchaser is . Of course there are many rumors asso­
ciating us all with it , but they know nothing. l05 
101 Spencer to Sanford, May 7 ,  1895 , ibid. 
102sanford to Spencer, May 11 , 1895 , ibid. 
103 Sanford to Spencer, June 24, 1895 , ill.<!· ;  Journal , June 10 , 
JO, 1895 . 
104 Sanford to McGhee , July 22 , 1895 , McGhee Papers . 
l05Ibid. 
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Thus did Knoxville and Knox County give up their K. & 0 .  stock 
to the "bugaboo" Southern Railway. In exchange, the two governments 
received shares in Boone ' s  vaunted Black Diamond line , a dream rail­
road which in the end was never built . 10
6 
While this incident shows a particularly ruthless side of Me-
Ghee 1 s relationship with the Southern Railway, it is worth noting that 
his personal relationship with Spencer occasionally enabled him to 
accomplish something in the direction of humanizing the policies of 
the corporation. When, as McGhee had privately predicted, the Southern 
began to close some of its Knoxville offices he was moved to intercede 
with Spencer for an old friend : 
I want to make a personal appeal to you for old man Campbell , 
who has been bookkeeper in the Treasurer ' s  office at Knox­
ville for the past twenty years . Mr. Campbell is seventy­
five years of age and has two sisters entirely dependent upon 
his salary for support . He is well preserved and is as 
thoroughly competent as he ever was for the discharge of his 
duties.  
This is no ordinary request but a personal appeal made to 
you in the strongest possible terms , and I hope you will be 
able to find a place for him where he may be able to earn a 
support . l07 
Fearing that Spencer might have forgotten about Robert Campbell,  Me-
Ghee wrote again asking him to "pardon me for coming to you again in 
this matter, but I feel a very deep interest in Mr. Campbell .  He is  an 
older man than I am, but we once went to school together and I am 
greatly attached to him. 11 108 As usual , McGhee was extremely sensitive 
106Kn . 11 OXVl e 
107 McGhee to  
108McGhee to 
Journal and Tribune , March 10, 1902 . 
Spencer, October 14, 1895 , McGhee Papers. 
Spencer, October 24, 1895 , ibid. 
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to the claims of personal friendship , and he took pains to protect an 
old friend who looked to him for help ; in this case he was successful 
and "old man Caltlipbell" was retained by the Southern. l09 
After thirty years of deep involvement in the East Tennessee , Mc­
Ghee found himself in 189.5 a "back number, " as he described it , in the 
affairs of Southern railroads . For three more years , until its eventual 
absorption by the Southern Railway, he remained president and receiver 
of the Memphis and Charleston, but these jobs took little of his time 
or interest . ·  He may have felt relief as he gave up the heavy responsi­
bility for directing the course of the East Tennessee ' s  future , but he 
also must have felt a pang of loss .  His personal fortunes had risen 
with those of the East Tennessee ; his association with the railroad 
had taken him to New York and had opened to him a larger financial 
career. For a time he had played a role in the life of a truly mammoth 
railroad combine . 
But Charles McGhee was not likely to become sentimental about 
a corporation, even one so important to his life as the East Tennessee . 
That railroad had served its purpose ; it had brought him large sums of 
money and great power. He was a businessman, a financier, a capitalist , 
and profits were the objective of his career. With the demise of the 
East Tennessee he would seek these profits in other areas . The move to 
New York led him to take a hand in diverse enterprises , and it enabled 
him to attract Northern capital for some of his Sout�er.n investments .  
Long before the East Tennessee disappeared he was deeply involved in 
l09Spencer to McGhee , October 2.5 , 189.5 , ibid. 
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a variety of other corporations , syndicates ,  and schemes .  Although 
McGhee may be remembered chiefly for his part in the complex corporate 
history of the East Tennessee ,  the history of these other enterprise s ,  
large and small , perhaps reveal even more about McGhee the man and the 
financier. 
CHAPTER V 
INVESTMENTS IN THE WEST : TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD 
AND AMERICAN CATTLE TRUST 
By the late 1880 ' s  New York City had become the financial center 
of the United States .  There was money, of course , in Boston, Philadel-
phia, and Chicago , as well as in the smaller and newer cities which were 
provincial capitals of trade and finance,  but it was in New York that the 
greatest business decisions were made , affecting the economic life o f  the 
l 
country. When the East Tennessee system became important enough to 
attract the attention of Northern capitalist s ,  when it was big enough to 
require large sums of additional capital , it became essentially a New 
York corporation, even though its official headquarters remained at Knox-
ville . At some time in the mid-eighties McGhee decided to move to New 
York where the future of the company would be decided.
2 He plunged into 
the activity surrounding the East Tennessee ' s  reorganization in 1885-86 , 
and he remained a power in its structure until the company disappeared 
in 1895 . 
1 
Actually New York had become the nation 1 s most important money 
market before the Civil War, but by 1880 New York inves tment bankers were 
playing an active part in managing the enterprises which they financed. 
See Fritz Redlich, History of American Business Leaders , ! Series of  
Studies (2 vols . ; Ann Arbor :  Edwards Brothers , Inc . , 1940 ; New York : 
Hafner Publishing Co. , 1951 ) ,  II , pt . 2 ,  pp. 360-65 . 
�y the summer of 1886 McGhee and his secretary, Charles T .  Leon­
hardt , were living in New York. His wife and youngest daughter, Eleanor, 
divided their time between New York, Knoxville , and various resorts . 
From 1886 until at least 1898 McGhee spent most of his time in New York .  
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Although the East Tennessee and the Richmond Terminal absorbed 
much of his attention during the years , he was alive to the many oppor-
tunities for profit making which his new situation afforded him. His 
association with Thomas , Brice,  John G. Moore , and other directors of 
the Richmond Terminal and the East Tennessee led him into varied specu-
lations . He soon resumed his close relationship with his old friend 
Wilson, and he made new friendships with such men as Robert Fleming, 
the British investor who was often in New York, 3 and Colonel Oliver H. 
Payne , the Standard Oil magnate who had himself just moved to the city 
from Ohio . 4 It is apparent that these friendships were based on personal 
regard as well as on business interest , and though McGhee ' s  correspondence 
is usually strictly serious and businesslike there are occasional notes 
which reveal an affectionate comradeship . At the end of a long business 
letter, for instance , Fleming added this paragraph:  
I hear the weather is very hot so  that you who have the in­
stincts of a salamander will feel happy. I fancy I see you 
now in a rocking chair with a cigar between your fingers on 
the veranda of the Oriental intent apparently on the ups and 
downs of the Atlantic but really perhaps on the ups and downs 
of Wall Street . I should like very much to have the seven S league boots that would place me by your side this afternoon. 
That these friendships were important to McGhee is shown by a telegram he 
once sent to Payne who was summering in Massachusetts : "Arrived here 
several days since . 6 Am very lonely when will you be here?" 
3Adler, British Investment in American Railways , 147-48 . 
4nictionary of American Biography, XIV, 329-30 . 
SFleming to McGhee , June 8 ,  1889 . All manuscript citations are to 
the McGhee Papers unless otherwise noted. 
6 McGhee to Payne , July 10 , 1893 . 
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Besides the pleasure of these congenial associations , New York 
offered much more to the Tennessean. Here he could easily raise 
$200 , 000 in cash by offering some of his securities as collateral. 7 He 
could al!'JO play an insider' s stock market game , as he did during a two-
week period when he realized a $10 , 000 profit in a speculation in Chicago 
Gas stock. 8 Most of his time was occupied with the affairs of enterprises 
whose need for capital had made them the concern of New York financiers . 
Usually these were Tennessee companies in which McGhee had a substantial 
personal and financial interest , as in the case of the East Tennessee , 
Virginia , and Georgia. But on two occasions he became deeply involved 
in deciding the destinies of companies which operated outside of Tennes� 
see or the Southeast. In one case he acted to save a sizeable investment ; 
in the other he became involved primarily because of a family relation-
ship . 
l .  
The collapse of  the Texas and Pacific Railroad into bankruptcy 
late in 18859 brought McGhee into the affairs of a company which lay out-
side the traditional geographic area of his interest . Heretofore he had 
been actively involved only with the railroads of the South, east of the 
Mississippi--in fact those lines which made up or connected with the East 
7McGhee to Central Trust Company, November 30 ,  1888 . 
8Memorandum of Chicago Gas speculation, Letterbook, February, 1892-
0ctober, 1895 , p .  875 . 
9Commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLI ( 1885 ) ,  714. 
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Tennessee system. The Texas and Pacific, however, began in New Orleans 
and stretched for almost a thousand miles to El Paso , constituting a 
large link in the southern transcontinental system. McGhee' s  initial 
interest in this road must have been the result of a heavy investment 
in the company' s  bonds , probably made prior to the Texas and Pacific 1 s 
receivership in December, 1885. At any rate, he owned almost $500 , 000 
10 of the company' s  bonds three years later, and it was this large hold-
ing which was endangered by the reorganization plan advanced in behalf 
of Jay Gould in 1886 . 
The Texas and Pacific had a troubled history even before its dif-
ficulties of the late eighties. Envisioned as the South' s  tie to the 
Pacific coast , the line was enthusiastically promoted by such Southern 
leaders as Jefferson Davis. 11 After the Civil War the road across Texas 
became the special project of Thomas A. Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad. 
Scott ' s  vision of lucrative government grants and the impatience of 
Southerners for the Pacific link had something to do , as C. Vann Wood-
ward relates in Reunion and Reaction, with the famous Wormley House bar-
gain and the succession of Hayes to the presidency in 1877 . The Southern-
ers , so the story goes, sold out Samuel J. Tilden, in exchange for 
federal support of the Texas and Pacific , and indeed Scott did receive 
a federal charter and the land grants from the state of Texas. Scott ' s 
10Letterbook, February 1888-February, 1889, p. 24. A listing of 
his securities at that time is in the Appendix. 
1lwoodward, Reunion and Reaction, 70. 
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rival , Collis P. Huntington, who was building his Southern Pacific 
line east from California , prevented the Texas and Pacific from ac-
quiring further government assistance , and in 1880 Scott sold his stock 
to Jay Gould and Russell Sage . Under the supervision of General Gren-
ville M. Dodge , Gould ' s  Texas and Pacific was extended west from Fort 
Worth to Sierra Blanca just ninety miles short of El Paso. Late in 1881 
Gould and Huntington entered into an agreement which gave the Texas and 
Pacific the right to use the track of the Southern Pacific from Sierra 
Blanca to El Paso . 12 
By the time of its bankruptcy in 188.5 , the Texas and Pacific 
spanned the Lone Star state and consisted of 1 , .500 miles of track. West 
of Fort Worth, however, the line traversed many miles of country "almost 
uninhabited except by hostile Indians , prairie dogs and coyotes where 
even water had to be transported long distances and the local territory 
could not supply the needs of man or beast . "lJ 0bservers noted the poten-
tial value of the prope rty, but the immediate problem of low traffic on 
its western, or Rio , division was clear. In addition, the charge was 
made that much of the line was poorly built and maintained, leading some 
�· � 
to contemptuously characterize the railroad as "two streaks of rust , 
with the New Orleans division half the time under water. 11 14 
12Ibid. , especially 7.5-76 ,  79-81 ,  and 23.5-37 · 
l3s .  G. Reed, ! History of Texas Railroads (Houston : St . Clair 
Publishing Co . , 1941 ) , 36.5 . 
14commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLI (188.5 ) ,  714. 
The forcing of Texas and Pacific into bankruptcy by its creditor, 
the Missouri Pacific , was widely viewed as a maneuver by Jay Gould to 
tighten his grip on the former road. 15 After all , Gould controlled the 
Missouri Pacific , and this company' s  claim of $1 , 800 , 000 was unsubstan-
tiated except on the books of these two Gould enterprises. As the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle of New York observed : 
Some of the same parties who were most prominent in the road 
at the beginning, and who reaped large profits ,  are yet con­
nected with the company, and will now appear asking the bond­
holders to forego their interest for an indefinite time , and 
the stockholders to pay an assessment , in order to practically 
rebuild the [Rio and New Orleans ] divisions . l6 
Moreover, the Chronicle saw "the hand of Gould" in the plan of reor-
ganization advanced by a group of Philadelphia holders of middle divi­
sion bonds under the chairmanship of General Isaac Wistar. 17 This plan 
was highly favorable to Gould ' s  interests , and the Wistar committee 
appears to have been the "Wizard ' s" stalking-horse for the capture of 
\ 18 the Texas road. Simply described , the Wistar plan proposed to re-
deem the Missouri Pacific debt by issuing enough stock in the Texas 
and Pacific to give Gould an undisputed majority. The road ' s  Rio 
l5Ibid. , XLII (1886) ,  61 .  16Ibid. , XLI ( 1885 ) ,  714. 
l7Ibid. , XLII (1886) ,  61 .  Wistar in his Autobiograp�y (New York : Harper and Brothers , 1937 ) ,  492-95 , says that his committee turned to Gould only after the rival New York committee began to fight the Phila­
delphia, or Wistar, plan. Wistar' s "irregular efforts of memory" do 
not seem plausible because as early as January, 1886 , the Chronicle 
warned of the influence of Gould over the Wistar group . The New York 
committee , of which McGhee was a member, was not formed until April , 
1886 . 
18Julius Grodinsky, Jay Gould: His Business Career, 1867-1892 
(Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press ,  1957) ,  441-46 . 
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division bondholders were then expected to submit to a "massacre" of 
their securities in a drastic scaling down of interest . 19 A reorgani-
zation along these lines would give Gould control of the Texas and 
Pacific which would be more valuable because of the reduction of its 
20 fixed charges.  
Despite the strong position of Gould and his cohorts and the 
famous financier' s reputation as a dangerous adversary, several groups 
of bondholders were stirred to action. Among the earliest of those to 
organize for self defense was a group of New Yorkers who held Rio divi-
sion bonds . Meeting at the offices of A.  M. Kidder & Co .  on April 19 , 
1886 ,  these bondholders appointed a committee consisting of McGhee , 
William C .  Hill of A.  M. Kidder, and Isaac L. Rice , a rai lroad promoter 
and a director of Richmond Terminal . 21 Soon other concerned parties 
began to organize . 22 Robert Fleming wrote to his friend McGhee : 
Please do not let us give up the battle without putting on 
our armour. 
I am willing if I can trust to your help to run out with 
all the Bonds on this side pledged to support me & you. I 
can with the assistance of our mutual friends make the thing 
go through but it can only be through joint and undivided 
action. 23 
By the middle of August , 1886 , a merging of the important interests 
opposed to the Wistar plan had occurred , and the Wistar group had been 
l9Commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII (1886 ) , .5.50 . 
20Ibid. ; Grodinsky, Jay Gould,  442-43 . 
21commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII (1886 ) ,  .519 .  
22Ibid. , 632 ; XLIII ( 1886 ) ,  12.  
23Fleming to McGhee , July 26 , 1886 . 
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forced to form a compromise reorganization committee , representative of 
a broad spectrum of Texas and Pacific security holders . 24 McGhee and 
Fleming were members along with Wistar, William D. Winsor, John Markoe,  
and J .  N. Hutchinson of Philadelphia, and Meyer Lehman of New York. The 
plan advanced by this consolidated committee was more favorable to the 
various bondholders but was nevertheless a compromise with the Gould 
interest . It was agreed that the Mis souri Pacific should have $6 , 500 , 000 
of Te±as and Pacific stock,  but the importance of these shares was 
diluted by increasing the total of Texas and Pacific shares from 
$32 , 000 , 000 to $40 , 000 , 000 . 25 The problem of a plan and a committee 
for the reorganization of the Texas and Pacific was not settled, but 
the question remained of how the railroad was to be run until reorgani-
zation was completed. Even more crucial was the future of the company 
after reorganization. Would it revert to the pre-bankruptcy status 
guo , i . e . , full control by Jay Gould, or would the Texas and Pacific 
emerge under an "independent" management unbeholdi:m to Gould? 
McGhee was intimately concerned with these question, both as a 
member of the reorganization committee and a large bondholder and as a 
personal friend of Governor John C .  Brown, the Texas and Pacific receiver 
who hoped to become president of the reorganized company. The friendly 
relationship between the two went back to the early 1870 ' s  when Brown 
was the Conservative redeemer governor of Tennessee and McGhee was a 
prominent legislator. At that time McGhee was accused of manipulating 
24commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLII ( 1886 ) , 133 , 181 .  
25Ibid .  
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the governor and legislature in the interest of Thomas Scott and the 
Southern Railway Security Company, and Brown was called a pawn of some 
Tennessee railroad interests . 26 After Brown completed his two terms as 
governor, Scott made him a vice president of Texas and Pacific , and 
during the Gould regime from 1880 to 188.5 he was the company' s  chief 
solicitor. 27 When Brown became receiver in 188.5 it was apparently at 
the urging of General Wistar and his group who probably promised him the 
presidency later. 28 While Wistar and Gould appear to have been allies 
in the initial struggle over reorganization, the alliance was not based 
on an identity of interests. Wistar and his Philadelphia group wanted 
to protect the middle division bonds and to do so were willing to cooper-
ate with Gould, who of course want ed to strengthen his hold upon the 
Texas and Pacific . Having a friendly Brown as receiver gave the Wistar 
faction leverage in dealing with Gould or any other parties . 29 Once the 
safety of the middle bonds was secured, however, Wistar and his friends 
were not particularly interested in championing the cause of the former 
Tennessee governor. 
Before the reorganization compromise was reached , Brown urged Me-
Ghee to get together with Wistar and recommended the latter as "a very 
26 See above , Cha�t er III . 
27Dictionary of American Biograp�y, III , 13.5-36 .  
28 Brown to McGhee , October 20 , 1887 . 
29Wistar1 s  comm�ttee was the first organized group of Texas and 
Pacific creditors . Tfierefore it was able to exercise "the very im­
portant right to name the Judicial Receiver, and thus control future 
proceedings , both legal and financial . " Wistar, AutobiographY, 493 . 
156 
good man and a very reasonable man when you have got at him properly. 1130 
Later, when Gould began to apply pressure to have him removed, Brown 
spoke of "the gentlemen who over-persuaded me to take the position I 
now occupy • • •  will not have completed their contract with me when 
the road passes out of the hands of the Receivers . ,. 3l If Brown 
did have an agreement with Wistar he found in time that he could expect 
little support from the Philadelphia general . He thus turned more and 
more to McGhee for aid and reassurance .  McGhee ,  for his part , was not 
only fond of Brown but desired to see the Texas and Pacific under an 
independent management , or the kind of leadership which he believed 
Brown could provide . While he admitted that Brown was not really a 
railroad man , he felt that the receiver was perhaps uniquely familiar 
with the Texas and Pacific and its problems . 32 
The committee toyed with several plans for reconstituting the ad­
ministration of the company. Fleming favored having an active man with 
railroad experience in New York as chairman of the board while the presi­
dent should reside in Dallas . Under such a plan the president , who would 
be on the scene in Texas , would be more a general manager than chief execu­
tive . 33 Eventually, however, all the plans for an independent management 
hinged on Brown, who in his position as receiver was for more than two 
years subjected to pressure from several directions . Part of his troubles 
3°Brown to McGhee , August 3, 1886 . 
3libid. , October 20, 1887 . 
32McGhee to Brown and to Fleming, both August 8 ,  1887 . 
33Ibid. 
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arose from the undisguised hostility of Gould who lost no opportunity to 
undermine him. Brown had left his post as general solicitor in the hope 
of becoming president , and thus Gould "felt that one of his men [Brown] 
had failed to go back to his old place and had set himself up against 
his wishes . 1134 The powerful financier thought :Brown disloyal and cor-
rectly reasoned that he was the instrument of those who wanted an inde-
pendent management . Brown ' s  difficulties were further complicated by 
the disappointingly small earnings of the Texas and Pacific and by the 
fact that Fleming doubted his ability. 35 
McGhee , who had no illusions about Brown' s  exposed position, de-
fended the receiver and at the same time constantly urged him to reduce 
expenses . 36 He realistically outlined to :Brown the problem as he saw it : 
While I shall , if I see any hope of accomplishing it , exert 
my utmost efforts to secure an independent management , it 
really seems to me that Gould occupies the position with 
reference to railroads that Crockett did to the Coon : "If 
that is you I come down. " Everyone seems to assume that 
there is no use in resisting his wishes .  If he cannot con­
trol he will exert his utmost to demonstrate that an injury 
has resulted in consequence of opposition to him. 37 
Despite this gloomy (and apparently accurate )  analysis , McGhee labored to 
save :Brown and to establish an independent Texas and Pacific . "I have no 
3�cGhee to Fleming, June 17 , 1889 . 
35McGhee to Brown, January 5 , July 26 , and McGhee to Fleming, July 27 , 1888 . 
36see , for example , McGhee to Brown, July 26 , October 29 , Decem­
ber 20 ,  and McGhee to W. T .  Walters , April 16 , 1888 . 
37McGhee to Brown, October 15 , 1887 . McGhee alludes here to the famous Tennessee frontiersman, David Crockett , who had such a reputation 
as a marksman that raccoons voluntarily gave themselves up at his approach. 
See :Benjamin A. Botkin (ed. ) ,  b Treasu;r of American Folklore (New York :  
Crown Publishers , 1944) ,  25 . 
I� 
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doubt , "  wrote Fleming, "that your prodding of Brown is doing good 
and as I am getting a little tired of my profession of being disagree-
able all the time I hereby hand my mantle over to you. " But , he added ,  
wryly, "I 'm afraid you won ' t wear it much. 1138 Nevertheless , McGhee 
pushed Brown so hard that at one time the receiver threatened to re­
sign. 39· 
In addition to securing the presidency for Brown, McGhee and his 
group were interested in a voice on the company' s board of directors . 
Both Fleming and McGhee were named to the board at the annual meeting in 
May, 1888 , but they wanted a place on the board ' s  executive committee as 
well. 40 Apparently J. N. Hutchinson of the Philadelphia group offered 
, 41 to resign to make a place for McGhee but later refused to do so . Me-
Ghee and his friends were incensed at what they considered a breach of 
faith by the Philadelphian. 42 "The way in which these Phila. men have 
imposed themselves upon us , "  wrote Fleming, "is a shame and disgrace . 
If they won ' t retire of their own accord we must make a public agita­
tion. 1143 Instead of making their outrage public , however, McGhee and 
Fleming complained to Gould, who apologized profusely and promised to 
38Fleming to McGhee , September ll , 1888 . 
39Brown to McGhee , July 28 ,  1888 . 
4°commercial and Financial Chronicle , XLV ( 1888 ) , 621 . 
4�cGhee to Wistar, April 16 , 1888 . 
42McGhee to Hutchinson, July 21 ,  1888. 
43Fleming to McGhee ,  August 7,  1888 . 
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rectify the situation when he could. 44 "In the meantime , "  McGhee ob-
served, "I am quite sure that I shall be consulted by the Gould people 
with reference to all matters connected with the Texas and Pacific . "45 
This incident thus led to closer ties between McGhee and Gould. 46 Al-
though he still supported Brown ' s  claim to the presidency, McGhee be-
came more reconciled to Gould ' s  control of the road. The failure of the 
Texas cotton crop in the fall of 1888 and the resulting decline of the 
railroad ' s  freight revenue further weakened Brown' s  position. 47 The low 
earnings led to a fall in the price of Texas and Pacific securities which 
alan:ned the owners and in McGhee ' s  opinion "paralyzed" any opposition to 
Gould ' s  domination of the property. 48 Writing to his friend W. T. Walters , 
the Baltimore capitalist , McGhee observed that Gould would accept no re-
sponsibility for Brown' s  administration : 
As you know, Mr. Gould desired to retain the presidency him­
self but an independent administration was demanded by the 
Committee and reluctantly agreed to by him. Whether he is 
so operating Missouri Pacific in connection with Texas and 
Pacific as to convince us that we made a mistake in puting 
[ sic] Brown in the presidency, is a question I am unable to 
decide . The annual meeting occurs in March, and I take it 
that Mr. Gould will secure a sufficient number of proxies to 
elect such a Board as he may wish. The class of securities 
which I hold in the property give me not very much concern 
44Gould to Fleming, July 24, 1888 . 
45McGhee to Fleming, September 22 ,  1888 . 
46see Gould to McGhee , Septembee 4,  1888.  
47McGhee to Fleming, December 20 , 1888 . 
48McGhee to Brown, February 5 ,  1889 .  
as they are bound to be good in any event . Still , however, 
I am looking after the affairs of the Company with some 
degree of interest. 49 
In reply Walters advised : 
Get rid of Brown--this is the only way to treat him, nothing 
can be made of him--and his experience in Texas Pacific has 
made him every day worth less--and from this time out he will 
be good for nothing except a "walking gentleman. " 
A fool like Brown is often worse than somebody who would 
steal a moderate amount--Brown hasn' t sense enough to steal . 
Stopping at a big Hotel and walking up and down Broadway will 
henceforth be his ambition. 
Turn the rascal out , but throw the fool out . 5° 
160 
There is no indication that McGhee ever turned against Brown, but 
the attitudes of Walters and Fleming, as well as the hostility of Gould ,  
must have convinced him that Brown ' s days as president of  the Texas and 
Pacific were numbered. At the same time , Gould was showing McGhee marked 
consideration. George Gould,  son of the "Wizard, " sent him confidential 
information on the road' s earnings and expenses as soon as these were re­
ceived in the New York office , 51 and Jay himself urged McGhee ' s  appoint-
ment to the company' s  executive committee . Writing to Wistar he described 
McGhee as "a practical railroad man • • •  [ whose] advice and cooperation 
would be of great service to .. the Company. .. 52 McGhee must have re-
alized that Brown had become a liability and that his own interests could 
49McGhee to Walters , January 16 , 1889. 
50Walters to McGhee , January 20 , 1889.  
51George Gould to McGhee , January 7,  1889.  George Gould was vice 
president of Texas and Pacific . 
52Jay Gould to Wistar, January 24, 1889.  
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no longer be served by a defense of the fomer Tennessee governor. Per-
haps for this reason he did not attend the annual meeting in March, 1889 ,  
but instead set out on a tour o f  examination over the company' s lines . 53 
Before leaving Knoxville , however, he wrote George Gould to approve the 
appointment of an experienced railroad man to the post of second vice 
president in charge of operations o "This no doubt will be perfectly 
satisfactory to Gov. Brown as it will leave him at liberty to give more 
especial attention to the legal , political and financial requirements of 
the property. "54 In fact , Brown resigned within a few weeks to return to 
his native state and the presidency of the Tennessee Coal , Iron and 
Railroad Company. 55 
Brown ' s  retirement from the Texas and Pacific marked the end of 
attempts to establish an independent management free of Gould control. 
As if by magic the company ' s  performance began to improve when Jay Gould 
succeeded Brown as chief executive . 56 McGhee ' s  prediction that the road 
would not prosper until Gould wanted it to was fulfilled , and his rela-
tions with both Jay and George Gould continued to be good. From time to 
time he offered suggestions on the road ' s  management , 57 and he remained a 
5�cGhee to Brown, February 5 , 1889 . 
5�cGhee to George Gould, March 18 , 1889 .  
55Brown to McGhee ,  April 2 , 1889 .  
56walters to McGhee , May 13 , Fleming to McGhee , June 8 ,  and 
McGhee to Fleming June 17 , 1889 .  
57McGhee to Jay Gould, May 23 and to George Gould, June 12 , 1889 and January 18 , 1891 . 
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director of the Texas and Pacific until 1903 . 58 But in the main he had 
little to do with the company after 1889 . 59 He and his friends had 
thwarted Gould in his initial attempt to ruin the company in order to 
rule it . Having accomplished this ,  McGhee had no wish to dominate the 
Texas and Pacific himself;  he was content to let the Goulds take over from 
Brown, as long as they took reasonable care to protect his investment . 
From his seat on the board he could make sure that his bonds remained 
safe . For McGhee , this objective was the essential one , more important 
to him than any dream of power, prestige , or glory. 
If his Texas and Pacific experience is a clear illustration of how 
McGhee acted to protect an endangered investment , the story of his involve-
ment in the American Cattle Trust is an example of how personal relation-
ships entangled him in complex business affairs . On January 7 ,  1880 , his 
eldest daughter, Margaret ,  married George White Baxter, son of John Bax-
ter of Knoxville , judge of the United States court of appeals for the 
sixth circuit . 60 Baxter had graduated from West Point in 1877 and had 
been sent West with the Third Cavalry. In 1881 he resigned from the army 
and entered the cattle business at a time when ranching was beginning to 
boom. Becoming active in Democratic politics , he was appointed territorial 
58He is listed as a director in Poor ' s  Manual of Railroads until 
the edition of 1903 . 
59There are few letters in the McGhee Papers relating to Texas and 
Pacific after 1889 . McGhee ,  however, apparently retained much of his in­
vestment in the company. When his granddaughter' s estate was settled in 
1971 , there were still Texas and Pacific bonds in the trust which McGhee 
had established for her. Interview with William Ross McNabb , July 28 , 
1974. 
60 McClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 . 
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governor of Wyoming by President Cleveland in 1886 but was forced to re-
sign within a few weeks when it was revealed that he had enclosed govern-
ment land in the process of fencing 28 , 000 acres which he had bought from 
the Union Pacific Railroad. 61 Fresh from this political disappointment 
the restless and ambitious Baxter was attracted by a proposal which seemed 
to promise financial success . In a short time he linked his fortunes to 
the American Cattle Trust and soon managed to interest his father-in-law 
in the scheme . Although the enterprise was an exciting one at the be-
ginning, Baxter and McGhee ' s  initial involvement was casual ; neither man 
realized how important it would become to them during the next decade . 
2 . 
One of the striking characteristics of the economic development 
of the United States in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was 
the tendency toward combination. 62 Railroad pools , Standard Oil , and the 
proliferation of trusts in many other areas of industry are testimony to 
the strong desire of some American businessmen to integrate production 
and distribution or to check competition. A manifestation of this trend 
in the range cattle industry may be seen in the form of the American 
Cattle Trust and its successor, the Western Union Beef Company. 63 Just 
61National Cyclopedia of American Biograp4y, XXIII , 176 . 
62Edward C .  Kirkland discusses this trend in Industry Comes of 
Age : Business , Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1§21. (New York : Holt , 
Rinehart and Winston, 1961 ) , 199-21) . 
63The first published study of the American Cattle Trust was 
Gene M. Gressley' s  "The American Cattle Trust : A Study in Prote st , "  
Pacific Historical Review, XXX ( 1961 ) , 61-77 · The McGhee Papers (which 
164 
as many of the "trusts" which attempted to embrace such products as lead, 
cordage , and tinware failed to achieve the conspicuous success of Standard 
Oil , so the American Cattle Trust failed to integrate cattle production, 
meat packing, and distribution, or to stabilize the price of cattle at a 
level favorable to the rancher. 64 Nevertheless ,  the history of the cattle 
trust and the corporation which succeeded it provide an insight into the 
machinations of businessmen as they struggled with the economic vicissi-
tudes which afflicted the range cattle industry in the years between 
1886 and 1898 . 65 
were unavailable to Gressley at the time of his study) reveal substantial 
additions to the factual content of the trust story. In addition, the 
author disagrees with Gressley' s interpretations in several respects .  
These differences will become evident in the course of this chapter. 
6�ot all trusts were successful . 
Industry Comes of Age , 214-15 . 
For ins tance , see Kirkland, 
65The boom and bust of the range cattle industry is analyzed in 
several standard accounts : James Sauk Brisbin, The Beef Bonanza : or How 
to Get Rich .£!! the Plains (Philadelphia-: J. B .  Lippincott & Co . , 1885); Edward Everett Dale , The Range Cattle Industry, Ranching gn the Great 
Plains , 1865-12£2 (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press ,  1930) ; Maurice 
Frink, W. Turren ine Jackson, and Agnes Wright Spring, When � Was King: 
Contributions !£ the Western �gg Cattle Industry Stugy (Boulder :  Uni­
versity of Colorado Press , 1956 ; Gene M. Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1966 ) ;  Ernest Staples Osgood, The Day of the 
Cattleman (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,  1929}; Louis 
Pelzer, The Cattleman' s Frontier (Glendale , Calif. : The Arthur H. Clark 
Co . , 1936')'; and Fred A .  Shannon, The Farmer' s Last Frontier :  Agriculture , 1860-1.§.2.1. (New York : Farrar & Rinehart , Inc . , 1945) .  Several monographs provide insight into the problems of cattle 
companies during this period : Walt M. Coburn, Pioneer Cattlemen in 
Montana : The � of the Circle Q Ranch (Norman : University oiOkla­
home Press ,  1968 ) ; Harmon Ross Motherhead , The Swan Land and Cattle 
Compan.y (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971);""'and William M. 
Pierce , The Matador Land and Cattle Company (Norman : University of Okla­
homa Press , 1964) .  The following general discussion is based upon these sources . 
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The depression which in 1886 began to grip the cattle business 
of the plains states and territories was especially distressing because 
it followed a lush period of boom and expansion. The discovery by 
Eastern and British capitalists and adventurers of the opportunities in 
cattle raising on the vast ranges of the West had led to the formation 
of a great number of cattle companies and the investment of relatively 
large amountsrof capital . Ey the early 1880 v s the mania for such inve st-
ments was indeed almost a craze . All that was necessary, it seemed, was 
to turn the beasts loose on the range , and in a year' s  time one could 
begin to reap fantastic profits from a herd naturally increased by re-
production and fattened by grazing on the inexhaustible grasses of the 
plains . 
The subsequent break in cattle prices ,  beginning in 1884 and con-
tinuing for the next two years , demonstrated the uncertainty of these 
investments .  The severe winter o f  1886-1887 which caused greater than 
normal losses among many herds was another blow to the optimism of 
ranchers and investors . Despite brave denials and predictions of a 
rosy future , it was apparent by the spring of 1887 that the business of 
cattle raising was not what it had been. As the ranchers and their 
press searched for the origin of their distress , much attention was 
"' 
focused on the "beef ring" or the "big four, " the handful of packing 
companies centered in Chicago which were the chief market of the Western 
66 stockgrowers . The discovery of this "monopoly" was at least several 
years old, but the hard times on the plains gave the subject a new 
66Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , "  62 , note 9 .  
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urgency. The fact that beef prices to the consumer remained relatively 
constant while cattle prices were falling seemed to prove that the "ring" 
was conspiring to maintain its profits at the expense of both cattle pro-
ducers and beef consumers . In general there was a widespread suspicion 
that someone else was now enjoying the money which had once been made in 
ranching. 67 
As earlier indicated, the ranchers ' hostility toward the packers 
and the "middlemen" or cattle brokers was not new. Local cattle pools 
had long sought the advantages of combination by marketing many small 
herds as one large unit . 68 The most ambitious attempt to revolutionize 
the entire process of turning range cattle into table beef was attempted 
by the fabulous French nobleman, the Marquis de More s ,  beginning in the 
early eighties .  De Mores visualized a chain of slaughter houses and 
refrigerator plants on the plains w�ich would at once compete with the 
"big four" and eliminate the long rail journey to the Chicago market .  
The Marquis '  companies actually built such a plant at Medora in the 
Dakota Territory and later opened a number of meat shops in New York City. 
But in 1886 the entire scheme collapsed, perhaps as the result of the mer­
curial Frenchman ' s  inability to bring hard realism to his striking dream. 69 
Just as the Marquis '  New York shops began to close , another great 
scheme to save the cattle business was being hatched by a Cleveland , Ohio , 
67Ibid. , 61-64. 68 Pelzer, Cattleman ' s  Frontier, 73-84. 
69The adventures of the Marquis de Mores are fully related in 
D. Jerome Tweten, "The Marquis de Mores and His Dakota Venture , "  Journal 
of � West , VI ( 1967 ) , 521-34· 
167 
merchant with heavy investments in Western ranches .  Edward M .  Mc­
Gillin 1 s70 concept of a gigantic cattle association, trust , or corpor-
ation, may be regarded as the ancestor of what was to be the American 
Cattle Trust ; but the trust , as it was finally organized, differed in 
many particulars from the rather vague ideas propounded by McGillin in 
the press and before the International Range Association at Denver in 
February, 1887 . 71 McGillin suggested an "association" of cattle growers , 
capitalized at $100 , 000 , 000 . This sum was to be raised by the members 
who were to mortgage their herds to the association at five dollars a 
head, receiving in exchange shares of stock. On these mortgages ,  he felt , 
the association could raise "any amount" of cash. Thus McGillin expected 
to include in his scheme some 20 , 000 , 000 head which he estimated to be 
the approximate range cattle population. With the capital raised from 
the mortgages he proposed to buy and build slaughter houses in Chicago 
and at points on the plains . Also , in some fashion, "the company should 
own and control every butcher ' s  shop in the United States no matter how 
insignificant . "  He expected that railroad rates could be cut in half and 
commissions to brokers eliminated. Prices could be regulated and raised, 
70McGillin was born in Ireland , im igrated to the United States ,  
and with the backing of H. B .  Claflin and Co . o f  New York, achieved 
initial success as a dry goods merchant in Cleveland, Ohio . He was in­
terested in the Fairmount Cattle Company, which operated in Indian 
Territory, and in the Harlem Livestock Company of Stratton, Nebraska.  
He apparently got into financial difficulty about 1889 and lost his 
fortune . McGillin died on November 3 ,  1919, in Los Angeles .  Gressley, 
"American Cattle Trust , "  61 , note 3 ;  Baxter to McGhee , June 17 , 1891 . 
7lG:ressley, "American Cattle Trust , "  61-62.  An earlier reference 
to McGillin' s  plan is in the Northwestern Livestock Journal , December 10 , 
1886 . McGillin ' s  speech is reported in ibid. , February 11 , 1887 . 
and the stock would become "the best paying in America. "  In short , 
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McGillin dreamed of controlling the entire beef industry 11 from the time 
a calf was dropped on the plains until it appeared in the market basket 
of the consumer."72 Here was a concept of integration and monopoly on 
the scale of Standard Oil itself, but the American Cattle Trust was not 
to be built on these grandiose proportions , even though McGillin was 
heavily interested in it and at one time served as its chairman. 
The reaction to the McGillin scheme was mixed. To some , the 
dimensions of the plan seemed oo great ; to o hers the monopolistic 
features were sinister. 73 Nevertheless , several other proposals for 
great combinations and revolutionary techniques were forthcoming. One 
of these , the American Beef Pool , proposed by Asa Shinn Mercer, editor 
of the Northwestern Livestock Journal , fea u.red a contract between cattle 
raisers and the Armour Packing Company. 74 Mercer believed that such an 
arrangement would do "an amount of good to the industry that is almost 
beyond calculation. It reverses , "  he wrote , "the usual methods by ere-
ating a sympathetic and close union where before has been a pulling 
apart . "75 Although the pool was actually organized in 1887 , it appar-
ently never caught on with the cattle producers . Another great combina-
tion, the American Meat Company, which will be described in greater 
72Ibid. , December 10 , 1886 , March 18 , 1887 . 
730riginally the Northwestern Livestock Journal was cool to the 
proposal , although it argued that "out of the multiplicity of ideas 
thrown off, cr,ystalizations of thought may be found that in the end will 
1 carry us safe over. 1 "  December 17 , 1886 . 
74Ibid. , September 16 , 1887 .  
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detail below, was highly touted in the press but came to nothing. The 
only such plan in fact to be converted into a functioning organization 
was the concept which became the American Cattle Trust . 
If McGillin ' s  proposals may be considered the inspiration behind 
the trust , the father of the actual organization was undoubtedly Thomas 
Sturgis . 76 A rather typical example of the young Easterners who poured 
time and money into the range cattle industry, Sturgis was in 1887 
president of the Union Cattle Company, a Wyoming corporation capitalized 
at $300 , 000. He had important financial connections in Boston and New 
York and was a recognized leader of the industry in the northern plains . 
He was thus perhaps an ideal organizer of a trust which was intended to 
hold the confidence of Western ranchers and Eastern capitalists alike . 
Sturgis had the help of his family and Eastern friends , and the support 
of some prominent Western cattlemen. Richard G. Head of New Mexico and 
Colorado , the president of the International Range Association, was an 
early backer, a trustee , and for some time the trust ' s  general range 
manager. John 1. Routt , some time governor of Colorado , was a trustee , as 
were Jared 1. Brush and John T. Lytle who were respectively the managers 
of the trust ' s  Colorado and Texas departments .  The Wyoming department was 
managed in the early months by Francis Warren, entrepreneur, Republican 
politician, and future United States Senator from Wyoming. In charge of 
the processing department in Chicago was Nelson Morris , whose Fairbank 
76Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 261-62 , and "American Cattle 
Trust , "  6.5-66 ; National QycloPedia of American Biograph,y, XXX, 326-27 . 
Canning Company was supposed to turn the steers into consumable 
beef. 77  
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In form the cattle trust was modeled on Standard Oil , a copy o f  
whose trust agreement the Sturgises secured "through influence . "78 A 
self perpetuating board of trustees was given complete control of the 
management , 79 and property was acquired by the issuance of trust certifi-
cates which were exchanged for the stock of companies ,  or were used to 
purchase cattle . In addition, capital was raised by the sale of cer-
tificates for cash. The certificates , or shaxes ,  bore a par value of one 
hundred dollars each but were considered to have an actual value of twenty­
five cents on the dollar. 80 Only unencumbered properties were supposed 
to be accepted by the trust , but , in fact ,  several of the companies car­
ried mortgages and some were in desperate financial condition. 81 It was 
charged with some justification that the trust was "the greatest 
77Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , "  65- 70 . The personnel involved 
in the trust is the subject of some confusion. Sturgis was certainly 
the first chairman and Head, Lytle , Routt , and Warren were probably 
among the · Western trustees ,  or directors , at the beginning. The identifi­
cation of the first Eastern trustees is  more difficult .  Gressley names 
Charles F. Smillie , Richard T.  Wilson, Jr. , and Samuel Thomas , and indi­
cates that they were recruited by Sturgis .  It  would seem that Richard T .  
Wilson, Sr. , was involved in the trust from the beginning, but I have 
seen no evidence that his son was a trustee. McGhee ' s  friends , Samuel 
Thomas and Calvin Brice , appear to have been interested in the trust as 
early as 1887 . 
78Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 261 , quoting F. K. Sturgis to 
Henry L. Higginson, April 7 ,  1887 , Higginson Collection, Baker Library, 
Harvard University. 
79McGhee to Winslow, Lanier & Co . , June 15 , 1888 . 
80Baxter to McGhee , April 29, 1887 ; McGhee to Baxter, May 18 , 1887 . 
81Northwestern Livestock Journal , September 16 , 1887 .  
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aggregation of financial cripples now attached to the livestock busi­
ness of this or any other country. "82 
This criticism struck at the weakest aspect of the combination, 
but there were other frailties which were not immediately apparent . 
Not the least of these was that the trust represented varying and some-
times contradictory things to different people . It appealed to some as 
"an attempt to make cattle paper a medium of speculation. "83 Wbat has 
been called "the highly speculative nature" of the stock was a lure to 
some investors . 84 To those who were convinced that the only way to 
fight monopoly was with monopoly, the trust might have seemed the cattle-
man' s solution in the battle with the "Beef Ring. " Finally, the trust 
was the last resort for some practical managers and investors driven to 
the wall by the cattle country depression. As the Anglo-Irish investor, 
Horace Plunkett , said , after consulting with the stockholders of the 
Frontier Cattle Company on the question of joining the trust : "We 
agreed that we did not like the scheme but saw no less objectionable way 
of liquidating a debt . "8.5 Besides these sometimes conflicting objec-
tives there were built-in difficulties which became apparent in time . 
For example , the trustees were not answerable to the stockholders or to 
82Ibid. , quoting New Mexico Stock Grower. 
83sir Horace Curzon Plunkett , manuscript diariea, 1881-1932 
(microfilm in Bancroft Library, University of California , Berkeley) , 
April 17 , 1887.  
84Gressley, "American Cattle Trust , "  69 .  
8.5P1unkett diary, May 10 , 1887 . 
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the public , since among the supposed benefits of the trust organization 
was secrecy and the consolidation of managerial power. 86 But the board 
was often torn by disagreements which sometimes paralyzed the management 
and prevented action. Under these circumstances it is surprising that 
the trust lasted as long as it did and that it did not collapse in bank-
ruptcy. Only the skill and determination of an Eastern financier saved 
it from such a disaster at the outset . 
Among those who were attracted early to the cattle trust were 
Baxter and McGhee . Disappointed for the moment in his political career, 
the young man spent the winter of 1886- 1887 in the East . Even before he 
heard of the trust he was interested in disposing of some of his Wyoming 
cattle and land. He hoped to exchange them for stock in a new company 
being organized by Alex Swan, the colorfu.l promoter who had channeled 
much British capital into the range cattle business. 87 The financial 
embarrassment of Swan, culminating in the collapse of the Swan Land and 
Cattle Company in the spring of 1887 ,  destroyed this possibility. 88 Then, 
after returning to Wyoming, Baxter learned of the trust through his 
father-in-law ' s friend, Richard T.  Wilson, whose Wilson Livestock Company 
was joining the trust ' s  Texas department . 89 
At first Sturgis was reluctant to accept Baxter' s relatively 
small herd, but he was persuaded when McGhee agreed to buy 2 , 000 shares 
86McGhee to Winslow, Lanier & Co . , June 1) , 1888 . 
87Baxter to McGhee , January 8 ,  19 , 2) , 1887 . 
88Baxter to McGhee , April 27 , May 16 , 1887 . See also Motherhead , 
� � � Cattle QQ. �. , 60-88 . 
89Baxter to McGhee , April 29 , 1887 . 
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of stock at a cost of $50 , 00o . 90 McGhee expected that Baxter ' s shares 
at the end of the year would be "a negotiable security at least . "  If 
Baxter could sell his land as well , McGhee observed , "you will be foot 
loose and can stay in Cheyenne , come to Tennessee or settle where you 
like . 11 91 Both men remained optimistic about trust affairs through the 
summer, as Sturgis and his cohorts went about the business of accumulating 
cattle and land. 92 Sturgis frequently consulted McGhee , and the latter 
wrote that "we agreed upon a plan of action which we intend to work out 
in the future , if the financial condition of the country will justify 
any hope of success in that direction. "93 Sturgis estimated that the 
holdings of the trust in mid-September included 350 , 000 head of cattle 
and 400 , 000 acres of land , as well as Morris ' Chicago establishment . He 
wanted to acquire 150 , 000 more cattle , "and would want to use $.500 , 000 
money in addition to the certificates to be used in part paym�nt for in-
creasing the herd to that number. " Two million dollars was required as 
working capital for the packing house ,  making it necessary to raise a 
total of $2 , 500 , 000 to carry out these plans . "For this purpose , "  wrote 
McGhee ,  "it is proposed to issue $10 , 000 , 000 Trust Certificates which are 
to be taken at 2.5% of their par value which would secure the amount of  
money necessary. " It was hoped that with a herd of 500 , 000 head, 100 , 000 
90McGhee to Baxter, May 7 , 18 ,  1887 . 
91Ibid . , May 9 , 1887 . 
9�cGhee to Baxter, June 27 , July 28 ,  1887 ; Baxter to McGhee ,  
June 15 ,  July 8 ,  22 , 1887 . 
9�cGhee to Baxter, September 15 ,  1887 . 
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could be sold each year at an average of $25 per head. This ,  with an 
anticipated profit of $500 , 000 from the packing house , would make an 
income of $J , OOO , OOO annually. 
We would have when all this is carried out $40 , 000 , 000 of 
Trust Certificates which would have cost the holders 251 on 
the dollar. Assuming $500 , 000 for working expenses ,  errors 
in our calculation,  and other contingencies we would have a 
net income of $2 , 500 , 000 which would be 6% on the par value 
of the Certificates, now divide this in half and we have 
left J% on the Certificates , or more than 10% on the money 
invested. 
Selling the new certificates , McGhee realized, might be difficult , but he 
retained "great faith in the enterprise if the money can be raised. "94 
It soon became clear, however, that such hopes were wildly optimis-
tic . Sturgis had grossly overestimated the number of cattle owned by the 
trust , since the total number never approached the figure of 350 , 000 
head. 95 His own Union Cattle Company, which was supposed to be a key 
trust property, was in dangerous financial straits .  When its true con-
dition became known, McGhee estimated that the company' s  debts were over 
$200 , 000 greater than its assets . At any rate , when tbe Union ' s  fall 
roundup was over only JO , OOO of  the presumed 50 , 000 cattle could be 
found. 96 Whether the winter of 1886-1887 had decimated the herd, or 
whether the company' s  "book count" had been foolishly inflated, this loss 
of assets was more than the Union could s tand, and in January, 1888 , the 
company went into bankruptcy. 97 
94Ibid. 
9Srn 1888 the trust owned 118 , 045 head. Letterbook, February, 1888-February, 1889 , p. SOl ; McGhee to Baxter, November JO , 1887 . 
96McGhee to Baxter, January S ,  1888 . 
97Baxter to McGhee , January 18 , 1888 . 
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The collapse of the Union Catt le Company caused the first great 
crisis of the trust ' s career. Sturgis ' only hope to save his company 
had been to incorporate it into the body of the trust before insolvency 
overtook it . This , McGhee , who had been el.ected a trustee in December, 
1887 , was determined to prevent . 98 With the cooperation of his friend 
Wilson and Nelson Morris , McGhee kept the Union c .. )mpw.y out and probably 
saved the trust by this ac tion. 99 Al though he was at first afraid that 
Sturgis was perpetrating a gigantic sw.i.ndle , MnGhee was J ater convinced 
that Sturgis acted honestl.y by protec ting tn1st cattle which had become 
entangled with the Union Company herds . 100 A t  the end of January the 
trust was almost falling apart and McGhee increased greatly his interest 
in it s affairs , advancing $1 , 000 to pay t .  e rent on the New York offices 
and undertaking to make drastic changes in the ma:nagement . 101 These 
changes he hoped to make with the cooperation of Sturgis because McGhee 
had serious doubts about the ability and honesty of  some of the Western 
trustees .  Later, he observed that Sturgis "seemed to grasp the situation 
but just sat and said or did nothing, like a man in a trance . " It was 
necessary, therefore , to "combine with the West , "  i . e . , the Western trus­
tees , to overthrow Sturgis and hi.s associates • .1°2 This was accomplished 
98w. C .  Lane to McGhee , Jar1uary 4) 1888 ; McGhee to Baxter, 
January 5 , 1888 . 
99McGhee to Nelson Morris , May 6 ,  1888 . 
100McGhee to Baxter, January 5 , 1888 . 
lOL_ �cGhee to Sturgis ,  February l ,  1888 . 
10�cGhee to Wilson, J1me 6 ,  J 888 . 
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at a trustees '  meeting in New York in May, 1888 . A complete change 
was wrought in the Eastern management : Sturgis was removed as chairman 
and his associates,  W. C .  Lane and Robert Bliss ,  lost their jobs as 
secretary and treasurer. 103 Although McGhee was urged to assume the 
chairmanship, 104 he avoided this and was elected secretary and treas­
urer. 105 E. M. McGillin, who held approximately 24, 000 sbaTes of trust 
stock, 106 and who in a sense was the originator of the trust idea� be­
came chairman in Sturgis ' stead. 107 The trustees decided that the Morris 
packing plant should be returned, and this was done without financial 
108 loss to the trust . In the West , George Baxter became the Wyoming 
manager and was elected president of the North American and Frontier 
109 Cattle companies .  
McGhee hoped that McGilHn would provide firm coordination o f  the 
trust ' s  western affairs , while he himself administered the New York office 
110 and kept a watchful eye on the treasury. But no sooner was Sturgis 
ousted than new difficulties arose . McGillin conceived an intense dislike 
for R. G.  Head, the general manager in the West , which Head returned with 
10�cGhee to Percy R. Pyne , May 12 , 1888 . 
104wilson to McGhee , March 19 , 22 , 1888 . 
l05McGhee to Pyne , May 12 , 1888 .  
106sturgis to McGhee ,  March 14, 1888 . 
l07McGhee to Pyne , May 12 , 1888 . 
108McGhee to Nelson Morris , May 6 , 1888 . 
l09R .  G. Head to Baxter, May 24, 1888 . 
110McGhee to Wilson, June 26 , 1888 . 
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interest . Exactly where the right lay in the McGillin-Head quarrel is  
impossible to determine , but relations between the two men soon deterio­
rated until they refused to correspond with each other. 111 Head had put 
his New Mexico property, the Phoenix Farm and Ranch Company, into the 
trust , but he retained a majority of the company' s stock which he re­
fused to turn over to McGillin. 112 Demanding that McGillin be removed ,  
Head finally refused to allow funds from the sale of cattle to pass into 
the trust ' s  New York treasury. ll3 McGhee and the other Eastern trustees ,  
though they felt that McGillin had been tactless in his treatment of  
Head, sternly demanded that the range manager obey the board ' s instruc­
tions . 114 The result of the costly feud was another managerial convul-
sion in which both McGillin and Head ceased their connection with the 
trust . McGi11in 1 s  trust stock apparently passed into the hands of John 
Claflin of the New York mercantile house ,  H. B. Claflin and Company. 115 
A Claflin associate and attorney, Charles W. Gould of New York, was made 
chairman in January, 1889 ,  though Thomas Sturgis vainly tried to regain 
that office . 116 The position of general range manager was left unfilled, 
111 Head to McGhee , August 27 ,  1888 .  
112 Baxter to McGhee , October 9 , 1888 . 
ll3Head to MqGhee , August 7 ,  1888 . 
11�cGhee to Head, August 31 ,  1888 . 
ll5McGillin seems to have gotten into serious financial difficulty 
in late 1888 ,  and as a result H. B. Claflin and Company assumed owner­
ship of his shares .  See John Claflin to McGhee ,  November 16 , 1888 , and 
January 1 ,  1889 . 
116 McGhee to Claflin, January 7 , 1889 . 
and the Western management remained divided into three departments 
managed by George Baxter, Jared L. Brush, and John T .  Lytle . 117 
By the spring of 1889 the cattle trust was two years old, and 
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its nature , along with its management , had substantially changed .  It 
had never seriously sought to monopolize cattle production and certainly 
never came close to this goal . After the return of the packing plant 
to Morris ,  the trust became in reality just a very large cattle company 
without pretense of combining the production and processing phases of the 
beef industry. Still the dream of such a combination persisted in some 
quarters .  Rumors of a new beef combine began to circulate in the summer 
of 1888 , 118 and in February of the following year it was reported that a 
company controlling over a million acres , 200 , 000 cattle , refrigerated 
railroad cars , and a Kansas City packing plant had been organized under 
New Mexico laws . 119 The corporation ' s  officers were said to include 
John H. Flagler, J .  0 .  Moss , and other leaders of the American Cotton 
Oil Trust , and the company was rumored to be planning retail outlets ip 
Eastern cities . So great was the scheme that it was referred to as 
"The Big Four' s Rival . i•120 Actually the American Meat Company, as it 
was properly called, originally seems to have been the creation of Stephen 
Dorsey, New Mexico ranch owner, and a figure in the Star Route mail 
121 frauds .  Dorsey approached McGhee with a consolidation proposal and 
ll7This arrangement prevailed from January, 1889 , until January, 
18QO . See Baxter and Brush to McGhee , February 3 , 1890 . 
118New York Times , August 16 , 1888 . 
119Ibid. , February 23 , 1889 . 120Ibid. 
12�cGhee to Charles Gould, May 9 , 1889 ; Dictiona;r 2f American 
Biography, V, 387 . 
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a tentative agreement was made to sell 60, 000 shares of cattle trust 
stock to the meat company at twenty- five cents on the dollar, ten cents 
122 
being in cash and fifteen in meat company stock. In describing this 
agreement to Charles Gould,  McGhee pointed out that although the two of  
them and several other trustees controlled enough cattle trust stock to 
personally furnish the 60 , 000 shares ,  they were honor bound to distribute 
the benefits  of the sale among all the shareholders : 
I feel quite sure you will agree with me that in occupying 
the position of Trustees we are prevented from exercising 
the rights of stockholders as we could were we not Trustees . 
That is we must look out for the interests of all parties 
for whom we are Trustees.  
Now I would just as soon, and I think a great deal rather, 
that the whole thing "upset" as I have no great faith in 
Dorsey, as from the representations of  others he is entirely 
unreliable in his statements . l23 
McGhee ' s  suspicions were soon fulfilled, for in May, 1889 ,  J. W. 
:... 
Davis and Company, agents for the meat company, stopped selling its 
stock as a result of the withdrawal of Flaglerrand his cotton oil trust 
associates from the management . 124 It was rumored that the ":Big Four, " 
who used great quantities of cotton oil products ,  had pressured Flagler 
125 
and the others to abandon the meat company. Efforts to reorganize 
the scheme under the leadership of former Senator Warren Miller of New 
York were not successful , but the cattle trust continued to entertain 
122.__ �cGhee 
121__ -McGhee 
to Wilson, May 14, 1889 .  
t o  Gould, May 9 ,  1889 .  
12�cGhee to John G.  Moore , May 17 , 1889.  
125
New York Tribune , April 12 , 1889.  
the idea of some kind of merger or traffic agree�ent with the meat 
company if it should in fact materialize . 126 McGhee even considered 
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buying the company' s  Kansas City meat packing plant for the trust , but 
one of the Western trustees advised against it , and the purchase was 
never made . 127 By the end of 1889 the talk of a great meat company 
faded away, and this failure to organize probably marked the end of 
efforts to create a completely integrated meat supplier. 
Though he often expressed the belief that cattle trust stock 
128 was worth at least 25 percent of its par value , neither McGhee nor 
any others were able to sell shares for as much as twenty- five cents on 
the dollar, a not remarkable situation since the trust had never paid 
a dividend. Still , the hope of successful speculation in its shares 
remained a major motive of the trust ' s  managers . Trust shares generally 
were considered "glamour stocks" by part of the investing public , and 
the cattle trust , because of its name , probably shared in this identi­
fication. 129 When the trust ' s  shares were first quoted on the New York 
Exchange in the summer of 1889,  the price ranged as high as nineteen. lJO 
At this time McGhee and another trustee , Samuel Thomas , traded heavily 
126 McGhee to J .  L. Brush, August 5 ,  1889 . 
127Brush to McGhee , August 22 , 1889 .  
128 See , for instance ,  McGhee ' s  letters to Winslow, Lanier & C o . , 
July J , to Brush, July 22 , to Routt , July 31 , and to Dr. G. A .  Baxter, 
November 8, 1889 .  
129Baxter to McGhee , June 30 , 1889 . 
130McGhee to Fleming, July 15 , 1889 .  The trust was not listed by 
the New York Stock Exchange , but its shares were quoted. The prices are 
reported in the New York Times ,  July-August , 1889 .  
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in the shares and over the course of a few days made a profit of over 
$5 , 000 apiece . l)l It was well that they seized this opportunity, for 
neither the cattle trust ' s  nor the Western Union Beef' s stock ever again 
exceeded nineteen in the quotations , and the shares usually sold for 
considerably less . 132 
It was probably the failure of the trust ' s  stock to be taken up 
by the public in an enthusiastic manner which led McGhee and others to 
consider making it into a corporation. Public opinion became increasingly 
hostile towards trust s ,  and in 1890 Congress responded by passing the 
Sherman Act , which was supposed to make such "combination in restraint 
of trade" illegal . The name "trust" had thus outlived its usefulness as 
a way of making stock a speculative security, and the trustees decided 
to create the Western Union Beef Company out of the American Cattle 
Trust . 133 McGhee assumed the chairmanship in January, 1890 , and from 
that time on the treasury was handled by Richard T .  Wilson' s firm. l34 
In· o-rder to "assure harmony in the management , "  McGhee and Wilson in the 
l)lSee McGhee & Thomas in account with J. W. Davis & Co . , trans­
action receipts ,  July, 1889 . 
l32Fluctuations of the prices of American Cattle Trust and Western 
Union Beef during the 1890 ' s  may be followed in the Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle . 
l33on November 8 ,  1889 ,  McGhee wrote Dr. G. A .  Baxter tbat "public 
sentiment is so bitterly against trusts that it is impossible to get 
anything like the real value for such stocks at present . "  
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In May, 1890 , McGhee actually resigned the chairmanship , but 
this may have been a maneuver to encourage Claflin to sell his stock. 
Likewise , Wilson may have temporarily surrendered the treasury of the 
trust to McGhee in the summer of 1890. It is clear, however, that after 
the middle of 1890 McGhee and Wilson were in complete control of the 
cattle trust and later of the Western Union Beef Company. 
spring of 1890 bought the stock held by John Claflin and the way was 
cleared for dissolution into a corporation. l35 
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The details of reorganization were handled by William Nelson Crom-
well,  of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell , and by Judge 
C .  G. Symes of Denver, a large stockhoJd er. 136 By the end of the year 
the necessary number of assents from stockholders had been received, and 
on January l ,  1891 , the trust officially became the Western Union Beef 
Company. l37 An exchange of shares was made on a one- for-one basis , the 
corporation being capitalized at $15 , 000 , 000 with 136 , 000 shares of 
138 issued stock worth $100 per share at par. Ironically, the trust was 
really stronger at the time of its demise than it had been since its 
founding. Cattle prices were a little higher in 1889 than in the two 
preceding years , and the trust managed to make a profit of $89,581 . 48 ,  
as compared t o  a profit o f  only $48 , 188 . 73 during 1887 and 1888 . 139 
A dividend would probably have been declared had it not been decided to 
change the trust into a corporation. 14° Payment was therefore postponed 
l35McGhee to Bruce F. Johnson, June 2 ,  1890 ; see also , McGhee ' s  
sto ck ledger, p .  45 , for the Claflin transaction. 
l36McGhee to Symes ,  August l ,  1890 . 
l37McGhee to Cromwell , December 24, 1890 . Statements of the 
American Cattle Trust were through December 31 , 1889 .  Those of the 
Western Union Beef Company began on January l ,  1890 . 
l38western Union Beef Company Letterbook. Cited hereafter as 
W. U. B. Letterbook. 
139Ibid . , 156-57 . 
l40Although Gressley cites a statement of the trust which indi­
cates that a 3 percent dividend was paid, I have found no evidence of 
a dividend prior to the l/2 of l percent paid by Western Union Beef 
in February, 1891 . 
until 1891 when the trust stock was exchanged for Western Union Beef 
shares , and the dividend appeared to the credit of that company. l4l 
The officers of the new company were C .  M. McGhee , president ; 
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C .  G. Symes , vice president ; C .  T. Leonhardt , secretary ; and C .  H. Bosher, 
of R.  T.  Wilson and Company, treasurer. In the West , the northern de-
partment , consisting of Wyoming, Montana, and a feeding station at 
Neligh, Nebraska , was managed from Cheyenne by George Baxter. The Colo-
rado department , composed of Colorado and the Texas panhandle , was run 
by J.  L. Brush of Greeley; the Texas department , by John T .  Lytle with 
headquarters in San Antonio . 142 The company owned 29) , 212 acres , most 
of which were located in Texas , "conservatively valued" at $1 , 060 , 36) . 
Two thousand acres in Colorado and 2 , 248 acres in Wyoming formed the 
core of operations in the states where cattle grazed mostly on the open 
government-owned ranges .  The 1 , 448-acre farm in central Nebraska was 
used for feeding cattle on grain. The company usually owned over 
100 , 000 cattle and sold from 7 , 000 to 18 , 000 head a year. 143 Typically, 
the Texas ranches were used as breeding grounds from which the immature 
steers and spayed heifers were shipped to the northern ranges where 
they were fattened and from which they were marketed. 144 
14L --w. U .  B .  Letterbook , 321 .  
l42In the absence of any complete statement of the officers and 
organization, I have based this upon a number of letters in the McGhee 
Papers . 
143 W. U. B .  Letterbook, 279-80. 
l44Leonhardt to Baxter, ibid. , 344-46 . 
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Unlike its predecessor, Western Union Beef was from the outset 
under the control of McGhee and Wilson, and the company soon took on 
the aspect of a family business .  McGhee stepped down to the vice 
presidency in 1�92 and was succeeded by Baxter, who continued to manage 
the northern department . 14S A year later, Richard Wilson' s nephew was 
named general superintendent of the company' s Texas ranches . 146 Finally, 
J. L. Brush was removed, the Colorado and northern departments consoli­
dated, and Baxter moved to Denver to oversee both of them. 147 Thus by 
1895 all important positions in the company were filled by members of 
the two families ,  or by McGhee ' s  and Wilson' s employees .  Although 
' 
apparently never owning a maj;�ity of the stock , l4B the two financiers 
were able to exercise complete control . This was possible for several 
reasons . The company never demonstrated any great earning capacity and 
therefore did not make an attractive target for raiders ; no outsider 
would have been tempted to take over such a property when the cattle 
industry was still suffering from a depression. A successful challenge 
from among the company' s  stockholders woul& almost certainly have had to 
include men of considerable stature in New York financial circles .  Me-
Ghee and Wilson lived at the heart of that financial center, possessed 
large amounts of capital and had access to more . It would have taken a 
l4SMcGhee to Baxter, ibid. , 63 . 
146Leonhardt to Frank Boulter, ibid. , 159 . 
+47Leonhardt to Brush, �. , 316-17 . 
l4BLists of stockholders in ibid. McGhee and Wilson together 
never seemed to own more than a quarter of the total shares .  
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powerfully connected alliance to have unseated them from control . 
Firially, the company was by no means mismanaged. Between 1890 and 1898 
it paid a total of 5 3/4 percent dividends on its capital stock, an 
amount which was at least 23 percent on the original cost of the stock 
to the investor, l49 a record which compares quite favorably with those 
f ttl . f . " l  . . thi . d l50 o ca e compan1es o Slffil ar s1ze 1n s per1o • 
The most damaging criticism which can be made of the McGhee-
Wilson control involves the manipulation of stock. As with the trust , 
the managers of the com�any were anxious to boom the price of shares .  
George Baxter, who keenly felt his financial dependence on his father-
in-law, constantly hoped to sell his stock at a favorable price and 
liquidate his debts .  McGhee and Wilson were no doubt more realistic 
about such matters , and it was not until 1895 that they seriously con-
sidered forming a pool to boost the shares on the market .  At that time 
Baxter wrote McGhee : 
If you think it would help out the scheme you have on hand I 
might crowd my beef shipments during July and August .  I 
think by going at it vigorously that I could ship $150 , 000 in July and $200 , 000 in August ,  instead of covering the entire 
season. It occurred to me that it might help matters to have 
the information go out that we were selling as much as that 
in one month. l5l 
l49A stockholder who valued his shares at 
standard valuation at the founding of the cattle 
his return at four times the declared dividend. 
dividends , see ibid. , 321 ,  473 · 
25 percent of par ( the trust ) could calculate 
For a schedule of 
l50See ,  for instance , Pierce , Matador Land and Cattle Company , 34, 
72 ; Gressley, Bankers and Cattlemen, 86 , 275-76 ; and Motherhead, Swan Land and Cattle Co . , 182 . 
l5�axter to McGhee , May 10 , 1895 . 
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A month later he offered to sell immature steers in order to in-
crease the company ' s  '1895 profits . 152 Apparently this was done , and a 
larger than usual dividend was paid in 1895 , but only at the cost of 
paying no dividend in 1896 . 153 Even this seems to have failed to pro-
duce a strong market for the stock and neither Baxter, McGhee , nor Wilson 
was able to unload a significant portion of his holdings. McGhee and 
.. ·� 
Baxter, however, made some profit on 2 , 824 shares which they bought at 
eight cents on the dollar from John L. Routt of Denver. 154 
Not only was Western Union Beef one of the largest cattle companies 
in the West , but it maY have been unique for the degree to which it was 
managed from the East . A Colorado corporation, it did not maintain a 
full time office in Denver until 1895 . Although the stockholders ' meet-
ings were held in that city as required by the charter, the board of 
directors always met in New York. Even after Baxter became president , 
decisions of importance were referred to McGhee and Wilson, who usually 
made the final determination. Petty matters as well were often brought 
to the New York financiers for decision. N. T .  Wilson, for instance ,  once 
asked McGhee 1 s opinion about burning off brush on·· some of the Texas ranch­
land, l55 a query which prompted the New Yorker t� compl�in to Baxter that 
"Wilson is very fond of shirking responsibility and do not like it. 11 156 
Notwithstanding the tight New York control of operations , it is clear 
that Baxter occupied a key position in the company. He could be relied 
l53w. u. B. Letterbook, 321 .  
l5�cGhee in account with J. W. Davis & Co. , transaction slips , 
July-September, 1895 ; Baxter to McGhee ,  June 2 , 1895 . 
l55w. u. B. Letterbook, 311.  l56!hi£. ,  312 . 
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on to carry out his father- in-law ' s wishes to the letter, but his judg-
ment as a practical cattleman was respected by both McGhee and Richard 
Wilson. 
:Despite a disinclination 11to live and die with Western Union 
Beef, 11157 Baxter was often optimistic about the future of the business .  
His enthusiasm usually peaked in the early summer when the grass was lush 
and the herds wer� growing fat , 158 but it waned as autumn approached and 
cattle prices sagged. l59 Like so many other cattlemen, he �ver seemed 
to realize that a good growing season commonly meant a glutted market in 
the fall . Similarly, he was unpleasantly surprised by the periodic bliz­
zards or droughts which ruined the best laid plans of stock raisers . 160 
The evidence indicates , however, that Baxter was an honest and hard 
working manager who did the best that he could in those years of hardship. 
His most controversial action was his role in the famous Johnson 
161 County war. In this connection Baxter has emerged as a scapegoat for 
those 11cattle barons 11 who , taking the law into their hands , set out to 
eliminate the 11rustlers11 in the Powder River country of Wyoming. There 
is no evidence that Baxter helped to plan and to finance this expedition 
l57Baxter to McGhee , June 25 , 1891 . 
l58see , for instance , ibid. , April 8 ,  11 ,  June 9 ,  23 , 1890 , 
May 1 ,  11 , 18 , July 21 , 1891 . 
l59Ibid. , September 18 , 25 , 1890 , September 20,  October 6 ,  1891.  
160rbid. , May 27 , 1892 , June 20 , 1894. 
161The longest and best (though not especially scholarly) account 
of the Johnson County War is in Helena Huntington Smith, � War .£!! Powder 
� (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966 ) .  
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of which he was not a member. This charge , made by Asa Shinn Mercer in 
his account , � Banditti of the Plains , 162 is reinforced by John Clay 
in his autobiography, !1Y Life .2!t the Range. 163 As vice president of the 
Wyoming Stockgrowers Association, Baxter would have presided during 
Clay' s absence at the meetings (if meetings there were ) which hatched 
the invasion. Clay, however, who was in Ireland at the time of the war, 
published his memoirs more than twenty years after the fact and may have 
been interested in disassociating himself from an active role in the 
affair. Mercer' s  motives in writing his diatribe have been seriously 
questioned ,  and it may be that his account was colored by his rivalry 
with Baxter in the Wyoming Democratic party. 164 Baxter certainly approved 
of the vigilante raid, but if he did plan it , or back it with money, he 
apparently did so without McGhee ' s  knowledge . 16S His financial situa-
tion was such that he hardly could have afforded to spend personally 
large sums in such an enterprise , and there is no indication that Western 
Union 'Beef did so . The company' s board did, however, commend in August ,  
1892 , "the able , bold, fearless and self- sacrificing manner in which 
162A. S.  Mercer, The Banditti of the Plains ; or, The Cattlemen ' s  
Invasion of Wyoming in 1892 : The Cro�iMinfamy of the Ages (Cheyenne : 
A. S .  Mercer, 1894 ; new edition, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press ,  1954) '  Jl-48 .  
163John Clay, !1Y Life .2!t the Range (Chicago : privately printed, 
n. d. ; new edition, Norman : University of Oklahoma Press ,  1962) ,  271 .  
164smith, War £g Powder River, 272-80. 
16SThat Baxter approved of the invasion is made clear by his letters 
in March, April , and May, 1892 , in the McGhee Payers . The same letters , 
however, strongly indicate that McGhee knew nothing of the affair until 
after it took place . 
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Geo.  W. Baxter has defended and tried to protect by all lawful means the 
interests of this Company in serious civil disturbances ,  which have 
occurred in the territory under his management . "166 
167 The charge made by Mercer, and enlarged and elaborated by Mari 
Sandoz in The Cattlemen, 168 that Baxter and his foreman stole some of the 
company ' s  cattle is without foundation. According to the Mercer-Sandoz 
theory, Baxter ' s theft was found out during the 1892 round up and he 
left Wyoming in disgrace . In fact Baxter remained in the state until 
the winter of 1895 , and as a mark of the board ' s confidence wa� elected 
president of the company in August ,  1892 . 
The irony of the Western Union Beef story is that after an eight-
year struggle with adversity the company was liquidated at the moment when 
the range cattle industry began to recover its prosperity. In the spring 
of 1897 new confidence began to creep back into western cattlemen, and 
this proved to be the beginning of a revival which made the industry 
generally quite prosperous for another decade . 169 Unfortunately, the 
West�rn Union Beef Company was not to enjoy it . The years of discourage-
ment and blasted hopes had taken their toll, and the prospect of selling 
166 W. U. B. Letterbook, 64. 
167Mercer, Banditti of the Plains , 141-42 . 
168Mari Sandoz , The Cattlemen, From the Rio Grande Across the 
ru Marias (New York : &stings House Publisher;:-1958) ' 399. In Sandoz I highly colored account the exposure of Baxter' s theft is stated as a 
fact . The only basis for this assertion seems to be Mercer' s innuendo 
which begins : "Some persons have bee'n uncharitable enough to suggest . • 
11 Smith in War .2!! Powder River does not mention the Mercer-Sandoz 
charge against Baxter. 
169 Shannon, Farmer' s Last Frontier, 236 , 244. 
out under favorable market conditions was tempting. In June , 1897 , 
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Alex ,Moore , a Texas stockholder,  pointed out to McGhee the advantages 
of such a liquidation : 
Cattlemen are all out of debt and getting rich, land is going 
up and in demand, crops fine , and the .grass and water con-
di t?-.ons could not be better, more range than stock to eat it , 
and cows and heifers wanted at big prices for breeding purposes .  
Everything in the stock business seems t o  prosper except 
"the Western Union Beef Co , "  judging from the price of shares 
in New York for which I see $) . 00 per share is only offered. 
This does not reflect much confidence in the Company with the 
public , and seems ridiculous to thos e who know better. 
If the Company can' t make money under present conditions 
and put the stock up to something near its value , the best 
thing would be to liquidate ,  as soon as it can be done to ad­
vantage . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
We don ' t  know how long the prices of cattle will keep up, 
but we do know that they � fast , and experience has shown 
that it is a good time to sell cattle when people want to buyf 
at high prices . l70 
During the summer and fall of 1897 the herds were sold and a 2 per­
cent dividend was declared in November. 171 At the beginning of 1898 a 
circular went out to the stockholders proposing to reduce the capital 
stock from $1J , 600 , 000 to $408 , 000 , represented by 4 , 080 shares of $100 
each, and to change the company' s  name to the Western Livestock and Land 
Company: 
It is manifest that the outstanding capital stock of the company 
is out of all proportion to the present value of its assets ,  
and therefore the board proposes to  decrease it . • . • The 
company has marketed most of its cattle constituting its stock,  
and will soon have in hand therefrom about $700 , 000 in cash. It  
170 Alex Moore to McGhee , June 7 ,  1897 . 
l7L --w. U. B. Letterbook, 465 , 473 •  
191 
seems undesirable to re-employ said capital in further pur­
chases at this time , and the question is presented whether it 
shall be retained indefinitely at unprofitable interest rates 
or be distributed to stockholders by way of reduction of 
capital . The company is free from indebtedness of any kind. 
We believe that the change of name and reduction of capital 
will establish the company in high credit for such operations 
as its means may permit , and give sound basis for its new 
capitalization and future operations . l72 
On February 28 , 1898 , the stockholders , meeting at Denver, approved the 
proposals , and the Western Union Beef Company went out of existence. l73 
The 1897 and the liquidation dividends , together with the new 
stock amounted to 10 percent of the par value of the old Western Union 
Beef stock. The stockholders thus received in cash and new securities 
an amount in excess of the figures at which the stock had been quoted 
since December, 1895 . 174 The dissolution therefore seems to have been 
a sensible means of distributing to the stockholders the true value of 
their shares .  This appears still more valid in view o f  another distri-
bution dividend paid in 1899 which was roughly equal to the par value of 
the Western L�vestock and Land shares . 175 Thus an investor who bought 
Western Union Beef at , say, eight , in December, 1895 , would have received 
back the original cost of the stock plus a 25 percent return in something 
over four years ' time--hardly a fantastic gain but still a respectable 
profit . Investors such as McGhee and Wilson, who bought stock in 1890 
172commercial and Financial Chronicle , LXVI ( 1898 ) ,  84. 
173Ibid. , 531 . 
17), . �. U. B .  Letterbook , 480 ; McGhee Journal , 103 . 
l75McGhee Journal , 163 . 
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at 12 1/2 ,  received a total of only about 11 percent above their original 
investment in a nine year period. 
The great losers were those who paid 25 cents on the dollar for 
cattle trust stock in 1887 . Such unfortunates lost quite . .  heavily by the 
end of the twelve-year career of the trust and Western Union Bee£. But 
most of the stock taken at this valuation was received in exchange for 
cattle and land which probably could not have been sold for anything like 
such values during the time of the severest cattle depression. McGhee ,  
of course , paid cash for his 2 , 000 shares in 1887 , but these were less 
than one third of his 1898 holdings . In the interval he had managed to 
reduce his losses by moderately successful speculations in the trust ' s  
and the company' s stock. Perhaps Wilson and other original cash in-
vestors did likewise.  Both Wilson and McGhee drew other benefits from 
their association with the enterprise. Wilson' s firm got a yearly 
$5 , 000 fee for its services as a financial agent ; McGhee drew a salary 
for being the company' s vice president ; and both men had relatives and 
personal employees on the payro11 . 176 It would not seem that these re-
wards were excessive , or that they outweighed the considerable total 
services rendered by the financiers and their dependents .  
The American Cattle Trust was organized at the beginning o f  a 
period of drastic readjustment in the range cattle business .  Many of 
the overblown corporations of earlier years were liquidated during the 
industry' s severe depression which lasted into the 1890 ' s . Despite 
176 W. U. B. Letterbook , 272 . The treasurer was an employee of 
Wilson' s firm; the company' s  secretary was McGhee ' s  private secretary, 
Charles T .  Leonhardt . 
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frailties of organization and the insolvency of some of its component 
companies , the cattle trust proved a haven for some Eastern financiers 
and Western cattlemen whose investments were seriously threa�ened by 
these business storms . The cattle trust was probably the product of two 
major impulses : the urge to " fight monopoly with monopoly" and the de­
sire to create an organization large enough to market its stock on the 
New York Exchange . The former motive betrayed a sensitivity to the 
growing sickness of the industry as a whole ; something was wrong with 
the cattle business , and the trust seemed to be a way to correct the de­
fect. The second motive , however, was ,  in a sense , a testament of con­
fidence in the industry' s future . A large organization, it was believed, 
could consolidate the prosperity of the cattle boom and become a de­
sirable speculative investment . "Fighting monopoly with monopoly, " which 
was the theme of E. M. McGillin 1 s  first trust proposal , may indeed be 
viewed as a manifestation of "protest . "  It is a mistake , however, to 
regard the actual cattle trust as essentially a "protest movement . "  The 
influence of the "protest" motive may have been strong at the outset , 
but it quickly faded before the realities of business life .  
The emergence o f  the McGhee-Wilson interest , which became dominant 
within a year of the trust ' s  founding, marked a shift of power from the 
West to New York City and a transformation of the trust ' s  raison d 1 etre . 
The financiers were interested in simply making the trust a paying enter­
prise with speculative possibilities .  Toward this end they worked with 
mixed success .  The Western Union Beef Company was wholly their creature 
and was only a new vehicle for their consistent motive . In a sense Mc­
Ghee and Wilson were thrust into control when Thomas Sturgis ' financial 
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difficulties exposed to them the precarious situation of the trust (and 
the cattle industry as well ) .  They "took hold of it , "  as McGhee would 
say, and saved only a part of the original investment . Had the trust 
been realistically capitalized from the beginning, their record would 
have been much better; a more realistic organization and better manage-
ment at the inception would also have contributed to the project ' s  pros-
pects of success .  As it was ,  the cattle trust and Western Union Beef 
failed to make much money for their stockholders , or to rehabilitate the 
cattle industry in gener,al , but the trust and its successor did salvage 
some of the investments which almost surely would have been lost in the 
collapse of the range cattle industry' s biggest boom. 
McGhee ' s  role in the Texas and Pacific was a natural outgrowth of 
his other railroad activities ; his involvement in the Western Cattle busi-
ness was accidental . Normally his investments were carefully planned and 
were concentrated in his native state, for Tennessee was the place he knew 
best , and there he sought returns in railroads , mineral resources ,  and 
real estate . The promotion of the area ' s  economic potential was at the 
hea:tt of these enterprises ,  but the drive for gain took precedence over 
all' else . Thus , "developmental" and "opportunistic" approaches to invest­
ment were mingled as McGhee sought to maximize his profits . 177 
l77The terms "developmental" and "opportunistic" were devised by 
Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E .  Supple "to distinguish generally between 
railroad investments made in anticipation of the long-run gains to be 
derived from sustained economic growth • • •  , and investments made with 
relatively shorter time horizons , the context of which was not so much 
future income growth as the securing of profits from available markets-­
whether for goods , for railroad services , or for stocks and bonds . "  See 
Johnson and Supple , Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads , ! Study in 
the Nineteenth-Century Railroad Investment Process (Cambridge : Harvard 
University Press , 1967 ) ,  10 . 
CHA.PI'ER VI 
IRON, COAL, AND LAND :  INVESTMENTS OPPORTUNISTIC AND DEVELOFMENTAL 
The 1880 1 s  is crucial in the history of the New South, for this 
decade represented the "take-off" period for the region' s  industrializa-
t .  1 �on. The eighties were years of general prosperity in the nation--a 
time of relief between the panics of the seventies and the severe depres-
. f th 1 . t '  2 s�on o e ear y �ne �es .  In the South i t  was an era o f  unprecedented 
commercial and industrial development , when the region' s  resources at-
tracted the attention of capitalists who exploited them as never before . 
For years Southern publicists had dwelt on their section' s advantages ,  
had begged for Northern capital , had proclaimed what one historian has 
called the "new order of thought and action. "3 After 1880 there was a 
lwoodward , Origins of the � South, 107-41 , disagrees with the 
"scholars who have fixed upon the latter year [ 1880] as the beginning of 
1 the industrial revolution ' in the South, " but he does not dispute the 
fact that Southern investment and development was accelerated during the 
decade . The activity of the eighties was especially important in Tennes­
see . See Constantine G. Belissary, "The Rise of the Industrial Spirit in 
Tennessee , 1865-188511 (unpublished Ph.D .  dissertation, Vanderbilt Univer­
sity, 1949) , 256-58. The term "take-off" is used by W. W. Rostow in 
� Stages of Economic Growth, ! �-Communist Manifesto ( Cambridge , 
England : Cambridge University Press ,  1960) , 7-9 .  
2In 1873 the United States entered a period of general busines s  
depression which lasted until the late 1890 ' s . Except for 1882-85 when 
there was a recession, however, the decade of the eighties was a lull 
between the severe depressions of the seventies and the nineties .  See 
Kirkland , Industry � of Age , 4-8 .  
3victor S .  Clark, "Modern Manufacturing Development in the South, 
1880-1905 , "  Economic History, 1865-1910 , Vol .  VI of � South in the 
Building of the Nation, ed. James Curtis Ballagh ( 13 vols . ; Richmond : 
The Southern Historical Publication Society, 1909 ) ,  266 . 
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flood of such propaganda , culminating in Henry Grady' s famous "New South" 
speech of  1886 . 4 The ground thus prepared ,  local businessmen, Northern 
and foreign capitalists, promoters and speculators launched a multitude 
of railroad, mining, and manufacturing enterprises .  Many of these faiied 
at the first appearance of a contracting economy, but others survived the 
depressed nineties to continue the industrial "evolution" in the South. 
Hardly typical of the old regime , Tennessee nevertheless suffered 
from the shortage of capital and enterprise which, it was widely felt , had 
oppressed the entire region. 5 Immediately after the Civil War the Radical 
Republicans , both for political and economic reasons , encouraged an in­
flux of Yankees and Yankee capita1 . 6 Even after the end of this Republi­
can rule , Democrats like Joseph Buckner Killebrew7 and Arthur St . Clair 
Colyar8 promoted immigration and industrial development . Thus the state 
was well prepared for the long heralded boom of the eighties .  
It  was fitting that much of  this economic activity was centered in 
East Tennessee . The "invitation to carpetbaggers" had been issued during 
the administration of a Knoxville Republican, Governor William G. Brown-
low, and , East Tennesseans remaining loyal to the Republicans after the 
!tpaul M. Gaston, The New South Creed, !. Study in Southern M.ytbmaking 
(New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 17-45 ; Belissary, "Rise of the Indus­trial Spirit , 11 vi-ix. 
5Ibid. , 128-34· 
6Hesseltine , "Tennessee ' s  Invitation to Carpetbaggers . " 
7samuel Boyd Smith, "Joseph Buckner Killebrew and the New South 
Mov�ment in Tennessee , "  East Tennessee Historical Society' s Publications , 
No . 37 ( 1965 ) ,  5-22 . 
8 Clyde L. Ball , "The Public Career of Colonel A.  S .  Colyar, 1870-
1877 , "  Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XII ( 1953 ) ,  23-47 , 106-28 ,  213-38 .  
restoration of  Democratic rule in the state , could justly claim that 
their section was receptive to northern men and ideas . In 1869 the 
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Knoxville Industrial Association was formed to promote immigration and 
encourage the development of the area ' s  natural resources . 9 The first 
president of the organization was John W. North, a New York adventurer 
who soon failed in Knoxville as an iron master and moved on to become one 
f th f d f Ri 0 d c 1 0 f 0 10 o e oun ers o vers1 e ,  a 1 orn1a. 
Other Northerners were more successful in establishing prosperous 
manufacturing enterprises in East Tennessee . Among the most prominent 
were John T .  Wilder and Hiram S .  Chamberlain, who were intimately associ-
ated with the development of the iron industry in the area. Wilder, a 
Union brigadier, and Chamberlain, Federal chief quartermaster of East 
Tennessee , discovered the potential of the region' s  iron ore during the 
Civil War and remained to exploit it . 11 In 1868 Chamberlain, with a 
Welsh ironmaster, David Richards , incorporated the Knoxville Iron Company 
which continues to this day the manufacture of finished iron products . 12 
Together with Wilder and other Northern investors , Chamberlain founded 
in 1867 the Roane Iron Company, a more ambitious project , which manufactured 
9Knoxville Industrial Association, Facts and Figures Concerning 
the Climate ,  Manufacturing Advantages ,  and the Agricultural and Mineral 
Resources of East Tennessee (Knoxville : T .  Haws and Co . , 1869). 
10Merlin Stonehouse , John Wegley North and- the Reform Frontier 
(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press , 1965}. 
1�orrow Chamberlain, ! Brief History of the P)g Iron Industry of 
� Tennessee (Chattanooga : Privately printed, 1942 , 6 . 
12Joseph Harold Clark "History of  the Knoxville Iron Company" (un­
published Master ' s thesis ,  The University of Tennessee , Knoxville , 1949) .  
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pig iron until 1930. 13 Although Wilder is perhaps better known and was 
certainly a talented promoter, it is Chamberlain who typifies the crea­
tive entrepreneur developing the . resources of the South. 
The Roane Iron Company built the South' s  first coke burning fur­
nace which went into blast at Rockwood, some fifty miles southwest of 
Knoxville , in 1868 . Drawing its ore and coal from mines at the foot of  
nearby Walden Ridge , the company produced pig iron which for a time com­
peted successfully in the Southern market and later was sold 'in other 
sections of the country. In 1870 the Roane Company merged with the South­
western Iron Company which for several years had operated a rolling mill 
at Chattanooga. Now the possessor of properties which made possible 
fully integrated production, the company plunged into the manufacture of 
iron rails for the South' s  expanding railroads . By 1876 the Roane Iron 
Company, with a paid up capital of one million dollars , employed over five 
hundred men at Chattanooga and half that number at Rockwood. It annually 
made 24, 000 tons of pig iron and rolled 28 , 000 tons of rail s .  With the 
rising demand for steel rails and the accompanying decline in sales of 
iron the company installed new equipment at Chattanooga, and in 1878 
manufactured the first steel made in the South. Although 50 , 000 tons of 
steel rails were produced, a drop in the price of rails and the difficulty 
of obtaining the proper ore forced the company in 1883 to abandon this 
pioneer effort in steel-making. A few years later, however,  a five-ton 
Bessemer converter was purchased, and the South' s  first Bessemer steel 
lJChamberlain, Brief History, 6-8 .  
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was made at Chattanooga in 1887 . 14 It was about this time that McGhee 
began to take an interest in the Roane Iron Company, and for fifteen 
years thereafter he maintained a close relationship with Chamberlain 
and exercised a strong influence on the company. 
During the first twenty years of Roane Iron ' s history there were 
two dominant groups of stockholders . One was composed of the founders 
of the company, Wilder, Chamberlain, and several Ohio and Indiana capi-
talists . As a result of the merger with Southwestern Iron, Abram S .  
Hewitt and other Easterners became Roane stockholders . 15 Wilder left 
the company in 1871 , and Chamberlain, moving from Knoxville to Chattanooga , 
became vice president and general manager. Succeeding to the presidency 
in 1881 ,  he retained that position until his death in 1916 . 16 For more 
than forty years he was the guiding spirit of Roane Iron, marking the 
company with what one economist has called Chamberlain ' s  "unusually 
. 17 good record" as a creative entrepreneur. But though Chamberlain had 
the imagination and energy to pioneer on industrial frontiers , he lacked I the capital to underwrite experimentation or to sustain the company in 
hard times .  It  is  unlikely that the Midwestern stockholders had the 
means or the inclination to take much part in their Southern investment , 
l4Ibid. , 6- 9 ;  James F. Doster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill : 
An Industrial By-Product of the Civil War, '! East Tennessee Historical 
Society' s Publications , No . 36 ( 1964) , 54. 
l5Allan Nevins , Abram S .  Hewitt , with Some Account of Peter Cooper 
(New York : Harper & Brothers:- 1935) , 25� --
16 Moore , Tennessee , the Volunteer State , III , 70- 75 .  
l7Redlich, History of American Business Leaders , I ,  104. 
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and though Abram Hewitt talked a good deal about the future of the 
South, his remarkable caution seems to have prevented his doing very 
much in that direction. Thus Chamberlain turned to McGhee , the Southern 
capitalist recently moved to New York,  for the financial connections and 
expertise which Roane Iron badly needed. 
The two men had known each other since the Union army' s occupa-
tion of Knoxville ; probably they had business dealings prior to Chamber-
lain' s removal to Chattanooga. They had different talents and backgrounds 
and belonged to different political parties but they must have seen busi-
ness matters in much the same way. Both were conservative about money 
but were willing to take a chance for a profit.  Neither would have hesi-
tated to liquidate or sell the company at the right price , but both men 
remained convinced that it had a profit-making potential as long as it 
was soundly managed. Chamberlain was a skilled industrial manager, Me-
Ghee a resourceful financial director. They formed a strong affinity 
which withstood disagreement and adversity, and together they saw Roane 
Iron through a crucial time in its history. 
Just when McGhee bought stock in the company is unknown, but he 
was a member of its board when the important decision to make Bessemer 
steel was considered in 1886. 18 In the summer of that year he purchased 
more stock and persuaded his business associate , Samuel Thomas , an ex­
perienced ironmaster, to take some shares . 19 At the autumn stockholders ' 
18chamberlain to McGhee , May 25 , 1886 . All manuscript references  
in this chapter are to  the McGhee Papers . 
l9Ibid. , July 22 , 1886. 
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meeting of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad he had Chamberlain 
20 elected a director, remarking that "the position will do you no harm. " 
In January, 1887 , he wrote that he was holding back an order of a 
thousand tons of rails for the M. & C .  until Chamberlain was ready to 
bid on them. 21 He persuaded the East Tennessee to "take all their rails 
from you at what it would cost them to buy the rails from other mills 
and lay them down at either Memphis ,  Brunswick,  or Bristol , giving you 
the benefit of the freight . 11 22 Besides making these helpful arrange-
ments McGhee sympathized with Chamberlain ' s  desire for building up a 
capital surplus . Reacting to the declaration of a 3 percent dividend 
in December, 1886 , he wrote : 
As you say, it was not advisable that the dividend should have 
been paid and while we cannot help this ,  we can avoid such 
mistakes in the future , and if the directory as it now stands 
are a class of men who cannot be controled [ sic]  in such 
matters we must make such changes as will secure a highly 
conservative management . 23 
Obviously he was taking a strong interest in the company; in re-
turn he expected regular reports from Chamberlain on production, sales ,  
and general progress .  But deep in the complexities of converting to the 
Bessemer process Chamberlain seemed unable to satisfy his friend ' s  thirst . 
for information and responded to McGhee ' s  questions by explaining that : 
I dislike very much to write unless I can say something posi­
tive one way or the other, either good or bad, and besides I 
have had so many annoyances to contend with and so much 
20 McGhee to Chamberlain, October 26 , 1886 . 
21Ibid. , January 24, 1887 .  
23Ibid. 
22Ibid. , January 28 , 1887 . 
shaping up to do, that I have been kept on the jump con­
stantly, and I have given little thought to anything or any­
body outside of the work here .  Have a little patience , and 
after a while I shall have time to make my reports more 
promptly. I wish you could have two weeks of starting a 
steel mill. (No ! �) . We are gaining eveg day, and I 
hope before long to make satisfactory reports . 24 
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McGhee , however, did not regard patience as a virtue in matters of this 
sort . Chamberlain' s  silences seemed inexplicable , and he was finally 
moved to write : 
I am very much at a loss my dear Captain, to account for your 
extreme reticence with reference to the operations of the Roane 
Iron Company[ . ]  If the Company has done remarkably well and 
you desire to give me an agreeable surprise by a favorable 
statement or that you have met with difficulties in your opera­
tions and do not wish to make a statement on that account which 
I very much fear, I of course am unable to say, but in either 
event you are making a mistake as my relations to the Company 
and to yourself personally are such as to entitle me to full 
and explicit information with reference to the Company' s  opera­
tions which I am sorry to say you do not seem to appreciate and 
up to the present time no effort upon my part to extract the 
information which I think is due me has been successful . 
This is the last appeal I shall make on this subject. 2S 
To his credit , Chamberlain was able to accept these rebukes with 
good humor and to mollify McGhee with information about production and 
sales .  Through the fall of  1887 and winter of  1888 the Captain tinkered 
with machinery, changed production managers, cajoled workers, and was able 
to make and market steel rails . 26 In New York the no less important task 
of financing the company went forward under the direction of the Colonel, 
24Chamberlain to McGhee , May 16 , 1887 . 
2�cGhee to Chamberlain, July 29, 1887 . 
26see , for instance , Chamberlain to McGhee, June 13 , September 2 ,  
8 ,  26 , October 27,  1887 , February 16, March 28 , 1888. 
. . 
., , .  
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who endorsed notes and managed to keep Roane Iron ' s  debt afloat . 27 
The best efforts of both men, however, were not enough to make the 
venture in steel making a success .  The trouble was in the quality of 
rails made for the East Tennessee system. The railroad ' s  general mana-
ger, Charles H. Hudson, on the recommendation of his superintendent , 
rejected a shipment found to have imperfections of length. 28 Although 
Chamberlain maintained that the trouble could be corrected easily, the 
East Tennessee suspended for several weeks its orders for rails , and the 
Roane Company was forced to shut down during most of the month of March, 
1888 . 29 "All you will have to do , "  McGhee advised, '' is to convince Hud-
son you will make him good rails and I am sure he will , as far as pos-
sible , endeavor to favor you, as of course he knows of Thomas and my 
interest in the mill . "30 But the Roane Company could not afford even 
temporary reverses . "Not working in March, " wrote Chamberlain, "has 
left us in no condition to meet April bills , and I say frankly, I am at 
my wit ' s  end. "31 The company owed $9 , 000 to the Cranberry mines for 
ore and unless this could be paid, "our position is very serious . It 
is a humiliating thing, " Chamberlain confessed to his friend, "to annoy 
you !with these matters , but I am compelled to talk with somebody, and 
there is no one here who can appreciate the situation or give any 
27McGhee to Chamberlain, August 13 , 1887 , February 23 , 1888 . 
28chamberlain to McGhee , February 16 , 1888 . 
29Ibid. , April 9 ,  1888 . 
30McGhee to Chamberlain, April 7 , 1888 . 
3lChamberlain to McGhee ,  April 9 , 1888 . 
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comfort . 1132 McGhee was not unsympathetic , but he felt it necessary to 
lecture Chamberlain on what he regarded as the root of the problem : 
The Superintendent of your Mill must be thoroughly incompetent 
or these things would not occur. If it had not been for the 
interest that General Thomas and I had in the Mill and that 
Major [ Henry] Fink desired to do all he could to encourage the 
manufacture of rails on the line of his road, the difficulties 
they have had in securing perfect rails , would have long since 
made them abandon any effort in that direction. 
I know you have done the best you could and that you have 
been very much worried in regard to the matter and if I could 
see any way in which I could relieve you I should cheerfully 
do so , but the only place it can be helped is in the mill. 33 
In the end McGhee got the East Tennessee to lift its ban on Roane rails ,  
endorsed the company' s $9 ,000 note and got it discounted at  Thomas ' 
Chase Bank in New York. 34 
Although a disaster had been averted at least temporarily, the situ-
ation remained precarious . McGhee was alarmed that the Rockwood furnaces , 
which had been supporting the entire property, seemed to be running at a 
loss . 35 The company' s 1888 statement confirmed this,  and McGhee observed 
that something was "radically wrong, " adding that "unless the Rockwood 
property can so far improve its condition and earning capacity as to meet 
the interest on our floating debt , the sooner we foreclose and sell out 
the whole concern, the better it will be for all parties interested . "36 
The answer, in fact ,  to the company' s troubles was to dispose of 
the ,Chattanooga steel facility which had been a costly failure . Both 
32Ibid . , April 10 , 1888 . 
33�cGhee to Chamberlain, April 11 , 1888 . 
34Ibid. , April 19 , 1888 . 35Ibid. , November 30 , 1888 . 
361Qi£. , February l ,  1889.  
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McGhee and Chamberlain recognized this reality and as early as the summer 
of 1888 had considered getting rid of the property. 37 In the spring of 
1889 a large party of Eastern capitalists toured the South in search of  
investment opportunities and on this occasion Chamberlain discussed a 
sale with Abram Hewitt . "He is very much impressed , " reported Chamber-
lain, "with the idea of making basic steel in Chattanooga from the cheap 
pig irons of this section,  and intimated that if he could get the property 
here at the right terms he and other New York parties might feel disposed 
to take hold of the enterprise . "38 Characteristically, Hewitt delayed 
a decision until his return from a visit to Europe to study steel making 
processes . 39 
Meanwhile others became interested in the Chattanooga property. 
Tennessee Coal , Iron and Railroad Company, undergoing one of its periodic 
management upheavals ,  lost the services of two of its top officials , 
Alfred Montgomery Shook and Nathaniel Baxter, Jr. Both were allied with 
one of Tennessee Coal ' s  largest stockholders , John H. Inman , who had 
temporarily lost control of the company. 40 Casting about for new employ-
ment , Shook proposed to buy the Chattanooga mill for the Southern Iron 
Company which he , Baxter, and Inman were organizing. 4l The delicate 
negotiations which finally led to the sale were handled in New York by 
McGhee , who had the difficult task of persuading Roane Iron' s scattered 
37�hamberlain to McGhee , July 14, 1888 . 
38Ibid. , March 26 , 1889 .  
39Ibid. 40I£i£· 
4l;hook to Chamberlain, April 23 , 1889 .  
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shareholders . He was particularly anxious to make the sale because in 
August , 1889 , he assumed most of the company' s floating debt , which could 
be liquidated only by selling the Chattanooga property. To avoid the 
appearance of conflicting interests McGhee resigned from the Roane ' s  
board and suggested that his son-in-law, Calvin McClung, be named in his 
place . 42 This move he felt was necessary because he was charging 8 per-
cent interest on the company' s $1.50 , 000 debt . "This is a very high rate, " 
he admitted, "but I have failed to find others willing to take any off 
my hands . ,4J 
Although a price of $2.50 , 000 for the mill was quickly agreed upon, 
there was much haggling about the terms of sale . Shook , Baxter, and In­
man offered part in cash and part in bonds of the Southern Iron Company. 44 
McGhee and Chamberlain were willing to accept this arrangement since the 
mill was , in McGhee ' s  words , "worthless in its present condition, "4.5 
but several of the Roane Company' s  Midwestern stockholders objected to 
this low price for what one described as "perhaps the best unoccupied 
location for a steel mill in the country. "46 Thoroughly disgusted at 
this opposition, McGhee told Antrim R. Forsythe of Indiana : 
My interest in the Roane Iron Company is not so large as to 
make it a sine qua � that the property should be saved, but 
my high regard for Capt . Chamberlain and his extreme anxiety 
42 ' McGhee to Chamberlain, August 6 , 1889 . 
4�cGhee to Antrim R. Forsythe , September .5 , 1889 . 
44"Preliminary Agreement , "  Letterbook, 1889-1892 , p .  242 . 
4.5McGhee to Forsythe , September .5 , 1889 .  
46Forsythe to McGhee ,  September 7 ,  1889.  
to bring it out all right has induced me to advance money and 
to aid him to a very large extent , and having no interest in 
any concern with which we are likely to trade , I feel that I 
am in a position to look calmly and dispassionately at the 
condition of things and • • •  I feel my views are entitled to 
more consideration than you gentlemen are disposed to give 
them. 47 
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McGhee ' s  firm arguments and his implied threat to wash his hands 
of Roane Iron had the desired effect . The Midwesterners , representing 
one third of the company' s stock ,  capitulated, and Forsythe admitted 
that "It seems I was unjustly suspicious • . • in the matter. I am per­
haps morbid in my dread of the ways of 'Wall Street . 1 "48 The Chattanooga 
plant was finally sold in October, 1889 , for $200 , 000 cash and $50 , 000 
in Southern Iron bonds . 49 McGhee was relieved and looked forward to 
better days for the company now that its floating debt was reduced and 
its operations restricted to the Rockwood iron furnaces .  The attempt at 
steel making, he told Calvin McClung, had cost the company $200 , 000 , but 
notwithstanding this loss he felt · that the stock was a good investment 
at fifty cents a share . 50 In February, 1890, he bought another 122 
shares for $6 , l00 . 5l 
In order to sell the Chattanooga plant McGhee had been obliged to 
make a small investment in the Southern Iron Company, taking $12 , 500 of 
its bonds and $18 , 750 of its stock and becoming a member of the board of 
47McGhee to Forsythe , September 6 , 1889.  
48Forsythe to McGhee , September 9 , 1889.  
49McGhee to Nat Baxter, October 19 , 1889 .  
50McGhee to McClung, October 19 , 1889 . 
5�cClung to Leonhardt , March 18 , 1890. 
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directors . 52 Despite this involvement he never took much interest in the 
affairs of the company. Southern Iron spent h�avily on its Chattanooga 
property, and on September 15 , 1890 , its new furnaces produced the first 
basic steel to be made in the South. Within a year this experiment had 
failed too , and the Chattanooga plant shut down permanently. 53 McGhee 
and Chamberlain appear to have been right in the decision to sell the 
steel plant at a sacrifice . The South' s  most capable iron manufacturers 
had tried to make steel there and failed utterly. Not until 1899 was 
steel again made in the South, and then it was at Birmingham rather than 
at Chattanooga. 54 Southern Iron was liquidated but the Roane company 
concentrated upon its Rockwood iron furnaces and survived the depression 
of the nineties which swept many other companies into bankruptcy. 
Among the reasons for Roane ' s  rapid recovery from the nearly fatal 
experiment in steel making was its venture into town promotion. Though 
a discreditable incident in the company' s history, the sale of lots at 
the town of Rockwood helped to cover some of the recent losses .  The idea 
for such an enterprise was naturally suggested by the outbreak of fever-
ish town promotion schemes which were sweeping the South at the time . 
Cardiff and Harriman, two town sites near Rockwood, were extravagantly 
·boomed by land companiers largely controlled by Northern capitalists . 55 
52Leonhardt to McGhee , February 21 , 1890 . 
53Chamberlain, Brief Histo;r, 8 .  
54Anne Kendrick Walker, Life and Achievements o f  Alfred Mont­
gome;r Shook (Birmingham: Privately printed, 1952),  90 . 
55William F. Donovan, Jr. , "The Growth of the Industrial Spirit in 
Tennessee , 1890-1910" (linpublished Ph.D .  dissertation, George Peabody 
College for Teachers , 1955 ) ,  27-33 ; Donovan, "Real Estate Speculation in Cardiff and Harriman, 1890-1893 , "  Tennessee Historical Quarterly, XIV 
( 1955 ) '  253-56 . 
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Although advertised as future industrial centers of great promise , 
neither of these locations could claim an established manufacturing enter-
prise of any importance .  Rockwood with its Roane Iron works would appear 
to have been a much sounder prospective town site , but it is clear that 
there was a good deal of opportunism in the decision to boom the lot­
selling at Rockwood. In December, 1889 , Chamberlain considered selling 
five hundred acres of Roane Company land to a Rhode Island capitalist 
for development . This scheme envisioned the organization of a furnace 
company with a bond large enough to build and work an iron furnace . 
Chamberlain reported that the developer "thinks he can place bonds on 
this basis , and sell the land [ as town lots] for enough to cover the ex-
penses ,  and make a handsome profit . "  Yet he was skeptical about the 
ultimate success of the promotion and thought the time would come when 
the furnace could be "picked up cheaply" by the Roane Company. He told 
McGhee that "I don' t feel like organizing a company myself and calling 
my friends to take stock as you suggest , as I would feel a certain respon-
sibility to make the thing a success ,  and might have to work harder than 
I feel like doing at my time of life . "56 
Notwithstanding Chamberlain ' s  early reluctance ,  it was the Roane 
Company itself which handled the promotion of Rockwood. As advertised, 
the company promised to build a new furnace as an inducement to speculating 
lot purchasers . 57 The prospect of a great industrial boom in the South 
along with an influx of Northern capital was very much a part of the 
56chamberlain to McGhee ,  December 27 , 1889 . 
57Donovan, "Industrial Spirit , "  42-4J . 
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public relations campaigns of the town promoters . The backers of Harri-
man, for instance , organized special trains to import buyers from New 
England and the Midwest to their town site . 58 Not wanting to be over-
shadowed, Chamberlain urged McGhee to collect some imposing Northern 
capitalists to ornament the Rockwood sale on May 13 , 14, and 15 , 1890 : 
Would it not be possible for you and Thomas and Hewitt to get up 
a carload of people and run down? The citizens of Rockwood do 
not think the Directors of the Roane Iron Co . take much interest 
in the property, and it occurs to me that in this instance the 
New York people can afford to take a hand, as they have large 
interests in the matter. If you can work this up I shall be 
very glad. You think I ought to "boom" some , and I think you 
ought to give a hand. 59 
Although McGhee and his New York associ*tes did not do much to "boom" the 
promotion, the Rockwood sale was a success . By mid-June , 1890 ,  Chamber-
lain reported that Roane had on hand enough pig iron and bills and 
accounts receivable to pay all its debts .  With general supplies ,  a 
company store , $125 , 000 in real estate notes from the sale of lots ,  and 
$50 , 000 in Southern Iron bonds on hand he pronounced the company in 
"first class condition. 1160 Enough cash was available to pay a 2 per­
cent dividend on July 10 , 1890. 61 
The dividend was made possible only by the sale of lots at Rock-
wood, but the payments had hardly gone out to the stockholders when the 
I I 
' town building bubble burst spectacularly. The "Baring Panic" of 1890 and 
58Donovan, "Real Estate Speculation, "  254-55 . 
59Chamberlain to McGhee ,  May 1 ,  1890.  
60Ibid. , June 17 , 1890. 
61orion 1. Hurlburt to McGhee ,  July 10 , 1890.  
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the subsequent contraction of British investment were symptoms of 
approaching hard times .  The first victims were the town companies which 
in many instances were based merely on the extravagant promises and the 
greed of promoters . Cardiff and Harriman in East Tennessee , as well as 
Middlesboro on the Kentucky border, were plunged into deep trouble . 
Roane Iron soon joined the list of companies being sued by unhappy lot 
62 owners . A suit was brought based on Roane ' s  failure to build the 
promised new furnace at Rockwood ; when the oase was heard in the chancery 
court , Judge Henry Gibson held in favor of the plaintiffs . As Chamber-
lain put it , "Gibson got in one of his communistic fits and decided the 
case against us • • . .  "63 On appeal to the Tennessee supreme court , how-
ever, the decision was reversed, and the Roane Company' s  profit was 
saved. 64 Chamberlain himself admitted that the down payments received 
for the lots represented "a pretty good price for the property. "6.5 
The Rockwood promotion was conceived and carried out as a means of 
cashing in on the temporary town building mania,  but Chamberlain and the 
owners of the company were soon busy with plans to improve their property 
with a new furnace . Before launching the expansion, McGhee sought the 
62nonovan, "Industrial Spirit , "  41-47 • .  
63chamberlain to McGhee , July JO , 1891 .  Henry Richard Gibson was 
an old antagonist of McGhee , having clashed with the financier when both 
were members of the legislature in 1871-72 . Gibson was an outspoken 
opponent of the convict lease system in Tennessee and was regarded as a 
radical by the Sanford wing of the Republican Party. He was elected as 
a Republican to Congress from the Knoxville district and served five terms , 
189.5-190) . See Rothrock , French Broad-Holston Country, 420-21 .  
64Ibid. , August 20 , 1891. 6.5Ibid. , July JO , 1891. 
advice of the experienced A. M. Shook. After examining the works at 
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Rockwood, Shook recommended the extensive remodeling of one furance 
and the construction of another, 66 a project carried out in 1893 with 
the proceeds of a sale of $300 , 000 in bonds, most of which were taken 
by McGhee and his New York associates , Thomas , Wilson, and Hewitt . 67 
Although the New York financiers took the bonds at a large discount , 
it is apparent that the money could not have been raised otherwise , be-
cause Chamberlain was able to place only $50 , 000 in the South and Mid-
68 west . 
During the later 1890 ' s  the Roane Company made money, thahks to 
its improved furnaces ,  the close management of Chamberlain, and the 
helpful advice and intelligence provided by McGhee . 69 This last was 
made possible by the New York capitalist ' s  close ties with the management 
of the mammoth Tennessee Coal , Iron, and Railroad Company. Besides his 
personal friendship with Nathaniel Baxter and A. M. Shook , who again 
managed Tennessee Coal , McGhee had close ties with John G. Moore whose 
firm, Moore and Schley, handled much of the corporation ' s  New York busi-
ness .  Finally, McGhee ' s  old friend and railroad associate , John H.  Inman , 
was for years the largest owner of Tennessee Coal ' s  stock .  Through his 
correspondence with Baxter and his access to confidential reports from 
66shook to McGhee , October ll , 1892 . 
67McGhee to Chamberlain, January 23 , 1893 . 
68chamberlain to McGhee ,  January 24, 1893 . 
69see "Roane Iron Company, Statement of Dividends , "  Letterbook, 
1899 , pp . 130-31 .  
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Moore ' s  office , McGhee was able to keep abreast of Tennessee Coal ' s  
production costs and sale prices . When this information was useful to 
Roane Iron, McGhee passed it on to Chamberlain who was thus able to make 
his decisions guided by the knowledge of what a large competitor was 
doing. 70 
McGhee ' s  original interest in Tennessee Coal seems to have sprung 
from a moderate investment in that company' s stock . 7l Later he joined 
the board and played a small role in its activities ,  but he seems to 
have been too wary to become heavily involved in a company whose history 
was especially marked by the struggle of ambitious men for control . It 
is certain that he rejected the interesting appeal which Shook addressed 
to him in November, 1896 . "The death of Jno . H. Inman , "  wrote Shook, 
"leaves the Tenn. Coal I & RR Co . without a leader--and we naturally 
turn to you. " Conceding that McGhee had declared he was "out of the 
Current and preferred to stay out , "  Shook maintained that it would not 
be necessary for McGhee to take a hand in managing the company. Eut he 
urged him to interest his friends , such as Samuel Thomas , in taking con-
trol , and he remarked that "it is greatly to the interest of the Southern 
Rail Road and the [Georgia] Central to have this property controlled by 
friends who wo�ld and could give these systems Half a million tons more 
freight than they now get . "  Shook also argued that if McGhee and asso-
ciates controlled Tennessee Coal , the acquisition of all the land and 
7°see , for instance , Chamberlain to McGhee ,  October 6 and McGhee 
to Chamberlain, October 29 , 1894.  
71rn 1896 McGhee owned 1 , 700 shares which had cost him over 
$42 , 000 . McGhee to Nat Baxter, August 18 , 1896 . 
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iron-making facilities at Sheffield, Alabama, would be an easy matter 
and that "the people who acquired and brought these properties together 
[ could] make a great deal of money. 11 72 
Tempting as these proposals may have seemed,  McGhee refrained 
from any attempt to dominate Tennessee Coal . Perhaps its situation 
reminded him of the late Richmond Terminal Company in whose affairs he 
had recently been tangled. For whatever reason, Tennessee Coal re-
mained only a peripheral interest , though he did join its board in 
1897 , probably at the urging of Shook and Nat Baxter. 73 On occasions 
McGhee helped to shoulder some of the company' s  floating debt , 74 and 
the�e is evidence that he may have helped to arrange the financing for 
the first of Tennessee Coal ' s  Birmingham steel plants . 75 
He played the role of broker in 1899 and engineered the sale of 
the Sheffield Coal , Iron, and Steel Company to Tennessee Coal . The 
Sheffield Company was created by a group of Tennesseans , led by E. W. 
' 
Cole , the one-time president of the East Tennessee and of the Nashville , 
Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Railroad. Beginning in 1886 Cole and his 
associates poured money into the town of Sheffield , Alabama, which suf­
fered the fate of other boom towns in the depression of the nineties . 76 
72shook to McGhee , November 8, 1896 . There is no copy of Mc-
Ghee ' s  reply to this letter. 
73Nat Baxter to McGhee ,  'October 23 , 1897 . 
7�cGhee to W. S .  Gurnee ,  December 7 , 1897 . 
75McGhee to James Bowron, May 17 , and to E.  W. Cole , May 23 , 1898 .  
76Nina Leftwich, Two Hundred Years at Muscle Shoals (Birmingham : 
Multigraphic Advertising Co . ,  1935),  260-6� 
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By 1898 the blast furnaces ,  coke ovens , coal mines ,  and land controlled 
by Sheffield were said to represent an investment of $2 , 000 , 000 , but 
the company remained a cripple which seemed incapable of paying divi­
dends. 77 In this condition it was an attractive bargain to the acquisi-
tive managers of Tennessee Coal . As early as 1896 it had caught the 
notice of Nat Baxter who asked McGhee to feel out the owners , one of 
whom was James Columbus Neely of Memphis , father-in-law of McGhee ' s  
youngest daughter, Eleanor. Baxter badly wanted to sew up the Shef-
field complex and wrote to McGhee on November 1 that "there are some 
other good furnaces at that place which we are attempting to get into 
shape that we can acquire them very cheap . "78 Within a week, however, 
John H.  Inman was dead, and the resulting power vacuum at Tennessee Coal 
probably dashed Baxter ' s dreams . 
Neely was at that time inclined to hold on to the property any­
way, 79 but by the fall of 1897 he was ready to consider a proposal . Me-
Ghee spoke to his friend John G. Moore , offering the Sheffield. property 
to Tennessee Coal for $700 , 000. Moore thought it cheap at that price 
but pointed out that Tennessee Coal could hardly buy more furnaces while 
it was barely meeting its fixed charges and some of its own furnaces 
were idle . 80 Besides , the "bitter opposition" of James T. Woodward, a 
77 Justin Fuller, "History of the Tennessee Coal , Iron, and Rail­
road Company, 1852-1907" (unpublished Ph.D.  dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1967 ) , 114-15 . 
78Nat Baxter to McGhee , November 1 ,  1896 . 
79Neely to McGhee , November 17 , 1896 . 
80 McGhee to Neely, September 22 , 1897 . 
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New York banker who had emerged as Tennessee Coal ' s  new kingpin, blocked 
the sales until the spring of 1899 . 81 As McGhee pointed out to J .  C .  
Neely, Jr. , the iron business then was good, but how long this condition 
would continue no one knew. He advised Neely that the company could be 
82 sold for more than before . Woodward 1 s  earlier opposition in fact 
cost Tennessee Coal $150 , 000 , since in 1899 it paid $850 , 000 for the 
Sheffield property which had been offered for $700 , 000 two years before . 
The Tennessee Company took another loss in 1902 when it sold Sheffield 
to the United States Ore Company for $600 , 000. 84 
McGhee played the role of 19honest broker, " but his part in the 
transaction serves to emphasize the casualness of his interest in Tennes-
see Coal--an interest based not on extensive financial holdings but on 
friendly personal relationships with men like Shook, Baxter, and Moore , 
who owned or managed the company. To be sure , he seized the opportunity 
to trade in Tennessee Coal ' s  stock in a manner reminiscent of his deal-
ings in Richmond Terminal shares ; one of the benefits of a directorship 
was the advantage it gave in playing the stock market . 85 McGhee was 
willing to serve on the board, to give advice , and to make modest cash 
advances to the company as an accommodation to his friends and as the 
price for an inside knowledge of Tennessee Coal ' s affairs . 
His attitude toward Roane Iron Company was entirely different . 
Tennessee Coal was Wall Street , but Roane Iron was East Tennessee .  McGhee 
8�cGhee to J .  C .  Neely, Jr. , May 19 , 1899 . 
82Ibid. 8 3Fuller, "History, " 114 .,..15 . 
84Ibid. 85see , for instance , Ledger, 107 . 
looked on the latter as a long term investment , especially after 1890 . 
With a capitalization of $1 , 000 , 000 , the company was the right size for 
him to dominate ;  this he did in cooperation with Chamberlain, both a 
close friend and a trusted business associate . Together they made Roane 
Iron a prosperous business which paid a good return on investment . For 
McGhee the return was e�pecially satisfactory in view of the nature of 
his securities .  He O¥lled apprqximately 10  percent of the company' s  
capital stock which he estimated in 1899 had cost him $56 , 900 . 86 In 
1893 he bought one fifth, or $60 , 000 , of the Roane ' s  bonds at a discount 
price of $46 , 200 . 87 Dividends from the stock averaged about 1 . 4 percent 
a year between 1886 and 1899 , while the bonds paid 6 percent a year from 
1893 onward. 88 The return on the bonds was thus almost 8 percent of the 
cost price , and the actual stock dividend was nearly 2 . 6 percent . The 
company' s  policies ,  as dictated by McGhee and Chamberlain, made the bonds 
a highly desirable and secure investment , while the stock was only medi­
ocre in its earning capacity. 89 This was hard on the mere shareowners , 
but it was quite rewarding for those like McGhee , who , after all , fur-
nished most of the capital which made the company' s  earnings possible . 
There was nothing improper about this particular example of one 
of McGhee ' s  favorite financial methods . Roane Iron was well run and well 
86Letterbook, 1899 , pp . 130-31 .  
87McGhee to  Chamberlain, January 23 ; Chamberlain to  McGhee , March 27 , 1893 . 
88Letterbook, 1899 , pp . 130-31 .  
89Because he regarded the bonds as  a safe investment he placed 
them in trust for his wife and children. 
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i taken care of; its stockholders could not legitimately complain about 
the McGhee-Chamberlain management . The same cannot be said, however, of 
other instances where similar methods were used to maximize McGhee ' s  
profits .  The III8.l1..agement of  the Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing 
Company, for example , is a case of the unscrupulous use of raw power. 
Here , he and his associates were guilty of virtual fraud against the 
stockholders of that company and those of the East Tennessee , Virginia , 
and Georgia Railroad as well . 
McGhee ' s  interest in the mineral resources of his native state 
had begun even before the Civil War. He and ten other East Tennesseans 
organized the Cumberland Mountain Coal and Land Company in 1858 ,  and 
after the Civil War it was reorganized as the East Tennessee Iron and 
----------
Coal Company with McGhee as president . 9° Although it owned large tracts 
of land in Anderson, Campbell , and Scott counties ,  the company never 
-
seemed to earn much. In time McGhee ' s  interest in it faded ,  but he re-
tained his stock, probably because he could not find a sale for it . Much 
more important was his involvement in Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing. 
-
Organized in 1868 by Charles H. Bulkley of New York City and Henry H. 
Wiley of Knoxville , it was reorganized four years later and the capital 
increased from $500 , 000 to $2 , 500 , 000 . Half of its 25 , 000 shares were 
owned by Bulkley and another fourth by Wiley. Among the other stock-
holders was McGhee who owned only fifty shares .  The company' s chief 
asset was some 90 , 000 acres of rich coal land in the vicinity of the 
90Rule , Standard History, 241 .  
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mining town of Coal Creek in Anderson County; from royalties on this 
property the company received about $45 , 000 in 1885 . Coal Creek was a 
leasing company which did not operate the several mines on its property 
which were served by the Knoxville and Ohio Railroad. 91 According to 
McGhee , the royalties were set so high that the development of mining 
was seriously retarded. Because this held down the freight revenues 
of the Knoxville and Ohio , he and several other "capitalists with en-
larged views" acquired the Bulkley stock, and thus with McGhee ' s  own 
fifty shares ,  they came into control of the company in 1885 . 92 
Others charged that McGhee and his associates forced Bulkley to 
sell out by threatening to divert the railroad facilities away from 
Coal Creek ' s property, thereby leaving those mines isolated and unable 
to operate .  It was alleged that McGhee and other directors o f  the East 
Tennessee were determined to dominate the coal fields along the line of 
the Knoxville and Ohio , and that they used their control of the rail­
road to force their way into the Coal Creek Company. 93 Subsequent de-
velopments seem to bear out this version of how the Bulkley stock was 
acquired. After gaining control of Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing 
McGhee ' s  syndicate attempted to eliminate competitors in the area by 
just such a diversion as may have been threatened against Bulkley. In 
this case they refused to permit the Coal Creek and New River Railroad, 
91Ibid. , 241-42 ; Cullen v. Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing Company, 42 Southwestern (1897-98 )  693-94. 
92McGhee to E. R. Chapman, August 18 , 1886 . 
93cullen y. Coal Creek, 693 . 
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a subsidiary branch of the Knoxville and Ohio , to haul coal from �es  
operated by John D .  Heck and L .  J .  A .  Petree in competition with the 
Coal Creek Company' s  mines .  Claiming to be the victims of a conspiracy 
which prevented their trade witl1 customers in North Carolina, Heck and 
Petree appealed to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In one of its 
first decisions the commission upheld Heck and Petree , ruling that the 
Knoxville and Ohio and the East Tennessee , Virginia, and Georgia were 
part of the same system and tllat the discrimination was a violation of 
the Interstate Commerce Act . 94 During the attempt of the so-called Rice-
Libbey faction to unseat the management of the Richmond Terminal in 1888 
this case was cited as proof that the McGhee syndicate had deliberately 
reduced the earnings of the East Tennessee system in the attempt to drive 
Heck and Petree out of business. 95 
Although thwarted in the Heck and Petree case , the syndicate was 
able to do a great deal toward consolidating the coal properties between 
Knoxville and the Kentucky border. The Bulkley stock was secured in the 
late summer or fall of 1885 , and on October l a stockholders ' meeting put 
the syndicate in full control of the Goal Creek Company. With one ex­
ception the old board was ousted and replaced by McGhee , Samuel Thomas,� 
/ John G. Moore , Calvin S .  Brice � .  H. Kneeland , John T .  Martin, Edward J .  
v Sanford, and George Andrews ; all except Andrews , a Knoxville lawyer, were 
directors of the East Tennessee , Virginia , and Georgia . The single 
94second Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(Washington, 1888), 139-40 .  
95commercial � Financial Chronicle , XLVI ( 1888 ) ,  580-81 .  
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director from the old board was Edwin F. Wiley who represented the large 
bloc of stock owned by the estate of Henry H. Wiley. At the regular 
meeting on October 20 this board was reelected, and it promptly named 
McGhee president , Andrews vice president , and McGhee ' s  son-in-law, Calvin 
M. McClung, secretary and treasurer. 96 The syndicate held a bare majority 
of stock which was enough to elect the board, but the large minority 
holding prevented complete domination. 
Soon the syndicate was negotiating for the 6 , 250 shares of Wiley 
stock, as well as other valuable property owned by the Wiley estate . 
Also bidding for this stock were Curtis Cullen and Charles S .  Newman , 
merchant partners of Knoxville , who owned 1 , 430 shares of Coal Creek 
stock .  E. R. Chapman, of the New York firm, Moore and Schley, repre­
sented the syndicate . 97 At stake were control of Tennessee ' s  richest 
coal fields and the East Tennessee railroad system' s  dominance of  the 
region. In the summer of 1886 the East Tennessee was not yet part of 
the Richmond Terminal ' s  empire , and in fact it appeared likely tha. t the 
former company would join the Norfolk and Western in deadly competition 
with the Terminal ' s  Richmond and Danville . The latter was considering 
a major invasion of Tennessee which would bring its lines into Knox-
ville , and Sanford reported to McGhee that Cullen had offered the Dan-
ville control of the Wiley-owned Poplar Creek Coal and Iron Company. 
Sanford realized that this would give the Danville an excellent base 
from which to challenge the East Tennessee, and he urged that "if the 
96cullen �· Coal Creek, 693-94. 
97Ibid . ; Sanford to McGhee , June 19 , 1886 . 
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R & D are in earnest the Wiley trade ought to be closed soon. "98 The 
syndicate now acted quickly and bought out all of the Wileys 1 interests 
for $150 , 000 . For this price it received the Wiley shares in Coal Creek , 
as well as 5 , 100 shares of Poplar Creek Coal and Iron and other assorted 
stock and real estate .  Shortly thereafter, the syndicate sold to Coal 
Creek all of this property, except for the 6 , 250 Coal Creek shares , for 
$217 , 343 . 10 .  Included in this sale was other miscellaneous property be-
longing to McGhee and Sanford. The members received payment in Coal 
Creek debenture bonds which bore interest at 6 percent . 99 
In 1887 the syndicate purchased the Walden ' s  Ridge Railroad Com-
pany and other property owned by the Oakdale Iron, Coal and Transporta-
tion Company for $183 , 122 . Almost immediately the real estate acquired 
in this transaction was sold to Coal Creek for $20 , 000 cash and $100 , 000 
. d b t 100 1n e en ures .  Less than a year later the Walden' s  Ridge Railroad, 
which had cost $160 , 000 was purchased by the East Tennessee , Virginia ,  
and Georgia for $500 , 000 in first extension mortgage bonds . 101 
McGhee and his associates had saddled Coal Creek with a bonded 
debt of $350 , 000 by 1887 . Seven years later the company was able to pay 
its first dividend to stockholders since 1885 ; during the interval all 
the profits had been paid out to the syndicate in the form of interest 
and bond retirement . 102 Thus Coal Creek ' s  earnings had been neatly 
98sanford to McGhee , July 3 , 1886 . 
99Cullen v. Coal Creek, 694. 100Ibid. , 695 . 
10� . Harr1son, � History, 906 ; McGhee to D. A. Carpenter, 
June 3 , 1887 . 
102 Cullen v. Coal Creek, 695 . 
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diverted to the members , who not only drained the company' s  treasury of 
cash but also received a bonus in Coal Creek stock. Assessing the 
syndicate ' s  work, McGhee noted that he had paid in a subscription of 
$75 , 000 and had received $50 , 000 in East Tennessee bonds , $35 , 000 in 
Coal Creek debentures and 2 , 000 shares of Coal Creek stock . 103 The 
latter securities he regarded as a very good investment , and in 1897 
after the company had begun to pay dividends again, he valued the stock 
at $40 per share . 104 He and the other nine syndicate members each made 
a profit of around $90 , 000 on the deals , 105 and they were not called to 
account until 1897 when Curtis Cullen and Charles Newman brought a suit 
to recover damages which they claimed to have suffered as stockholders . 
McGhee and Sanford based their demurrer on the lapse of six years under 
the statute of limitations and did not attempt to refute the facts as 
Cullen and Newman presented them. The Chancellor of Knox County, and 
106 subsequently an appellate court , upheld the defendants .  Why Cullen 
and Newman waited so long to bring suit is not known. It may have been 
that it took them nine years to understand just what had happened ,  al-
though this seems improbable . More likely, the two unfortunate stock-
holders became desperate and brought the suit in a frantic attempt to 
recoup their fortunes when their mercantile business failed. 
l03McGhee to McClung, June 13 , 1887 . 
10�cGhee to Sanford, August 18 , 23 , 1897 . 
l05McGhee to D. A .  Carpenter, October 7 , 1887 . 
106 Cullen y. Coal Creek, 693-98 . 
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The Coal Creek case was controversial , and McGhee ' s  part in it did 1 
him no credit , but this was not the sort of affair which aroused public I 
I 
outrage in the 1890 ' s . Business was conducted according to a set of 
hard rules which left plenty of room for this kind of profit-making but 
allowed little pity for the losers in financial struggles. Had Cullen 
_succeeded in getting a majority of Poplar Creek stock, he would have 
sold it at a premium to the Richmond and Danville , and little thought 
would have been given to the welfare of Poplar Creek ' s minority holders . 
l 
But Cullen lost and suffered the consequences , while McGhee succeeded 
and enjoyed the spoils. The nineteenth century held success in the 
I 
\ ' \1 \') , l  
highest regard : success was equated with competence , and incompetence � 
it was believed, went hand and hand with failure . 
Although this philosophy was often used to mask wickedness ,  it had 
a certain harsh merit to it . Incompetence was dangerous and could do as 
much, perhaps more , harm than ruthlessness . The promoters who "built" 
the railroads and towns which never came to be did incalculable harm to 
the small investors who took a few shares of stock or bought town lots .  
Idealists and confidence men alike preyed upon a public that thirsted 
for progress ,  growth, and profit . Governments and individuals sank 
millions into schemes which never materialized, and few towns failed to 
grasp the "golden opportunity" of subsidizing a railroad which ended in 
dismal failure . 
Some promoters were charlatans of the worst kind. This descrip-
tion seems to fit Colonel Albert E. Boone , whose Black Diamond line was 
characterized by Edward J .  Sanford as the "Wind Railroad. 11 107 Knox-
22) 
ville ' s  newspapers and government officials supported the Colonel en-
thusiastically until it became apparent that they bad been bilked. The 
city' s mayor, Samuel G. Heiskell , then wrote a scathing letter in reply 
to an enquiry from a mayor of a midwestern town: 
Dear Sir: Yes ,  sir-ee ,  we know the versatile and tireless 
colonel. We know him like a book .  We have been privileged 
to gaze upon him in all the splendor of a railroad builder, 
whose lines extend from Knoxville , Tenn. , to Madison, Ind . , 
and from there to the isles of the sea and ends of the earth, 
and thence in an air line , as the bird flies straight into 
the pearly gates of the New Jerusalem. Not to know the colonel 
is to have lived a void and empty life ,  to be a tree without 
fruit , a bush without the rose , "a stunned and stolid thing, 
a brother to an ox. 11 
Do we know the colonel !  He got from our local suckers 
$40 , 000 as a promoting fund to promote "the Black Diamond, "  and like John Brown' s soul our forty thousand "still goes 
marching on" ; and as for the Black Diamond, it has already 
been constructed over a circle of territory of which Knox­
ville is the center and infinity the circumference and it 
keeps on a-going. l08 
Other entrepreneurs were truly talented and well meaning but 
lacked the realism to make their fascinating dreams come true . Such a 
promoter was Alexander Alan Arthur who founded Middlesboro , Kentucky, 
and built the Knoxville , Cumberland Gap , and Louisville Railroad to his 
new city on the Tennessee-Kentucky border. Arthur, a Scottish engineer, 
visited Cumberland Gap on horseback in 1886 and became convinced that 
the area could be the hub of the New South. To him this part of the 
Cumberlands seemed the healthiest , most beautiful , and potentially the 
107see above , Chapter IV. 
108Knoxville Journal and Tribune , March 10 , 1902 . 
226 
richest place in the world. He was able to convince English investors 
of the worth of his scheme , and the American Association, Ltd.  poured 
capital into the town which he described as the future steel center of 
the United States . 109 Hungry as always for another railroad, Knoxville 
voted overwhelmingly to subscribe $22) , 000 to finance the K.  C .  G .  & L. 
The confident Arthur promised to build the l�ne within two years and 
further agreed that the subscription need not be paid until thirty days 
after a train should run over the road to Cumberland Gap . 110 The actual 
construction proceeded slowly, however, and Arthur apparently became 
desperate as his self-imposed deadline approached. Ever on the alert 
for a bargain in railroads , McGhee sensed that the K.  C .  G .  & L. was in 
trouble and asked an old friend in Knoxville , George Brown, for a re-
port . Brown' s description of the line was hair-raising : 
The road is very badly built in fact not near finished. 
There is [ sic]  several miles next to Knoxville that is only 
half graded and many miles only one half of the X ties are 
in. The bridges are on poles with one end in the bottom 
of. the River • . • . 111 
Finished or not ,  a train had to · travel over the line in order to se-
cure the city ' s subscription, and on August 22 , 1889 , the maiden 
run of the K.  C .  G .  & 1. was made . Several miles from Knoxville , 
l09Robert L. Kincaid,  The Wilderness Road (Indianapolis : The 
Bobbs-Merrill Co . , 1947) ,  312-24. 
11011Brief and Argument of J .  W. Yoe for Defendant , 11 in Knoxville 
Cumberland Gap, and Louisville Railroad Comp{lF' et al . �· Board of 
Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Knoxville N .p . : n. n. , n. d. ), 1-4. 
This bound volume , consisting of the various briefs in the case , is 
in the McClung Historical Collection. 
111 George Brown to McGhee , August 13 , 1889 . 
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while crossing Flat Creek, a trestle collapsed, and the train loaded 
· th Kn · 11 a ·  · t  · f 11 · t th · 112 w1 oxv1 e 1gn1 ar1es e 1n o e rav1ne . It was ,  as Calvin 
McClung wrote ,  "The most terrible calamity that has befallen our com-
munity in my time . " A number of prominent men were killed and others 
severely injured ; Arthur himself escaped with internal injuries and a 
damaged career� ll3, 
McGhee ' s  approach to the development boom of the eighties was 
conservative ; perhaps he felt that the spectacular success of the Coal 
Creek syndicate had been due partly to luck. Sanford wanted to go 
ahead with new plans for a town development near Knoxville in 1887 , but 
McGhee averred that "our Syndicate has done very well .and I thi� it 
best to rest easy for a time . "  To his friend ' s  repeated urgings Me-
Ghee replied :  
I fully agree with you in the views that you entertain with 
reference to the City • • •  and would like very much to see 
the enterprise undertaken and carried through. But I do not 
feel willing that our Syndicate should embark in the enter­
prise . We have as you say made a success and I do not feel 
like embarking in anything that will take the profits that we 
have already made . A capital of a million dollars would be 
required to ensure the success of a city and while I would be 
willing to put in $50 , 000 as my part of the venture , yet the 
temper and spirit here is not now favorable to the giving of 
the other $950 , 000 , I think if I would father the scheme _and 
undertake to do so I could secure the needed amount of money 
but if I did so I would have to assume the management of it 
to some extent and would have to become morally responsible 
to my friends who I would induce to go into it , this I feel 
unwilling to do . 
112Knoxville Journal, August 23 , 1889.  
ll3Kincaid, Wilderness Road , 325 . 
When you come on I will do what I can to aid your en­
devers [ sic]  to create a city • • •  but I have not pluck 
enough to do anything myself except as an aid to some one 
else . ll4 
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Without McGhee 1 s  active leadership in New York there was nothing that 
could be done and Sanford finally dropped the city scheme . 
Properly skeptical of Arthur and his visionary plans , McGhee ad-
vised Ca.J:Iiin McClung to be very careful in advancing the Scot credit at 
McClung ' s  hardware store , but he admitted to his son-in-law that "I am 
too conservative entirely to direct any active business and therefore 
you must receive all my cautions with proper allowances . 11 115 As the 
boom continued into 1889 he may have wQndered if he was being too con-
servative for he wrote to a friend : 
At one time I hooted at the idea of anyone bhilding [ rail] �oads 
in East Tennessee knowing it was p�etty rough c6untry but they 
build them all the same and I no longer consider an enterprise 
as impossible of being carried through simply b�cause it Seems 
to me to be unnecessary and expensive . ll6 
It was possibly the fear of being bypassed during the boom, as well 
as his deep commitment to developmental investments ,  that led McGhee into 
a town building enterprise. When the stock of the Lenoir Manufacturing 
Company was offered to him in the fall of 1889 he at first demurred . ll7 
This may have been a ploy to reduce the price , or it may have indicated 
a genuine reluctance to make the investment , for McGhee had no further 
nh· �cGhee to Sanford , June 10 , 1887 . 
ll5McGhee to McClung, September 7 , 1887 . 
116McGhee to W. T .  Walters , May 18 , 1889 . 
117 ' Cornelius E. Lucky to McGhee , September 19 , October 23 ; 
McGhee to Lucky, November 15 , 188�. 
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correspondence on the subject for several months . But in February, 1890 , 
he went to Tennessee , and when he returned to New York in April the 
Lenoir City project was underway. 
The property that became the town had been the estate of the 
Lenoir family for eighty years . Unwilling to divide the large planta-
tion, the Lenoirs passed it on intact from generation to generation, and 
the 2 , 700 acres bought by McGhee and his associates was , by East Tennes-
see standards , an extraordinarily large single tract of arable land. It 
was an ideal town site , located at the confluence of the Little Tennessee 
and Tennessee rivers , and twenty-five miles southwest of Knoxville on 
the main line of the East Tennessee , Virginia , and Georgia Railroad. 
Besides hundreds of acres of fertile bottom land and rolling wooded 
hills , the place included a flour mill , cotton factory, store , ware­
houses ,  shops ,  barns , and twenty- six dwellings , all valued at $157 , 000 . 118 
The Lenoir City Company was incorporated in the spring of 1890 
with most of the members of the earlier syndicate as participants .  -Mc­
�Ghee , �omas, �ice , Chapman, Moore , �sanford, and McGhee ' s  friend, Oliver 
*H. Payne , were the seven equal partners , with an eighth place left for 
T .  H. Heald of Knoxville . 119 The seven carried Heald ' s  part at first , 
and several other Knoxvillians were soon admitted as stockholders . From 
the beginning most of the actual work of the enterprise was done by an 
enthusiastic Sanford, but almost at once he was pressed by the New York 
5-29 . 
118Prospectus of � Lenoir City Comp�y (Lenoir, Tennessee [ 1890] ) ,  
1191 McClung to Leonhardt , June 4,  1892 . 
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partners to hurry the project in order to compete with the other town 
promotions . His response , in a letter to McGhee ,  indicates his sound 
approach to Lenoir City' s development : 
I am surprised that Mr. :Brice thinks that we can sell an 
imaginary city here without surveying it or can lay off a 
town upon any piece of property without having some accurate 
measurements and contour map , etc. 
I am also surprised that Mr. Moore thinks that we will 
have the only town site unsold and that he has lost faith 
in it so soon, or could expect it to be sold by this time . 
In all the other towns where I have known of, they have 
been months at the same , they have had accurate surveys made , 
lithograph maps showing all the grades and lots and spent 
thousands of dollars in advertising, getting up trains of 
Pullman cars and hauling people down, and it takes months to 
do each one of them. Harriman, :Bluffton, Cardiff, all have 
been months in making preparations for their sale , and it is 
evident to my mind , that that particular line of selling 
property and making cities has been over done , and it would 
be foolish to adopt that plan and to simply have a map of 
lots drawn from imagination and offer it for sale and attempt 
to have a sale at this time . 
I am told privately, that Cardiff, while to the outside 
world was a great success ,  yet the sales were very largely 
made to the Directors of their own Company and there is much 
dissatisfaction growing out of it . Their expense has been 
so enormous and results so unsatisfactory. In this big hurrah 
of sales now being made it has transpired of late , that a lot 
of irresponsible speculators are on hand : they bid with reck­
less freedom upon any and every thing, they get up excitement 
with the outsiders if possible , and if they can sell their 
bid to some innocent countryman or excited party over the 
future of the place at an advance over what they paid for it , 
they will do so and let the sale be consummated, but if they 
fail to do that and do not manage to swap off lots before 
they have to pay for them, they silently take the train and 
go off, leaving the immense sales made , only in the newspaper 
articles .  Now, I do not know personally about this , but I 
can see very well how it can be done , and I imagine it is done . 
The general impression that I hear on all sides and every­
where , is that Lenoir is to be a substantial improvement . In 
my opinion we cannot afford to make it any thing else. We 
cannot afford to start any thing there that will go up like 
a rocket and come down like a stick. l20 
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Clearly Sanford believed in real development rather than opportun-
istic promotion, and the way that Lenoir City Company shares were offered 
to the publio shows that his views prevailed. Half of the capital stock 
was issued to the members of the syndicate , while the remaining four 
thousand shares were sold at par. With each share bought , the purchaser 
also received a lot , so that the original property owners of Lenoir City 
were also stockholders in the company. Half of the receipts was placed 
in the company' s  treasury, and the other half was paid to the syndicate 
members to reimburse them for the purchase of the Lenoir property ;' the 
remaining land owned by the company was to be sold for commercial or 
121 industrial development . The value of the lots and stock was thus de-
pendent upon the attraction of capital investment to the town, and this 
objective occupied the attention of both Sanford and McGhee for some 
years to come . 
To show their confidence in the project the syndicate members each 
bought a lot and built a house on it . This , Sanford maintained, "will I 
give confidence to people , knowing we are putting our own money in bui�a­
ing, �hich can hardly be estimated in the public mind. "122 Within a year 
several manufacturers had located at Lenoir City, and it must have given 
Sanford pleasure to send McGhee news clippings which described the 
12� Sanford to McGhee , May S ,  1890 . 
121Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 22-26 ; "Lenoir City 
Syndicate , "  a statement bearing date of May 17 , 1892 . 
122sanford to McGhee ,  August 21 ,  1890 . The houses were built to 
rent ; none of these capitalists ever lived in Lenoir City. 
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difficulties afflicting the rival towns of Cardiff, Harriman, and Rock-
wood. "When I read articles of this kind, " he wrote ,  "I am more than 
satisfied with the course I have pursued with regard to Lenoir. 11 123 By 
avoiding "the brass band and much promising course" he had laid the 
foundation for slow but steady development . 
The growth of Lenoir City would have been more rapid had not the 
depression of the early nineties severely reduced investment and develop-
ment in the South. This , and the difficulties of the East Tennessee , 
prevented McGhee and Sanford from building a railroad from Lenoir City 
to the line of the Cincinnati Southern. 124 The difficulties of city 
building during a depression were hard on Sanford. "I  have not lost 
faith in Lenoir, " he told McGhee , "and I feel it will all work out yet ,  
although as I stated before I have had more disappointments in i t  than 
in any other business attempt in my life . 11 12.5 Nevertheless , both men 
remained committed to the enterprise , and in 1891 they increased their 
investment by buying out Calvin Brice ' s  interest . 126 They also became 
heavily involved in the Lenoir Car Company, a manufacturer of railroad 
equipment , which became the town 1 s major industry. 127 Lenoir City sur-
vived because of Sanford ' s  tireless . activity, supported by McGhee ' s  
123' Ibid. , May 26 ,  1891 .  
12�hey seriously discussed this idea in the summer of 1890 .  See 
McGhee to Sanford, August 2.5 , 1890 .  
12.5sanford to McGhee ,  November 27 , 1891 .  
126 McClung to McGhee , May 28 ,  1892 . 
127 1 Sanford to McGhee , January 19 , 1893 · 
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financial and moral influence .  The latter' s New York connections made 
the enterprise possible in the beginning ; it was McGhee who drew in the 
Northern capital to underwrite the Tennessee project . The investors , 
such as Brice and Moore , probably would have soon liquidated the company 
to cut their losses had they not trusted McGhee ,  who in turn had great 
confidence in Sanford. 
The Lenoir City Company was truly a developmental enterprise , de­
void of those unsavory features which characterized some of the two old 
friends ' joint schemes .  Ironically, it  was also one of their less 
successful ventures .  These experiences illustrate some of the realities 
of nineteenth century business life . Making money and holding on to it 
was very difficult . The fortune which McGhee accumulated sometimes 
seems to have been the product of a golden touch, but it was actually 
the result of great shrewdness and energy. His business success was 
based on his ability to seize the best opportunities for turning profits .  
He was not attracted by vulgar schemes to defraud or steal ; neither was 
he deterred by a modern sense of ethics . His code led him to be true to 
his word, to avoid illegalities , and to be kind to his friends and de­
pendents .  Beyond these strictures he and many other businessmen of his  
time felt free t o  use any opportunity t o  make money. The field of busi­
ness combat was strewn with the failures of men like Alexander Arthur 
whose talents were not equal to their ambitions . To succeed in business 
was not easy, and success at McGhee ' s  financial level required not only 
intelligence , discretion, and perseverance but a touch of ruthlessness 
as well. 
234 
With financial success came political power, which McGhee found 
a useful concomitant of wealth. After his brief career as a politician 
during the Reconstruction era, he devoted himself to business but his 
money brought an influence in public affairs . The politicians sought 
his favor ,  and some of them became his friends . Using these alliances 
and his fortune , he exercised political power to advance his personal 
and business interests .  
CHAPTER VII 
FRIEIIDS ,  ISSUES , ANTI INTERESTS : POLITICS ANTI 
\ :BUSINESS IN THE GILDED AGE 
During the years between the end of the Civil War and the late 
1890 ' s  the political life of the United States was especially dominated 
by the. nation ' s  business community. Controlling both major parties , 
wealthy business interests imposed upon the politics of the day a re-
markable sameness , a monotonous conformity of approach to many of the 
important issues of the time . Little real difference could be detected 
between the positions of Republicans and Democrats on questions affect-
ing social and economic justice , regulation of the economy, or the role 
of government in American life .  Voters or politicians who sought dif-
ferent answers to these questions were driven to the fringes of politics ,  
to third parties or quasi-political activity. Not until the election of 
1896 , when some of the "fringe" elements came into control of the Demo-
cratic party, was there a national contest which truly polarized the 
electorate and gave a clear choice between the two great parties . 1 
In the South, Tennessee , perhaps more than other states , reflected 
the national political image . Unlike the situation in the United States ,  
the Democrats were the dominant party, but the Republicans were a strong 
minority which threatened this supremacy whenever their opponents became 
; 1This general interpretation is drawn from John A. Garraty, The 
New Commonwealth, l:.§TI-1890 (New York : Harper & Row, 1968 ) and Howard W. 
Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics ,  l:.§TI-1896 (Syracuse , N. Y. : Syracuse University Press , 1969) . 
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divided. It may have been that two-party politics prevented the develop-
ment of the radical movements which in one way or another were making 
themselves felt in other Southern states in the late eighties and early 
nineties .  At any rate , neither o f  the two parties departed from the 
stance of their national counterparts , and no successful third party 
movement came into being. 2 
l .  
The politics of the Gilded Age were typified by the activities of  
Charles McGhee and his close friend, Edward Sanford. The former had 
strongly identified himself with the Democrats as early as 1870 ,  and he 
continued to be influential in the councils of his party. Sanford was 
perhaps even more prominent in Republican affairs , attending national 
party conventions and planning strategy on the state and local levels . 3 
But if the two men really differed in their approach to issues there is 
no indication of it . Their partisan roles seem to have been determined 
by tradition; McGhee was an ex-slave owner and former Confederate , while 
Sanford was Connecticut-born and had been a staunch Unionist . 
Both men believed simply in policies favorable to their intere sts , 
and as long as these policies were being carried out it mattered little 
2Folmsbee , History of Tennessee , II , 129-200. In 1890 the Farmers ' 
Alliance managed to control the Democratic state convention and nominated 
and elected John P. Buchanan, but the Buchanan administration, 1891-93 , 
did not represent a departure from the conservative policies of the past . 
3A brief biography of Edward Jackson Sanford appears in Rothrock, 
French Broad-Holston Country, 479-80. 
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which party was in power. This was especially true of McGhee who , less 
a partisan activist than his friend, was perfectly comfortable in using 
his money to further the career of a good Republican. When William Rule , 
prominent Republican and editor of the Knoxville Journal, bought out an 
uncongenial partner in his publishing company and sought new capital for 
the enterprise he approached McGhee .  "You may think me ' cheeky, "' he 
wrote ,  "in asking you to take stock in a republican paper;  but you know 
the Journal has been uniformly friendly to things in which you have been 
or are interested. This it will continue to be whether you think it 
best to take stock or not . 114 Under the circumstances , McGhee ' s  response 
to Rule ' s  "cheek" was entirely predictable , and he wrote to Sanford : 
I have a letter from our friend Rule asking me to take stock 
in his paper. Now the idea of him asking me , as good a 
democrat as I am, to take stock in a republican sheet is the 
most inconsistent and outrageous thing I ever heard of. If, 
however, you will subscribe for $1 , 000 of the stock and have 
it issued in your name I will pay for it . But I cannot so far 
compromise my position with the Great Democratic Party as to 
have my name upon the books of a republican organ. You know 
just what sort of democrat I am. Seriously, however, in doing 
the above I do not want anyone to know it . Of course I feel 
disposed to help our friend Rule , and do anything he asks me 
to ,  as he has always conducted a clean and decent republican 
paper. He is in fact a decent man anyway. I do not even 
want Cal [McClung] to know I have taken this stock ,  let it be 
a matter between you and myself. 
P. S. Upon reflection I have concluded to send the check 
for $1 , 000 herewith. Do not give this check to Rule but pass 
it to your credit and give him your check for the amount . The 
secrecy is more on Rule ' s  account than my own as you will 
readily understand. ) 
4william Rule to McGhee , January 31 , 1889 .  All manuscript cita­tions are to the McGhee Papers . 
)McGhee to Sanford , February 4, 1889 . ' 
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In order to protect this Republican' s  usefulness it was important 
that he retain a seeming partisan purity, for if Rule ' s  Republican in-
fluence were ever needed his business association with a Democrat could 
be embarrasing. McGhee found that it was in fact more satisfactory for 
this influence to be used behind the scenes.  Thus when he was support-
ing the candidacy of former Democratic Governor James D. Porter for the 
United S�ates Senate in 1886-87 , he asked Rule to talk on Porter' s be-
half to Republicans in the legislature . The Democrats controlled the 
assembly, but in the event that the party could not agree on a single 
candidate the election would be decided by the Republican members . 6 
Although the state ' s  parties were equally "safe" from the stand-
point of the wealthy businessman, the Democrats in the mid 1880 ' s  were 
divided into three major factions . 7 The states rights or ex-secessionist 
wing, led by United States Senator Isham Green Harris , was conservative 
and agrarian. Another group , sometimes called the "young Democracy, "  
composed of small farmers and restless young men ambitious for office , 
succeeded in electing thirty-six year-old Robert Love Taylor as governor 
in 1886 . Taylor was about the nearest thing to a radical which the 
Democratic party produced during this time , but his "radicalism" was 
more of style than of substance .  The third faction of Tennessee Demo-
crats were predominantly ex-Whigs who were especially identified with 
the industrial and railroad interests ; it was to this group that Porter, 
6 Rule to McGhee ,  December 21 ,  1886 . 
7This delineation of factions appears in Daniel M. Robison, Bob 
Taylor and the Agrarian Revolt in Tennessee (Chapel Hill : University 
of North Carolina Press , 1935),  14-19 . 
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a former president of the Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Rail­
S road belonged. 
Because Porter' s  political position was quite similar to Rule ' s , 
McGhee could expect the editor to lend important assistance , and Rule 
went to Nashville to work for Porter, offering "to come out squarely for 
him, even to the extent of writing editorials in my paper favoring his 
election. "9 McGhee also sent to the capital an old friend and nemo­
cratic politician, Daniel A .  Carpenter, to do what he could for Porter. 
All of these efforts failed , however, when the Democratic caucus of 
legislators selected William B. Bate as the party' s  candidate and elected 
him to the senate . 10 
Although Porter was exactly McGhee ' s  kind of Democrat , personal 
rather than political considerations had led him to support the former 
governor. McGhee ' s  son-in-law, George W. Baxter, had recently obtained 
an appointment as territorial governor of Wyoming, and Porter, who was 
assistant secretary of state in Cleveland ' s  first administration, had 
been useful in pleading Baxter' s cause . 11 Personal bonds of loyalty were 
always of primary importance to McGhee , unlike some other businessmen of 
the Gilded Age . This attitude explains his interest in the senatorial 
election, but when Porter was defeated the financier accepted it philo­
sophically, remarking to Carpenter that "Both you and I • • •  have 
8Ibid. , 18-19. 
9Rule to McGhee , December 21 , 1886 . 
10Daniel A .  Carpenter to McGhee ,  January 27 , 1887 . 
1�cGhee to William Baxter, December JO ,  1886 . 
240 
discharged the obligation we owed him and it is not our fault that he did 
12 not succeed. " 
The extreme importance of these personal ties was illustrated 
again two years later when he supported the reelection of Senator Harris.  
This old war horse of the Democrats had never been a particular friend, 
but he had recently endeared himself to McGhee at the same time that 
Harris ' opponent , James DeWitt Clinton Atkins , had earned his deep 
enmity. Atkins , a former congressman, was serving as commissioner of 
Indian affairs when McGhee asked him to help to secure Baxter ' s appoint-
ment as territorial governor of Wyoming. As McGhee explained it to his 
sister in Tennessee : 
Something like one year ago I was in Washington and thought I 
might need the influence of Senator Harris and my old school­
mate James D. Adkin [ sic] in regard to a matter. I called 
Senator Harris and stated my case to him and , notwithstanding, 
the fact that our relations had never been warm or close at all , 
he promptly told me I could command his services .  I called 
upon Adkins and was very warmly greeted by him, but as soon as 
I broached the subject , I saw from his manner that he was most 
supremely selfish and would not exert himself to do anything 
in my behalf. I ,  however, did not need the services of either. 
The action of Adkins upon that occasion releases me from any 
obligation that I might otherwise have had in forwarding his 
political aspirations and leaves me at liberty, as far as may 
be in my power, to promote the election of Harris . l3 
When McGhee made his position known to Carpenter it developed 
that he too had suffered at Atkins ' hands : 
When I made up my mind to apply for the Pension Agency you 
gave me a very strong letter to him which I delivered in 
1�cGhee to Carpenter, January 31 ,  1887 . 
l3McGhee to Margaret Niles ,  August 29 , 1888 . 
person • • • and the man almost became frantic and turned loose 
a perfect torrent of objections to him having any thing to do 
with the matter. • • • I thought he never would get done talk­
ing about it . Of course I was mortified, and I knew you would 
be if you knew how he had acted. And I made up my mind to save 
you of the mortification and never tell you any thing about his 
actions : but while in his office I made up my mind and swore 
in my heart that I would be avenged for the insult offered me . 
And when the Legislature meets I am going to Nashville and take 
a Room near him and if I can influence E£ �' I will have the 
satisfaction of letting him know the unbounded Contempt I have 
for him and if it does him no harm at all it will do me a great 
de�l of good. l4 
In perfect agreement on the course to pursue , McGhee and Carpen-
ter went to work for Harris.  This involved spending money, furnished 
by McGhee ,  to elect suitable members of the legislature , although as 
Carpenter remarked , "Experience has taught you that it is hard to find 
men that will faithfully use money for election purposes ; it is sorter 
[ sic ] like stealing from the Government or a Rail Road Co. The tempta­
tion is great and man is weak. "l.5 McGhee could not very well expect 
help from Republicans for such an avowed former rebel as Harris , but he 
called for assistance from others , such as his friend, Robert N. Hood, 
a member of the ex-Whig Democratic faction. ,Although he found it hard 
to swallow Harris ,  "who has a prejudice against men like myself who were 
in the Federal Army, " Hood promised to do anything that McGhee asked. 16 
On this occasion McGhee ' s  money and influence and Carpenter ' s 
work succeeded in helping to elect a senator. When the votes had been 
counted Carpenter reported with great satisfaction : 
l4Carpenter to McGhee ,  September 18 , 1888 . 
l)Ibid. , September 6 ,  1888 . 
16 Robert N. Hood to McGhee ,  September 13 , 1888 . 
We • • • had a Jolly time after the tlring was settled and 
with your Experience with Legislators you know what I mean 
when I say a Jolly time . While in Nashville I had a long 
talk with Senator Harris ,  he told me a good deal about men 
and things , and in the conversation your name came up . And 
I simply wish to say that should it become necessary at any 
time for you to call on the Senator for anything you can do 
so with the full assurance that you can get anything that is 
in his power to give . I enjoyed the mortification and 
humiliation of Atkins hugely. I remembered him in his 
spacious office in Washington. l7 
This election marked the beginning of a long friendship between 
McGhee and Harris ,  and though the financier sometimes solicited the 
Senator' s help in advancing the interests of those close to him, there 
is no indication that he ever asked Harris to violate his integrity in 
political matters . 18 There were a number of other politicians whose 
friendship he enjoyed and whose influence could be useful , and he took 
pleasure in aiding them with money or other support . One such friend 
was Senator Howell E. Jackson of Tennessee who was later appointed to 
the United States Supreme Court . McGhee went to a great deal of trouble 
to arrange a loan of $25 , 000 for Jackson and his brother, and finally 
ended by lending them the money himself. 19 Another friend was Repre-
sentative Joseph Wheeler, the ex-Confederate general through whose 
Alabama district the Memphis and Charleston Railroad ran. Because 
Wheeler was also a valuable political ally McGhee saw to it that the 
l7Carpenter to McGhee , January 16 , 1889 . 
18 On several occasions McGhee asked for Harris ' help in getting 
assignments for his son-in-law, Lawrence D. Tyson, then a lieutenant in 
the U. S .  Army. 
l9McGhee to William H. Jackson, June 28 ,  1888 . 
' . 
superintendent of the M. & C .  treated Wheeler' s  wishes with special 
20 respect . 
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On some occasions McGhee attempted to influence important politi-
cal decisions . He was ,  for instance, strongly opposed to the Interstate 
Commerce Act , which he condemned as "one of the crudest and most mis-
chievous measures that the unwisdom of legislators has ever undertaken 
21 to impose upon the Country. " In 1893 he spent a good deal of time 
in Washington unsuccessfully trying to get the law amended so as to per-
mit pooling by the railroads . One of the strongest advocates of this 
measure was Josiah Patterson, congressman from the Memphis district , with 
22 whom McGhee worked closely. When Patterson faced a hard contest for 
renomination he was able to count on McGhee , who asked the Memphis and 
Charleston 1 s superintendent "to bring to bear al.l possible influence 
in his favor at the approaching election. " 23 
At other times , when the issue was less important to his interests , 
his efforts were merely perfunctory. He had no desire to champion lost 
causes or to engage in political machinations for their own sake . Thus 
when he was called upon to promote a subsidy for maritime shipping he 
wrote Wheeler a letter which reveals much about his usual approach to 
politics : 
20 McGhee to R. ] .  Pegram, August 29 ,  1888 . 
21 Letterbook, August , 1886.-February, 1888 , p .  43 . 
22see , for instance , Josiah Patterson to McGhee ,  June 2 , and 
McGhee to Patterson, June 5 , 1894. 
23McGhee to Pegram, October 4, 1894. 
The President of Pacific Mail asked me to aid him with my 
friends in Congress in securing a subsidy. I said to him 
that I would not ask any of them to vote for the bill , that 
it was likely to be made a party measure . He then asked 
that I use such influence as I had to secure a hearing. I 
accordingly wrote ,  but delayed doing so until the legisla­
tion has passed beyond the point at which a hearing was 
desirable � or as it appears from your letter possible . 
The Administration seem to regard an encouragement of our 
merchant marines a measure of importance .  Whether it  is 
wise or not is a question for the future . If it is wise 
the country will get the benefit , if unwise the Republican 
party will be responsible for the error of the legislation. 
If I were a member I would let the dominant party pass all 
their pet measures (except the Force Bill) without hinder­
ance . The more unwise the measure , the more the injury 
that will result to the dominant party. 24 
2� 
While men like Sanford and McGhee held supreme influence in their re-
spective parties the latter could view politics with a comfortable 
complacency. He contributed, for instance ,  $1 , 000 to Grover Cleveland ' s 
campaign in 1888 , 25 but his true attitude was summed up in a letter to 
a son-in-law : 
As you know I have no special feeling in regard to the matter 
one way or the other, although of course I am for Cleveland , 
but still I do not consider his election is essential to good 
government and the prosperity of the country, as our interests 
will be safe no matter who is elected. 26 
All this was changed by the nomination of William Jennings Bryan 
for president , and the adoption by the Democrats of a platform which in-
corporated enough of the Populist program to frighten badly McG�ee and 
his fellows . Already he had seen the signs of what seemed to be dan-
gerous radicalism in the party; in 1894 he noted that Democrats in New 
2�cGhee to Joseph Wheeler, July 22 , 1890 . 
25Chase Bank checkbook stub , August 28 ,  1888 . 
26 McGhee to McClung, October 25 , 1888 . 
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York and Ohio were in serious trouble , but observed that "the fact is  
there are a great many Democratic congressmen that do nobody any good 
a:nyway. "27 The old order, the accepted political way, was changing, 
and McGhee was galvanized by what he viewed as the loosing of "the 
forces of mis-rule . "  To combat the new terror--"an attack on property, 
on contract , and judicial institutions 1128--he contributed money to the 
McKinley campaign, circulated propaganda , and wrote letters to those 
whom he might influence . 29 
To McGhee , prepared as he was for political revolution, the re-
sults of the election were a great relief, and almost a surprise . 
Nevertheless Tennessee and the nation had changed, and such businessmen 
as McGhee and Sanford could no longer be so certain of the good will of 
friendly politicians and subservient newspapers . Two years before the 
McKinley-Bryan contest Sanford had noted that "our connection with any 
city improvement seems to have the same effect upon the citizens here 
as a red rag does to a bull. "JO McGhee ' s  last active business venture 
was an investment in a kind of "city improvement , "  a.TJ.d though a splendid 
financial success ,  it acquainted him with this hostility and brought him 
into conflict with the new political forces at work in Tennessee . 
27McGhee to Patterson, October 22 , 1894. 
28 McGhee to McClung, July 16 , 1896 . 
29McGhee 1 s  campaign activities may be traced in Stanley J .  Folmsbee 
and Marguerite B .  Hamer (eds . ) , "The Presidential Election of 1896 as 
Reflected in the Correspondence of Charles McClung McGhee , "  East Tennes­
see Historical Society' s Publications , No . 22 (19.50 ) , 1.58-68 .  
JOSanford t o  McGhee ,  September 1.5 , 1894. 
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2 . 
The death of John Hamilton Inman in November, 1896 , made neces-
sar,y radical readjustments in the companies in which he had major stock 
holdings. For three decades the Southern-born capitalist had invested 
heavily in the enterprises of his native region. Even after the col-
lapse of his greatest venture , the Richmond Terminal, in 1893 , Inman 
retained a sizeable interest in the South' s  largest iron manufacturer ,  
the Tennessee Coal , Iron, and Railroad Company. 3l Tennessee Coal had 
its headquarters in Nashville where its long-time president , Nathaniel  
Baxter, Jr. , made his home and where he had extensive interests , 32 among 
them the Nashville Street Railway Company, which Baxter, Inman , and a 
local magnate , General William Harding Jackson, had cont rolled since 
1894. 33 Inman ' s  death was probably the occasion for the exchange of 
securities which brought McGhee into the company. John Inman ' s  partner, 
James Swann, wanted to dispose of the interest held in the name of the 
New York banking house , Inman , Swann and Company. 
Having recovered from his bad scare over the McKinley-Br,yan elec-
tion, McGhee was ready to embark on a new venture , and in November, 
1896 , he wrote Baxter that "after quite an amount of talk • • •  I have 
3lHolland Thompson,  "John Hamilton Inman , "  
American Biograp�y (20 vols .  and index; New York : 
Fuller,  "Histor,y of  Tennessee Coal , "  125-28 . 
in Dictionary of 
1928-1945) ,  IX, 484. 
32Baxter actually moved his office to Birmingham in June , 1896 , 
at the request of Tennessee Coal ' s  board of directors . Ibid. , 129-30. 
33Nashville Banner, Februar,y 9 , 1894. 
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concluded that I will buy the Swann interest at $60 , 000 or thereabouts 
and pay him the floating debt . "  McGhee observed that this would give 
him a one-third interest , equal to that of Baxter and Jackson. 34 Bax-
ter responded with a proposal that McGhee join him in buying out General 
Jackson, who appears to have been in financial straits . 35 Baxter would 
later have cause to regret his role in securing Jackson' s interest , 
but the opportunity must have looked too good to resist . On December 11 
it was announced that McGhee and Baxter had acquired a controlling in­
terest in the company. 36 McGhee received 3 , 996 shares of stock and 
$194, 700 in bonds , for which he paid a total of $18) , 209 . 63 ; but of 
this amount $64, 24) . 62 went to Inman, Swann to buy Nashville Street 
Railway' s  floating debt . Thus Inman, Swann took a loss in the securi-
ties it sold to McGhee ,  in return for which the latter assumed the un-
secured note of over $60 , 000 , representing advances made by the banking 
house to the street railroad. McGhee therefore acquired stock and bonds 
with a par value of almost $600 , 000 which actually cost him $120 , 964. 01 . 37 
Only a financier sure of ,himself and with plenty of  capital could 
have made such a lucrative deal . Nashville Street Railway had apparently 
never shown much earning power. Its large floating debt and the willing-
ness of Jackson and Inman, Swann to part with their holdings at such 
figures were telltale signs that the company' s performance had been poor 
3�cGhee to Nat Baxter, November 13 , 1896 . 
35Ibid. , November, 23 , 1896 . 
36Nashville American, December 11 , 1896 . 
37Leonhardt to McGhee ,  December 26 , 1896 ; Journal, )2 . 
and that its prospects were uncertain. For McGhee , or indeed any 
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capitalist who might have taken such an interest in it , the important ·' 
thing was to control Nashville Street Railway' s management . There was 
above all the matter of the floating debt which was certain to be paid 
only if the holder of the note had a free hand in the company' s  finan-
cial affairs . It is clear that after the purchase , McGhee , with Bax-
ter1 s assent , exercised such absolute control . 
McGhee approached the problem as he had approached similar ones .  
To provide for the floating debt and to  pay the coupons on the company' s  
bonds , he required that every spare penny be remitted to New York. 38 
By May, 1897 , something less than half of the debt to McGhee had been 
paid with interest . 39 Baxter approved this policy and urged McGhee to 
"make a clean sweep of what is left in the Treasury, anli leave them to 
scuffle for their July [ bond] interest . "  He hoped that June earnings 
would be enough to cover both operating expenses and July interest , but 
noted that "if it should not there will be no difficulty in obtaining 
an accommodation from the banks for the short term • • • •  "40 McGhee , 
however, was not such a hard taskmaster. He could afford to relax and 
wait a bit for the re�t of his money. In reply, he observed "quite a 
bit of demoralization in Nashville Street Railway securities , and it 
occurs to me that it would be well to let them accumulate their July 
38McGhee to Leonhardt , January 2 , 1897 ; T .  M. Steger to McGhee , 
February 13 , 20 , and 27 , 1897 . 
39Leonhardt to McGhee ,  May 10 , 1897 . 
4°Nat Baxter to McGhee ,  May 17 , 1897 . 
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interest before making any further payments .  After doing that , "  
he said, "they can pay me my unsecured debt , and then can arrange to 
accumulate their January interest . "4l 
After six months ' experience with the property McGhee expressed 
himself as "delighted" with its earnings . 42 It was a good time to be 
in the street car business in Nashville . The Tennessee Centennial Expo-
sition opened in May, 1897 , and the railway was busy carrying throngs to 
visit the Exposition grounds during the summer and into the fall as the 
Exposition was held open until November. Typically, McGhee was guardedly 
optimistic about the road ' s  future , but he kept in close contact with 
the company' s  president , Thomas M. Steger, a Nashville lawyer, and with 
its general manager, E. C .  Connette.  Both officiers frequently consulted 
McGhee about details of operations , such as the desirability of using 
bumpers on the cars and the issuance of free passes . Likewise , the mana-
gers were expected to justify their expenditures to McGhee ' s  satisfac­
tion. 43 
It was perhaps well that McGhee maintained such close scrutiny of 
the company, for Nat Baxter proved to be a less than perfect partner. 
Baxter had little time to spare for Nashville Street Railway affairs be-
cause he needed all his energy to stay on top of Tennessee Coal . That 
company had for years been the target of Wall Street raiders , its stock 
4�cGhee to Nat Baxter, May 19, 1897 . 
42McGhee to Steger, June 2 , 1897 . 
43see , for instance ,  McGhee to Steger, July 14, August 13 , 23 , 25 and September 15 ; Steger to McGhee , July 6 , 13 , August 4, 12 18 , and 
September 1 ;  E.  C .  Connette to McGhee ,  July 16 , August 2 , 1897 . 
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gyrating wildly as a result of the speculators ' maneuvers . In 1897 Bax-
ter was already losing control to a party of New York financiers , although 
his ouster from the presidency was still a few years in the future . 44 
Much of his stock in Tennessee Coal , as well as all of his original 
Nashville Street Railway securities ,  was held as loan collateral by Inman, 
Swann. 45 As early as May, 1897 , James Swann predicted to McGhee that 
"the time is coming when we will have to close up with Baxter, either by 
selling his [Nashville Street Railway] stock to someone else or by buying 
it ourselves • •  Baxter ' s matters have been running with us so long, 
that we cannot , in justice to ourselves ,  continue much longer. "46 Me-
Ghee felt that Swann would be glad to take Baxter' s 2 , 700 shares to 
settle the latter' s  $125 , 000 debt , or that the New York banker would buy 
it outright at thirty dollars a share . 47 
Although effusively grateful to McGhee for taking the street rail­
road in hand , Baxter could not refrain from speculating in its stock . 48 
"Captain Steger says , "  wrote McGhee ' s  son-in-law, Lawrence D. Tyson, 
"that every time Mr. Baxter comes to town, he boosts the stock about a 
point , and that it is very hard to keep taxes down under such publicity. "49 
44Fuller, "History of Tennessee Coal , "  125-28 ;  Walker, Alfred 
Montgome;r Shook , 80-81 , 114-15 . 
45McGhee to Tyson, June 30 ,  1897 . 
46James Swann to McGhee , May 24, 1897 · 
47McGhee to Tyson, June 30 ,  1897 . 
48Nat Baxter to McGhee ,  June 28 ,  1897 . 
49Tyson to McGhee , October 5 ,  1897 . 
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Baxter, who was quite familiar with such practices through his Tennessee 
Coal experience , doubtless found a congenial atmosphere in Nashville for 
stock boosting. More than other Southern cities , Nashville was already 
a center for securities speculation, and the manipulation of a local 
company' s stock on this market was not unusual . 50 Still , such a prac-
tice ran counter to McGhee ' s  plans , which were to build a solid founda-
tion for the company' s  future earning capacity and to spend net profits 
on the property to keep it in a "high state of physical condition. " He 
found that Baxter wanted to pay stock dividends with the first avail-
able money. This , McGhee said , was "diametrically opposed" to his own 
views . In a New York conversation he told Baxter that "I did not want 
to be in his way, and that if he was opposed to the manner in which I 
managed the finances of the property that I would sell my stock to any-
body he might select that would take care of the property. "  Baxter 
disclaimed any desire to have McGhee sell and pled his precarious finan-
cial condition as justification. McGhee wrote Tyson that Baxter expected 
to be in better condition the following year and added that "when he 
goes back home , I hope he will cease his efforts to bolster up the price 
of the stock. 1 151 
Two months later, however, Baxter ' s money problems caused an em-
barrassing incident . When Baxter bought half of General W. H. Jackson' s  
street railway securities in December, 1896 , he apparently gave the 
50John B. McFerrin, Caldwell and Compru;y: ! Southern Financial 
Empire ( Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press ,  1939), 2 .  
5lThe conflict with Baxter i s  fully stated in McGhee ' s  letter 
to Tyson, October 7 , 1897 . 
general a twelve-month note in payment . As the date due approached ,  
Jackson advertised the stock and bonds for sale to satisfy the debt . 
A flurry of telegrams informed McGhee of this development , and Baxter 
asked him for a loan to pay Jackson, but be.fore McGhee could respond 
Baxter secured from Jackson a renewal of the note . 52 
This incident was probably the occasion referred to in an anec-
date related by J .  C .  Bradford, a nephew of James C .  Bradford, who was 
intimately associated with Nashville Street Railway: 
"Colonel" Nat Baxter, Jr. had executed a note to GEI!leral 
William H. Jackson of "Belle Meade" in connection with a 
transaction in which Mr. Baxter had purchased an interest 
in a street railway company in Birmingham, Alabama [ sic] . 
The . note came due -and Mr. Baxter ' mailed· a renewal note to 
General Jackson. The latter mailed it back , saying that 
there was no understanding as to its renewal . This meant 
of course, foreclosure on the collateral . Mr. Baxter got 
his horse and buggy and a shotgun, drove out to "Belle 
Meade , "  and went to General Jackson ' s front door with the 
renewal note and the shotgun. When the general came to the 
door, Mr. Baxter asked him if he would not renew the note .  
General Jackson immediately accepted the renewal note , got 
the old note , and delivered it to Mr. Baxter. ' Thereafter, 
in Nashville banks when a note from Mr. Baxter appeared 
it was commonly referred to as a " shotgun note . 1153 
The story may be apocryphal , but it fits the situation too well to be 
entirely discounted. Although he did not mention his shotgun, Baxter 
explained to McGhee that he had "arranged" a four-month renewal with 
Jackson. Baxter professed to have been shocked at the general ' s  initial 
intransigence until he learned that Jackson was bitter about the original 
52Tyson to McGhee , December 19 ; Steger to McGhee , December 19 ; 
Nat Baxter '.to McGhee , December 19 , 21 , 1897 . 
53William Waller (ed. ) ,  Nashville in the 1890s (Nashville : 
Vanderbilt University Press ,  1970) , 100-l .  
2.53 
sale of the securities to Baxter and McGhee. The general believed that 
Baxter had squeezed him, "and now he had the opportunity to squeeze me 
and had retaliated . ".54 
In any case , Baxter kept his interest in Nashville Street Railway, 
and McGhee found that actual control of the property could be secured 
by working through James Swann, who still held a large block of the 
Baxter stock as security • .55 By the spring of 1898 McGhee had assumed 
complete direction of the company and his son-in-law, Lawrence Tyson, 
was installed as president , replacing Thomas M. Steger. James C .  Brad-
ford became vice president and general counsel . Close management and 
more prosperous times began to make the street railway a paying in­
vestment , fully justifying McGhee ' s  gamble on its future . 56 
But if the company had by the middle of 1898 come a long way on 
the road to prosperity, its journey had not always been an easy one . 
Among the more persistent problems which faced McGhee and his associates 
was the railroad ' s  relationship with government and the general public . 
Like most municipal public transportation facilities ,  Nashville Street 
Railway was a monopoly under a charter granted by the city government . 
The company was a big business with assets which were highly visible 
on the streets of Nashville , and transactions in its securities were 
quoted in the local press. The company naturally attracted the attention 
5�at Baxter to McGhee ,  December 21 ,  1897 . 
55McGhee to Swann, December 22 , and to B .  S. Clark, December 27 , 
1897 . 
56McGhee to Tyson, June 1 ,  to Bradford, June 21 ,  and to Nat 
Baxter, August 19 , 1898 . 
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of tax collectors, and it was rmderstandably resented by some of its 
farepaying patrons . With a large stake in mrmicipal government , some 
of the company' s employees became involved in local politics . General 
Manager E. C .  Connette was active in the Democratic party, and, using 
the company' s  patronage to expand his influence ,  he built something of  
a political machine and became president of  the city' s board of  educa­
tion. 57 While he never shrank from using political power to accomplish 
desired ends , McGhee disapproved of Connette 1 s  occupying such an obvi-
ous public position, but he was rmwilling to have his general manager 
driven from office by critics who were beginning to attack not only 
Connette but Nashville Street Railway as well . 58 
"There is a daily newspaper here called 1 The Srm, 1 "  wrote T .  M. 
Steger, "which has promoted and urged these attacks , and if it continues 
rmder its present management , it has other troubles in store for us . 1159 
In fact ,  by July, 1897 , when the president reported thus to McGhee ,  the 
Nashville Daily Srm had made the Nashville Street Railway Company one of 
the chief objects of its war on "the corporations , the monopolies and 
60 the trusts . " From its inception in December, 1895 , the Srm had pro-
claimed its readiness "to arraign at the bar of public opinion individuals ,  
.57McGhee wrote Connette that "your political strength i s  largely 
due to the fact that you have had the patronage of the Company at your 
disposal--without the Company you would find yourself sadly shorn of 
power, " McGhee to Connette , July 27 , 1899 . 
58McGhee to Steger, July 12 , 1897 • 
.59steger to McGhee , July 6 , 1897 . 
60Nashville Daily Sun, December 19 , 1895 . 
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corporations , and public officials who invade or attempt to invade or 
61 disregard the rights of the people . "  Founded especially to advance 
the doctrine of free silver, the Sun became the Nashville voice of left 
wing Tennessee Democrats and Populists ,  as well as a Bryan campaign 
organ in the election of 1896 . After Bryan' s  defeat , it focused attacks 
on the Louisville and Nashville and the Nashville , Chattanooga, and 
Saint Louis railroads , blaming these corporations for opposing Bryan 
and for generally oppressing labor and the citizenry of Nashville . 62 
In the spring of 1897 the newspaper began to assail several local pub-
lie service corporations for a variety of offenses . Typical of these 
attacks was an editorial directed at Nashville Street Railway and 
entitled "Corporation Tyranny" : 
Nashville,has come to look with great susp1.c1.on upon certain 
local corporations operating under grants from the people 
and growing fat by exactions from the people . 
Take , for instance , our local street car company. There 
are a great many people who believe that it should pay more 
taxes .  There are many who believe it should give some quid 
pro quo , owning as it does by grant of the city the right 
of way through streets and thoroughfares .  There are those 
who insist that it should not be allowed to gobble up streets 
at its pleasure, or for its profit , and stop the running of 
cars on certain lines because the same may not be so profit­
able as others . 
There are thousands who are of the opinion that this 
company should get out and stay out of politics and leave 
our Board of Education and our City Council severely alone . 
All of these matters are going to be looked into,  and The 
Sun gives its warning in due time . This is not a healthy 
62rbid. , November 8 ,  13 , 1896 . 
year for such methods as are unquestionably being complained 
of. There is a growing sentiment that these corporations 
are not so powerful that the people cannot take them in hand. 
The Louisville and Nashville Railroad dwelt in false security 
when it .imagined that the fight made by The .Sun for a Rail-
road Commission would be a losing one . Let the Nashville Street 
Railway Company profit by the example of the Louisville and 
Nashville . There are new councils to be elected, and those 
who win will have to secure the support of the people . That 
support will be terribly slow in coming once those same people 
are aroused to a proper sense of their duty. Corruption can­
not long thrive , tyranny has but temporary life , and the 
right is sure to be eventually done . 03 
2.56 
Taxes proved to be the most effective stick with which to beat 
the corporations , and the Sun campaigned to raise the assessments of 
the street railway, gas ,  telephone , and electric companies . 64 After 
several weeks of editorial bombardment , the newspaper was able to claim 
a victory when the Board of Assessors announced a general rise in cor­
poration assessments . 6.5 Nashville Street Railway' s taxable assets were 
raised by the city from $710 , 000 to $860 , 000 ; the county assessment was 
raised to $1 , 000 , 000 . Although the � thought the assessment should be 
$1 , 800 , 000 , it was jubilant over the increases and promised that "we are 
not through with you yet , Mr. Street Railway. 1166 
The Sun' s attacks , while bothersome , did not at first seem of much 
importance to McGhee .  When apprised o f  them, he was not inclined to 
give the matter much attention. "I can give you no views in regard to 
the newspaper, " he wrote Steger, "as it is a subject that I do not 
63Ibid. , May Jl ,  1897 · 
64Ibid . , June l ,  2,  3 , 4, 6 , 7 ,  10 , 18 , 20 , 1897 . 
6.5Ibid. , July 2 ,  1897 · 66Ibid .  
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understand, and I must leave it to you and Mr. Tyson. "67 Probably he was 
reluctant to spend money to stop the Sun, and he was too concerned with 
the larger financial affairs of the company to notice the clamor of a 
scurrilous Nashville newspaper. McGhee ' s  Tennessee associates would 
have to handle the situation as best they could. At first it seemed 
possible that the Sun' s  victims might buy out their antagonist . Dis-
sension among the paper' s owners had become bitter as two factions 
fought for control , and so William Morrow, one of the original stock-
holders , approached Steger for help . The street railway executive or-
ganized a syndicate composed of his company, the gas and electric com-
panies , and the 1. & N. Railroad to furnish the money for Morrow to gain 
68 control of the Sun. Other political or business interests must have 
sought to secure the paper, however, because Steger decided that the 
bid should be withdrawn when the price was driven up . 69 Having failed 
in the attempt to buy it , Steger hoped the paper would go into receiver-
ship , but , although beset by creditors , it continued to publish attacks 
on the street railway and other corporations . 70 
Perhaps it was an affront of a more personal nature which stung 
McGhee into striking back. In an editorial entitled "Quasi Public 
67McGhee to Steger, July 15 , 1897 . 
68 Steger to McGhee , August 4,  1897 . Dr. William Morrow, a promi-nent Nashville capitalist , was originally from East Tennessee . He made 
a fortune in the manufacturing .firm known as Cherry, Morrow and Company 
and in the leasing of convict labor from the state penitentiary. He was 
state treasurer of Tennessee , 1871-75 . Waller, Nashville in the 1890s , 79 . 
69steger to McGhee , August 12 , 1897 . 
7°steger to McGhee , August 18 ; Tyson to McGhee , October 5 , 1897 . 
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Corporations , "  the Sun for the first time concentrated its fire on the 
man who controlled Nashville Street Railway: 
The submissiveness of the American people comes not so much 
• from patience as from the circumstance that these wrongs 
are not directly inflicted by an individual , but through an 
impersonal entity, the corporation. 
Of course , there is an individual or several individuals 
behind the corporation. • 
Take , for instance , the street railway company, which, 
while it benefits ,  perhaps to the extent of $1)0 , 000 from 
the Centennial , yet it is a daily and constant source of 
danger and annoyance to our people and to strangers who 
visit the city. 
If the people of Nashville realized exactly that it is 
Col. Charles McGhee of Knoxville , who owns the monopoly of 
the use of the streets for street car transportation, they 
would look upon the concern as an impersonal corporation. 
Colonel McGhee is a worthy gentleman and an excellent 
citizen of Knoxville . His chief and probably only interest 
in Nashville is entirely confined to knowing how much his 
exclusive right to tax the people of this city will add 
to his yearly income . 7l 
Early in November McGhee went to Tennessee .  The reasons for his 
visit to his native state may have been varied , but certainly the problem 
of the Sun was one of them. On November 10 , he wrote A .  B .  Andrews , the 
Southern Railway' s  vice president : "The news-paper deal was closed a 
few days since , and under the agreement I paid $12)0 . 00 on your account , 
in addition to $12)0 on my own account . Please remit check at your 
earliest convenience for $12)0 . 00 . "72 Four days previously the paper 
had revealed that E .  T. Noel ,  W. W. Page , and David Crutchfield had 
sold their interest in the paper to Wharton Allen, the Sun' s  business 
71sun, October 17 , 1897 . 
7�cGhee to A .  B.  Andrews , November 10 , 1897 . 
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manager. 73 The paper' s  staff and policies would remain the same it was 
announced, but five weeks later the Sun abruptly ceased publication. 74 
From McGhee ' s  correspondence it is possible to reconstruct the 
stor,y of the demise of this radical journal. When he went to Tennessee , 
McGhee arranged for the cooperative purchase of the Sun by his street 
railroad , the Southern Railway, and probably a number of other corpor-
ations . Once the paper was bought by a "dummy, u  Wharton Allen, its 
control was entrusted to J. C .  Bradford , vice president of Nashville 
Street Railway. 75 No abrupt change in editorial policy occurred, but 
references to specific individuals or corporations disappeared. The Sun 
continued to pursue a generally reformist line , calling occasionally 
for the assessment of franchises and attacking the issuance of free 
passes by railroads to public officials . 76 Thus the new owners averted 
suspicion. "We have been able to mystify people completely about the 
ownership of the paper, " wrote Bradford , "and no one knows who are the 
real parties .  It  has been whispered on the streets that the gas and 
street railroad companies controlled it ; and again it has been said Bob 
Taylor ' s friends controlled it . " 77 So well was the secret kept that 
Jacob M. Dickinson, the local attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad, 
one of the participating owners , did not know of his company' s  involve-
ment . Suspecting that the street railway controlled the Sun, he 
73sun, November 6 , 1897 . 74Ibid. , December 17 , 1897 . 
75J .  C .  Bradford to McGhee , December 17 , 1897 . 
76sun, November 12 , 17 , December l ,  3 , 4 , 1897 . 
77Bradford to McGhee ,  December 17 , 1897 . 
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threatened to complain to McGhee about an editorial which criticized the 
railroads ' opposition to the state railroad commission. 78 Dickinson 
need not have worried, for the paper ' s new owners had decided that it 
must die , and soon after its second birthday, they ended the Sun' s  cru-
sading career. Ironically, Nashville Street Railway continued to have 
occasional troubles with the press.  The Nashville Daily American, organ 
of the Nashville , Chattanooga, and Saint Louis Railroad,  took an antago-
nistic position in the summer of 1898 , and McGhee complained to Bradford : 
I have been surprised at the course of the "American" in re­
gard to the matter. In order to get the "Sun" out of the way 
and stop its abuse of Maj . [ John W. ] Thomas and ourselves we 
contributed $.1500. [ sic ] to the purchase of the "Sun" and we had a right to believe that the "American" would be friendly 
to us . It seems to me that [Mayor E. C . ] Lewis and Thomas 
have treated us badly in the matter. 79 
Differences with the American, however, could not seriously dis-
comfort McGhee as Nashville Street Railway seemed to go from strength to 
strength. In the summer of 1898 its debt was lower than at any time 
since he had bought into the company, and earnings for the first quarter 
of fiscal 1898 were almost $12 , 000 above operating expenses and interest . 80 
Early in 1899 he and his associates decided to sell out to a syndicate 
led by Hambleton and Company, a Baltimore firm which owned other street 
railroads around the country. 81 Besides Nashville Street Railway, Hambae-
ton bought Cumberland Electric Light and Power Company, and Citizens 
1899 . 
78Ibid. , ;  Sun, December 12 , 1897 . 
79McGhee to Bradford , August 25 , 1898 .  
80Ibid. , ;  McGhee to Nat Baxter, August 18 , 1898 .  
8�cGhee t o  Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Company, February 11 , 
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Rapid Transit Company, thus consolidating all of the city' s street car 
and electric power interests .  These purchases were underwritten by 
the Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Company which expended $1 , 697 , 709 . 81 
in buying the securities of the various companies .  McGhee sold his 
stock at fifty dollars per share and received a bonus of $40 , 000 , which 
brought his total receipts to $240 , 000 , or roughly twice his original 
cash investment in Nashville Street Railway. 82 Not included in the sale 
were bonds with a face value of $194 , 700 which he retained. He also 
participated in the syndicate which consolidated these electric and 
transportation properties into a new company called Nashville Railway, 
but by the beginning of 1900 McGhee had to all intents retired from the 
active management of the Nashville street car business . 83 
In smoothing the way for the new Nashville Railway Company, Me-
Ghee played the role of elder statesman which had become typical of his 
later years . He was able , for instance , to instruct the new Yankee mana-
gers in some of the finer nuances of doing business in the South. When 
the city ordinance which was necessary for the consolidation of the 
companies encountered the opposition of some Nashville politicians , Me-
Ghee wrote a long letter of advice to T .  Edward Hambleton, president of  
the new company : 
82Ibid. ; Commercial and Financial Chronicle , April 15 , 1899 . 
83"0riginal Syndicate Agreement , "  April 6 , 1899 . Nashville Rail.:.. 
way soon suffered bankruptcy, probably as a result of its rapid expan­
sion. The company was reorganized in 1901 under the leadership of a 
Nashville businessman, Percy Warner. Commercial and Financial Chronicle , 
August 24, 1901 . 
-
From Baxter' s letter, a copy of which I sent you, aad from my 
conversation with Judge [ J .  C . ] Bradford, it seems that the 
power most potent against favorable action by the Mayor [ of 
Nashville] is the influence of Judge Malone , president of the 
Gas Company. This being the case , it occurs to me that you 
should authorize your representatives ,  Judge Bradford and [Major 
E. C . ] Lewis ,  to assure Judge Malone in the most positive terms 
that it is not your intention to attempt to operate opposition 
gas works . You know, of course ,  better than I do the impor­
tance to your syndicate of the passage of the consolidation 
ordinance .  In my judgment the acquisition of the gas works 
is a matter of no importance whatever as compared with the 
consolidation ordinance .  Please telegraph me on receipt of 
this letter and let me know whether you will give such authority 
to Judge Bradford and your representative in Nashville . If your 
answer is in the affi�tive , I think I can send some telegrams 
to Nashville that will be of great service to you, as my rela­
tions with Judge Malone and the Mayor are most cordial . Judge 
Malone and the Mayor were in the same regiment and in the same 
company during the war of the Rebellion, and the Mayor will 
not ,  in my judgment , do any act that will materially affect 
the interests of Judge Malone . 84 
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The Nashville Street Railway experience conformed to the pattern 
which McGhee followed--or attempted to follow--in numerous business in-
vestments .  His formula was to buy at a bargain and to  consolidate his 
control of the company' s  management , especially of its financial policy. 
Acting directly, or through trusted associates and subordinates , he 
would pursue a conservative program, eschewing short term profits and 
dividends , improving the company' s physical plant and protecting its 
securities from other speculators . He never hesitated to make unsecured 
advances to a company at reasonable interest rates--a safe investment if 
he in fact controlled the company' s  management . When the company was in 
sound condition McGhee could buy or retain its bonds , secure in the 
knowledge that the coupons would be paid. If, as in the case of 
8�cGhee to T. Edward Hambleton, September 4, 1899 . 
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Nashville Street Railway, he could sell out his st�ck at a �;rge profit , 
he would do so because he was essentially an investor with speculative 
instincts rather than an entrepreneurial developer or empire builder. , 
In this way he was different from the promoters , traction magnates , or 
Wall Street raiders who were his contemporaries .  His insistence upon 
" sound" or conservative business principles in the operation of the 
companies which he controlled set him apart from the ambitious , imagin­
ative "spinners of dreams" as well as from the unprincipled "sharks" of 
Wall Street . Neither did he seek to dominate any particular industry 
or territory. In business his goal was profit , and his pursuit of 
profit was characterized by shrewdness ,  perseverance , and the applica­
tion of what he considered to be sound business principles .  If McGhee ' s  
methods and his objective prevented him from being an entrepreneurial 
innovator or a charismatic captain of industry, they also saved him 
from the stigma of being a ruthless "robber baron. " 
CHAPTER VIII 
LEGACIES OF A FINANCIER 
The active business career of Charles McGhee ended during the 
last years of the nineteenth century, and although he lived until 1907 , 
his time was spent not on Wall Street but with his family in Knoxville 
and at various resorts .  In a real sense all the accumulation of money 
had probably been for the benefit of his wife , his daughters , and their 
husbands and children, and indirectly for the multitude of others who 
claimed kinship with thim. It was a fortune which, if not equal to the 
demands of all of his kith and kin, was sufficient to support a dynasty 
of wealth that consisted of his immediate family and their descendants .  
Unfortunately McGhee ' s  papers do not contain complete statements 
of his assets and liabilities ,  but his extensive financial records are 
enough to give some indication of his wealth. In 1888 a list of his 
securities showed stocks , bonds , and other negotiable commercial paper 
with a par value of almost $3, 000 , 000 . 1 Much of this amount was in 
bonds which had a value near or even above par, but the stock was prob-
ably worth far below par, and it is not possible to determine the market 
value of many of the items on the list . Nor is there a listing at the 
time of his real estate holdings , the personal and unsecured company 
notes that he held, or his liabilities .  At various times these items 
involved large amounts .  
1 Letterbook , 1888- 1889,  p .  24. The list is reproduced in the 




He owned a number of business buildings in Knoxville , for instance , 
and in 1895 his rental property was valued at $312 , 688 . 46 . 2 In 1892 he 
held forty personal notes with a combined value of more than $20 , 000 , 3 
but these did not include special loans to relatives or important friends 
such as Senator John B. Gordon of Georgia who owed him $5 , 000 throughout 
the decade . 4 Although McGhee himself often owed a large amount , this 
was usually in the form of a single loan from a New York bank. 5 During 
1895 he filed a return for the federal income tax which was later ruled 
unconstitutional . On this statement he declared an income of $70 , 266 . 66 
in 1894, of which $13 , 200 was salary from the East Tennessee Railroad 
and the Western Union Beef Company. 6 During that same year he made 
$21 , 716 . 38 in speculation and lost $4, 141 . 50.  The bulk of the rest of 
his income came from interest and dividends . McGhee listed as deduc-
tions $6 , 716 . 16 paid out in interest and $5 , 627 . 34, the amount of local 
taxes paid. 7 He thus had an annual disposable income of about $58 , 000 
at a time when the national per capita income was under $357 . 8 
Withal , he did not consume lavishly but spent conservatively and 
lived in comfort . In New York he stayed at the Murray Hill or Plaza 
1898 . 
2Ledger, 48 .  
3Letterbook, 1892-1894, p .  267 . 
4Gordon to McGhee , August 16 , 1892 ; McGhee to Gordon, October 10 , 
5McGhee to F. P. Olcott , May 17 , 1889 . 
6Leonhardt to McGhee , February 13 , 1895 . 
8Kirkland , Industry Comes of Age , 401 . 
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9 hotels where a typical weekly bill was $197 . 25 . He ·belonged to the New, 
Manhattan, and New York clubs , as well as the New York Southern Society, 
and he bought steadily from Park and Tilford Co .  which supplied him with 
liquors and cigars . 10 Although he was naturally generous with himself, 
friends , and family, he paid close attention to details and hated to be 
cheated, as a letter to his tailors illustrates : 
Your bill has been received but before paying it , I must in­
sist that you make my last pair of trousers fit me . I returned 
them once but they are still too long. I also have a pair of 
blue serge pants that you made for me last summer which I have 
not worne [ sic] until now and I find them a misfit also , being 
to [ sic ] long, and not seeming to fit anyway. 
It is too much trouble for me to run back and forth to get 
my cloths [ sic] to fit and also pay you whatever you may see 
fit to charge . I shall therefore not pay the bill until your 
work is satisfactory. ll 
McGhee ' s  warmest and most tender feelings were reserved for his 
daughters , and he certainly must have agreed with Sanford who wrote him 
that " I  think we can both safely feel that it is not for ourselves that 
we are working. With the start we will be able to give our children, if 
they can ' t take care of themselves ,  they could not keep what we give them 
no matter how much it might be . 11 12 Still it was hard for him not to 
worry about them, especially after the death of his daughter, May Lawson, 
who married David Shelby Williams and died after childbirth in 1883 . 
1887 . 
9Receipt from Plaza Hotel , October 2 , 1899 . 
10 See , for instance , receipt from Park and Tilford ,  August 8 ,  
1�cGhee to Lea�ens & Thompson, July 5 , 1887 . 
12 Sanford to McGhee , December 5 , 1890 .  
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This tragedy, made more heartbreaking by the death a few months later 
of her baby, was an agonizing reminder to McGhee of the loss of his 
first wife and their son many years before . 13 Often he was in New York 
while his family was in Knoxville or elsewhere , and on such occasions 
he fretted, as in a letter to his son-in-law, Calvin McClung: 
It was necessary for the family to go to Tennessee and this 
has brought about a separation that is very distastful [ sic] 
to me as I find myself tied here by business connections al­
though I am continuall [ sic] trying to arrange matters so I 
can run down and see them. It does seem to bad that Nellie ' s  
frealth should be so delicate and for poor Annie to be such a 
sufferer. Nellie ' s  health and the wory [ sic] of the present 
financial situation has left me in no comfortable frame of 
mind but still I feel that I am in the line of duty, which 
is one of the greatest comforts one finds in life . 
I find myself in about as much worry about Nellie as I was 
when she was sick last winter. She is my baby. l4 
Despite the tragedies and anxieties he was fortunate that each 
of his daughters was apparently happily married to a man of means and 
promise . Margaret ,  the eldest , married George White Baxter, sometime 
territorial govern�� of Wyoming and an official of the Western Union 
Beef .Company. 15 After McGhee ' s  wife , Cornelia, died in 1903 the Baxters 
returned from the West to Knoxville and made their home at McGhee ' s  
Locust Street mansion. 16 Next door to this house lived Calvin McClung 
1�aClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 . 
1�cGhee to McClung, August 16 , l887 . McGhee ' s  youngest daughter, 
Eleanor, married James Columbus Neely, Jr. , of Memphis .  She died in 
1964 at the age of ninety-one . Knoxville News-Sentinel ,  April 17 , 1964. 
15 ' McClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 . 
161Ei£. ;  Knoxville City Directory, 1905 , p .  133 . 
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and his wife Annie , McGhee ' s  third daughter, who died suddenly in 1898 . 17 
The relationship between McGhee and t'his son-in-law was especially close , 
and for years McClung managed McGhee ' s  property in Knoxville , as well as 
running a highly successful wholesale hardware business .  Since McClung 
was interested in history and book collecting his father-in-law took 
pleasure in finding rare volumes for him in New York. 18 He showed his 
regard for McClung in an even more important way when he wrote him that 
"You have husban[ d] ed and taken care of the money which I have heretofore 
given Annie �n a satisfactory manner and I herewith enclose your notes 
for $20, 000 . • • . ,, l9 
Much of his money and his influence with politicians were used to 
advance his sons-in-law, particularly Lawrence n .  Tyson, who married Mc­
Ghee ' s  daughter Bettie in 1886 . 20 On several occasions he used his con-
nections to help Tyson ' s career, and it was probably a result of McGhee ' s  
efforts that the young West Point graduate was assigned as professor of 
military science and tactics at The University of Tennessee in 1891 . 21 
While at this post Tyson studied law, resigning from the army in 1895 to 
join the Knoxville law firm of Lucky and Sanford. 22 Prior to serving at 
the University, however, Tyson considered becoming a merchant , and McGhee 
l7McClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 . 
18McClung to McGhee , April 20 , 1889 . 
l9McGhee to McClung, July 2 , 1889 . 
20 McClung, McClung Genealogy, 37 . 
21see , for instance , McGhee to James D. Porter, August 2 , 1887 . 
22 Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 498 . 
agreed to invest $)0 , 000 in the mercantile business of Daniel Briscoe 
and Company so that his son-in-law could become a partner. 23 Tyson later 
repaid McGhee ' s  interest with a number of military, financial , and pol1ti-
cal successes .  He volunteered for service in the Spanish-American War 
and World War I and achieved the rank of brigadier general during the 
latter. Between the wars he was active in some of the Knoxville companies 
in which McGhee was interested, and in 1924 was elected a United States 
senator from Tennessee . 24 
It was both natural and easy for McGhee to be generous to his own 
daughters and their husbands ,  but his assistance to his many less success-
ful relatives and friends is a further demonstration of his devotion to 
the mores and principles of the time in which he grew to manhood. The bond 
of kinship was so important that he seemed never to be able to refuse at 
least the first appeal from anyone who had such a cla� �pon him and who 
really needed his help . Over a period of at least fifteen years he. gave 
and lent money to his brother Barclay ' s son, John B .  McGhee ,  and was some-
times irritated by his nephew' s  inability to do without this aid. Usually 
he gave John perfunctory advice , as when he wrote , "Enclosed I send you 
check for $300 . 00 .  Please sign the enclosed note and return to me . The 
only suggestion I have to make is greater economy and more energy. "25 
Occasionally, however, he became angry and poured out his exasperation : 
2�cGhee to McClung, May 1) , 1889 .  In the end Briscoe made other 
arrangements and Tyson did not become a partner. 
24aothrock ,  French Broad-Holston Count;Y, 498-99.  
25McGhee to John B. McGhee ,  November 3 ,  1894. 
I have tried to make you a successful business man, and would 
have been willing to aid you further if I could see any hope 
of you becoming self sustaining. You have in some way run 
behind several hundred dollars each year, and if it continues 
the end is not difficult to predict , nor would any aid I could 
give you avert it . Contrary to my advice you have kept a little 
store where you and your family set [ sic] around when you should 
have been out on the farm at work. The position of [ United 
States] Commissioner pays you but little and keeps you running 
around to attend the Federal Courts .  I f  you can satisfy me that 
you will change in the management of your business affairs which 
will enable you to become self sustaining, I will lend you money 
to pay your debts ,  take a mortgage upon your entire farm. But 
if you are to continue running your little store and your Com­
missioner' s business, instead of working on your farm, I shall 
not attempt to give you any temporary relief, as it will do no 
good whatever. 
I · 11 t t t Ma. t c ·  · t ·  t ·  · J 26 w1 ry o ge ry o 1nc1nna 1 some 1me 1n une . 
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Mary was John ' s daughter, and McGhee paid for her musical educa-
tion. While he often warned her that he would "be greatly disappointed 
if you fail to cultivate and develope [ sic] your talent , "27 he wanted her 
to enjoy herself :  
I want you to have everything to make you comfortable and to 
enable you to keep yourself neat . If your companions are 
from time to time in the habit of going to places of amuse­
ment , I want you to feel at liberty to use some of the money 
for the purpose of seeing something of the theatrical world. 
You ought , however, never to go to any places of amusement 
with a young man alone . 28 
He was anxious that his relations should go to school, and he paid to 
educate John ' s children as well as those of his sister' s son, Thomas W. 
Humes .  Taking what he felt was a practical approach he advised that "A 
thoroughly good english education is about all that you can reasonably 
26Ibid. , May 29 , 1895 . 
27McGhee to Mary S .  McGhee , July 26 , 1895 . 
28Ibid. , October 18 , 1895 . 
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expect to give them and it is all that is necessary to success in life 
and a respectable situation in society. A clasical [ sic] education, "  he 
added , "I do not consider of any substantial � . 1129 
Unfortunately, neither "success in life" nor "a respectable situa-
tion in society" was achieved by John McGhee and his children. When she 
was a few weeks short of her fourteenth birthday, John 9 s daughter, Alvah, 
married Thomas C .  Howard, thus enraging her father against the Howard 
family and causing a feud to break out in 1898 when John McGhee and his 
son, Joseph, killed Thomas Howard ' s  brother, Ernest . 3° For four years 
the killings continued until in 1902 Thomas Howard was shot to death by 
John McGhee ' s  nephews , Joshua and Moultrie Jones . 3l Loyal to his kinsmen 
though revolted by their troubles ,  McGhee paid the legal expenses for the 
defense of John and Joseph McGhee in their trial for murder. 32 He kept 
in close touch with the lawyers ,  and wrote one of them at "I have felt 
very much like coming to Knoxville in order to be near at hand, but really 
the whole matter has so nauseated me that I think I shall stay away and 
rely on you • • •  to do what is necessary. n33 Repulsive though the affair 
was ,  he must have taken a certain pride in remaining loyal to the end to 
his unhappy relatives .  
29McGhee to  John B .  McGhee , June 10 , 1887 . 
3°state of Tennessee v.  John B. and Joe McGhee , Brief for Appellants 
in McClung Historical Collection. 
3�cClung, McClung Genealogy, 35-36 . 
32McGhee to McCroskey & McCroskey, June 22 , 1899 . The McGhees were 
eventually acquitted, but Joseph was murdered in 1933 . 
33McGhee to W. L. Welcker, September 12 , 1899 . 
272 
If he stood by these members of his more immediate family McGhee 
was also generous to distant cousins and old friends. When they needed 
a house to live in, medical treatment , or a loan he was glad to oblige if 
they were truly in need. 34 Yet his generosity was based on traditional 
personal relationships ,  and it does not seem that he was especially re-
sponsive to some of the larger needs of society. Thus when he made a 
"generous response" to an appeal for the Sisters of St . Mary home for 
children in Memphis it was probably because the applicant was the daughter 
of an old friend. 35 He could also adroitly turn aside requests which did 
not touch his interest or sympathy. Dr. William Morrow, a wealthy sup-
porter of Emory and Henry College , asked for a donation, and McGhee re-
plied half seriously : 
I feel a deep interest in the cause of education. Emory & 
Henry is an old institution and should be supported in the 
good work which it is doing. Feeling entire confidence in 
your earnestness , and ability to succeed in any thing to which 
you put your shoulder, I shall in he future feel no anxiety 
in regard to that time honored institution, but shall turn 
my attention to other beneficiaries that have not secured the 
interest of such an able supporter. 36 
McGhee ' s  greatest philanthropy was the public library which he gave 
to Knoxville as a memorial to his daughter, Lawson. The city' s public 
library movement had been a struggling enterprise before he decided to 
build a three-story building to house the collection of books . He selected 
a lot at the north-east corner of Gay and Vine streets in the heart of the 
34see , for instance , McGhee to Mr� . Anne Thompson, December 6 , 1888 , 
July 8 ,  29 , August 15 , 1889 , November 5 , 1895 . 
35Lizzie J .  Tate to McGhee , July 16 , 1895 . 
36McGhee to Morrow, January 29 , 1889 . 
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downtown business district as the site , for it was his intention that 
the first floor of the building should be rented for commercial purposes 
to help support the library. 37 When the cornerstone was laid in 1885 
the occasion was bailed as "the beginning of an ep�ch, n38 and when the 
building was completed at a cost of around $50 , 000, a Knoxville newspaper 
claimed that "There is not in the Southern States such an elegant build­
ing . .. 39 Having donated the building which made a true public library 
possible , McGhee was determined that the people of Knoxville should sup-
port it. In response to a request from Judge 0. P. Temple , the president 
of the board of trustees , for "$5 to 10 , 000 of books , "40 he replied that 
"with such a donation as you suggest there would be nothing left for the 
pommunity to do but enjoy the benefits ,  that would be improper, they 
should have a part to perfor.m. "4l Some years later, however, he did 
make at least one donation of $1 , 000 to Lawson McGhee Library.42 
His code owned much to the patriarchal ethos of the Old South, but 
he also believed fir.mly in the newer Social Darwinism of the late nine-
teenth century. McGhee ' s fortune had been accumulated by skill and hard 
work, and he gave no indication of believing that he did not deserve every 
penny of it . Neither did he pass judgment on the financiers and businessmen 
37Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 243 . 
38rbid. , quoting Knoxville Journal, July 25 , 1885. 
39Tribune, October 29 , 1886. 
40Temple to McGhee , May 5 ,  1887.  
4�cGhee to Temple , May 13 , 1887. 
42Leonhardt to McGhee , January 17, 1900. 
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of his era except in individual cases ,  as when he described Robert Garrett , 
president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, as 11not worthy to associate 
with the brokers of Wall Street . "43 In the last years of his life he 
must have enjoyed the knowledge that he had endowed his descendants with 
a fortune which could last for generations . 
As had become his custom, he spent the winter of 1907 in Florida, 
returning to Knoxville in late April . Shortly after his arrival he 
developed penumonia and for �o weeks he sank steadily. 44 His last 
moments were described by his son-in-law, Calvin McClung: 
On the evening of  a beautiful Spring Sunday, May 5 , 1907 , at 
ten minutes before 7 o 1 clock ,  Colonel Charles McClung McGhee 
peacefully passed away, in his bed-room on the first floor 
at the South-west corner of his old Homestead, 505 Locust 
Street , Knoxville , Tennessee , aged 79 years 3 months and 12 days . 
At his bed-side were his daugh ers , Margaret W. Baxter and 
Bettie McGhee Tyson, his sons-in-law, George W. Baxter, Calvin 
M. McClung and Lawrence D. Tyson, his old friend and physician 
Dr. John M. Boyd, Dr. R. P. Oppenheimer, and his attendant and 
nurse for some three years past , Otto Lutts. 
He was buried in Old Gray Ceme ery between his two wives 
on the afternoon of Wednesday, May 8th. 45 
43McGhee to W. T .  Walters , July 13 , 1887 . 
44Journal and Tribune , May 6 ,  1907 . 
45Calvin Morgan McClung, 11Record of Births , Marriages and Deaths 
of Members of the McClung and Related Families ,  11 unpublished manuscript 
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J .  W. Davis & Co . , 20 , 000 . 
A . M. Kidder & Co . , 35 , 000 . 
Moore & Schley, 1 , 000. 
R. T .  Wilson & Co .  181 , 000. 
Cotton Seed Oil , 80 , 000 . 
R. T .  Wilson & Co . , 
Texas Stock 530 , 000. 
R .  T .  Wilson & Co. , 
Moore & Schley, 
J .  W. Davis & Co . , 
A . M. Kidder & Co . , 
Knoxville & Ohio Bonds 
Cent . Trust Co . , 
R. T .  Wilson & Co . , 
80 , 000 . 
20 , 000. 
30 , 000 . 
300 , 000 . 
180 , 000 . 
108 , 000. 
100 , 000 . 
8 , 000 . 
E.  T .  First Pfd. , 9 , 300 . 
J .  W. Davis & Co . , 
Box 
E. T .  Consols , 256 , 000 . 
Cent . Trust Co . , 
Moore & Schley, 
Mo . Pacific , 100 , 000 . 
A . M. Kidder & Co . , 
Texas Consols , 179 , 000 . 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co . , 
A .  M. Kidder & Co . , 
J .  W. Davis & Co . , 
Mich. & Ohio Trust Rects. , 
R. T.  Wilson & Co . , 
Richmond Terminal , 100 , 000. 
200 . 
9 , 100. 
200 , 000 . 
56, 000 . 
100 , 000 . 
144, 000 . 
14, 000 . 
21 , 000. 
82 , 000. 
82 , 000 . 
Moore & Schley, 100 , 000. 
Wabash 2d Mort . , 20, 000 
A .  M. Kidder & Co . , 
Fort Worth Firsts , 50 , 000 . 
J .  W.  Davis & Co . , 
20 � 000. 
so , ooo. 
Securities in Safe and Box 
M. & 0 .  Stock ,  3 , 000 . 
Roane Iron Co .  Stock ,  87 , 800 . 
Chase Nat . Bank Stock ,  8 , 300. 
Knox. Water Co .  Stock 39 , 000 . 
11 11  11  Bonds , 10 , 000 . 
Memphis Elevator Bonds , 2 , 500 . 
Knox. & Ohio Stock 8 , 500. 
11 Fire Ins . Stock ,  10 , 000 . 
11 Woolen Mills Stock ,  20 , 000. 
E.  T .  I .  & Coal Stock, 90 , 000 . 
Citico Furnace Stock, 11 , 400. 
Mabry & Bell Ave R .R. Stk. 1 , 000. 
Crown Cotton Mill Stock, 3 , 120. 
New River Mining Co. Stock 5 , 000. 
J .  Allen Smith Stock, S, OOO. 
American Cattle Trust Stk. , 300 , 000. 
L. N. O . &T .  1st Mort Bonds , 67 , 000 . 
Do 2d 11 11  53 , 000. 
Do Incomes ,  56 , 000. 
Do Stock 27 , 800. 
Coal Creek Debnt Bonds , 35 , 000 . 
E.  T.  Extentions 90 , 000. 
Duluth So. Shore B6hds , 5 , 000 . 
Do 1st Stock, 12 , 500 . 
Do Com. \ 11 15 , 000 . 
Sundy Creek Coal Stk Pfd.  6 , 000 . 
11 11  11  11 Com. 7 , 500 . 
1 Letterbook, February, 1888-February, 1889,  p .  24, McGhee Papers . 
Numbers represent par values of securities .  
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